Nolan v. Taylor
| Decision Date | 26 November 1895 |
| Citation | 131 Mo. 224,32 S.W. 1144 |
| Parties | NOLAN et al. v. TAYLOR et al. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
2. A judgment for taxes against "Jeff M. Thompson," and a sale thereunder, is sufficient to give the purchaser title to land entered in the name of "M. Jeff Thompson."
Appeal from circuit court, Hickory county; Argus Cox, Judge.
Ejectment by T. C. Nolan and others against Dennis Taylor and another. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal. Reversed.
Rechow & Pufahl, for appellants. J. H. Childers, T. T. Loy, and Wm. O. Mead, for respondents.
The action is ejectment to recover the N. W. ¼ of section 8, township 36, range 21, in Hickory county. Petition in the usual form. By answer defendants admit the possession of Taylor as the tenant of his codefendant, W. C. Gentry. Some equities are claimed by answer, which need not be noticed. The answer contained also a general denial. On the trial plaintiffs introduced in evidence two patents of the United States to Quinces R. Nolan. This is all the information given us of these patents. It is explained in the bill of exceptions that after the trial they were lost, and could not, for that reason, be copied into the record. We assume that they purported to convey to the patentee the land in controversy. These patents were never recorded. Plaintiffs then introduced in evidence a copy of an instrument in writing purporting to be the last will of Quinces R. Nolan, and certificate of probate by the ordinary of Henry county, in the state of Georgia, under which the land in question was claimed to have been devised to plaintiffs. The instrument was dated the 22d day of July, 1875. The date of the certificate of probate was June 5, 1876. A number of objections were made to the sufficiency of the probate of this instrument to authorize its admissibility as evidence. We do not deem it necessary to consider these objections, but will assume that it was the will of the said Nolan, proved, certified, and recorded as required by our laws, and that the land in question was devised to plaintiffs. Upon this evidence of title, plaintiffs rested. To support their right to possession, defendants introduced in evidence a copy of the book of original entries, duly certified by the register of lands, on file in the office of the county clerk of said county. This book showed the following entries: . . Plaintiff then introduced a sheriff's deed to John M. Critcher under a judgment for taxes. The deed recites a judgment in favor of the collector of the county, and against Joseph A. Kelley and Jeff M. Thompson, rendered the 14th day of November, 1881. Deed was dated May 19, 1882, and was duly acknowledged and recorded. No objection was made to the form or sufficiency of the judgment or deed to convey any title Jeff M. Thompson had to the land. Defendant Gentry claimed under a deed from Critcher. Upon this evidence the court found for the plaintiffs, and defendants appealed. The only question is whether the sheriff's deed passed the title to the purchaser.
1. The revenue law, under which this sale was made, was intended to provide for enforcing the payment of taxes by a sale of the land against which they are charged. It does not provide for taking or enforcing a personal judgment against the owner of the land. The law requires the owner to be made a party, in order that he may have opportunity to defend against the charge upon the land, or to avoid a sale by payment of the taxes. At the same time it was not intended that the owner should escape taxation by withholding the evidence of his title from record. Hence it is held that the owner, within the intent and meaning of the law, and in the absence of notice...
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