Robinson v. Neil
| Decision Date | 07 January 1971 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 5887. |
| Citation | 320 F. Supp. 894 |
| Parties | Samuel Ed ROBINSON v. William S. NEIL, Warden, Tennessee State Penitentiary. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
James D. Robinson, Chattanooga, Tenn., for petitioner.
David M. Pack, Atty. Gen., Nashville, Tenn., Edward E. Davis, Dist. Atty. Gen., Chattanooga, Tenn., for respondent.
This is a proceeding upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus wherein the petitioner seeks to set aside his convictions and sentences in three cases, each entitled States of Tennessee v. Samuel Ed Robinson, being Docket Nos. 103,810, 103,811, and 103,812 in the Criminal Court for Hamilton County, Tennessee.
It appears undisputed in this case that the petitioner was tried and convicted of three offenses of assault and battery in violation of an ordinance of the City of Chattanooga, and was fined $50.00 and assessed costs upon each offense. Thereafter, on September 26, 1962, a grand jury of Hamilton County returned three indictments in the above three cases, each charging petitioner with an offense of assault with intent to commit first degree murder. The occurrences giving rise to the three indictments were the same as those giving rise to the three city charges. Upon petitioner's plea of guilty to the indictments, he received two sentences of three to ten years and one sentence of three to five years, such sentences to run consecutively. Upon July 12, 1966, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Criminal Court for Davidson County, Tennessee, upon grounds of double jeopardy. The writ was denied. Petitioner appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court, which affirmed the judgment below. Upon March 28, 1967, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee upon grounds of double jeopardy. This action was subsequently transferred to this court. By order dated May 15, 1967, this Court denied the writ. See Robinson v. Henderson, 268 F.Supp. 349 (E.D. Tenn., 1967). Basing its deciion upon Palko v. Connecticut, (1937) 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288, and the line of authority following the Palko decision, this Court concluded that the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment was not applicable to the states and that no Federal Constitutional error was alleged in the petition. Petitioner appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed this Court's denial of the writ by order dated April 10, 1968.
The instant petition again raises the double jeopardy argument. As in the prior petition filed in 1967, the petitioner's sole contention in the instant case is that he was twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense and that the convictions and sentences resulting from the second trial are therefore invalid. The petitioner relies upon the recently decided Supreme Court case of Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 90 S.Ct. 1184, 25 L. Ed.2d 435 (1970). The facts, as stated above, being undisputed, the issue before the Court is one of law.
The facts in Waller v. Florida were as follows. Joseph Waller, together with a number of other persons, removed a canvas mural from the wall inside of the City Hall in St. Petersburg, Florida. As a result of this act, Mr. Waller was found guilty in municipal court of destruction of city property and disorderly breach of the peace and was sentenced to 180 days in the county jail. Subsequently, an information was filed against Mr. Waller charging him with grand larceny. Mr. Waller was found guilty of the charge, was sentenced six months to five years, less 170 days of the 180-day sentence imposed by the municipal court. It was undisputed that the same facts gave rise to the city and state charges placed against Mr. Waller. In discussing the applicability of the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against double jeopardy as applied to the States in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), the Court specifically held as follows:
The Court concluded that the defendant's second trial based on the same facts giving rise to the municipal court trial constituted double jeopardy violative of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
The relevant factual situation in the instant case and in Waller are substantially identical. The only legal problem presented is whether the holding in Waller should be applied retroactively. The petitioner contends that it should and in support of his legal position relies upon certain footnotes in Waller v. Florida, supra, and in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). The respondent on the other hand relies upon the criteria outlined in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, and Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 89 S.Ct. 1030, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 (1969), and contends that in accordance with these criteria the decision in Waller should be applied prospectively only.
In the original memorandum filed by the Court upon September 22, 1970, this Court concluded after consideration of the relevant cases upon the double jeopardy question that:
Although there has never been a reasoned analysis by the Supreme Court on the issue of retroactivity, this Court can only conclude from the above review of the cases that Benton v. Maryland and Waller v. Florida should each be accorded fully retroactive application.
In view of this conclusion the Court provided that a judgment would enter setting aside the petitioner's convictions and sentences.
The respondent filed a timely motion to reconsider. Upon reconsideration of the original memorandum opinion and cases upon the subject and for the reasons stated in a memorandum filed upon October 27, 1970, this Court concluded:
"* * * that the retroactivity of Waller v. Florida has not been resolved by the Supreme Court and must therefore be determined on the basis of the criteria established by the Supreme Court in the cases of Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); and Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 89 S. Ct. 1030, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 (1969)."
The Court thereupon set an evidentiary hearing to afford both parties an opportunity to submit any relevant evidence in support of their respective positions. Upon November 30, 1970, the respondent submitted certain statistical information for consideration by the Court in determining the impact of a retroactive application of the Waller case. The case has been briefed and argued and is now for decision by the Court.
In embarking upon this analysis of retrospective versus prospective effect of an overruling decision certain general principles have been clearly defined by the Supreme Court. The latest detailed pronouncement of these principles is to be found in Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 89 S.Ct. 1030, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 (1969), wherein Justice Stewart observed:
Accordingly, "the accepted rule today is that in appropriate cases the Court may in the interest of justice make the rule prospective." See Linkletter v. Walker, supra. Applying the criteria outlined in the Linkletter case to the instant case, this Court must look to the history and purpose of the Waller rule; any reliance placed by the States upon the rule of law as it existed prior to Waller; and the effect on the administration of justice of a retrospective application of Waller.
In this regard the Court in Desist v. United States, supra, further outlines the relative importance of each criteria in weighing the relative merits of retroactivity.
"Foremost among these factors is the purpose to be served by the new constitutional rule * * * It is to be noted also that we have relied heavily on the factors of the extent of reliance and consequent burden on the administration of justice only when the purpose of the rule in question did not clearly favor either retroactivity or prospectivity."
The first appropriate inquiry to be undertaken is an examination of the history and purpose of the Waller rule. In this regard, the specific holding of Waller v. Florida, supra, is as follows:
The decision in the Waller case, holding that a municipal court conviction and a state court conviction of the same offense constitutes double jeopardy and is in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, is in turn based upon the prior decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23...
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Robinson v. Neil
...proceedings in this case. A history of these proceedings is set forth in a prior opinion of this Court as reported in Robinson v. Neil, 320 F.Supp. 894 (E.D. Tenn.1971), where the issue then before the Court was as to whether the Waller decision should receive retrospective application, the......
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Robinson v. Neil
...granted appellee Robinson's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and held that Waller should be applied retroactively. Robinson v. Neil, 320 F.Supp. 894 (E.D.Tenn.1971) The facts pertaining to the instant action are not complicated. In 1962, appellee was tried and convicted in the municipal......
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Robinson v. Neil
...Holding that Waller was to be accorded retrospective effect, the District Court granted the petitioner habeas corpus relief. 320 F.Supp. 894 (ED Tenn.1971). The Sixth Circuit reversed (452 F.2d 370 (1971)) and we granted certiorari to decide the retroactivity of Waller v. Florida. Robinson ......
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Douglas v. Nixon
...enable appellant to raise a double jeopardy defense to the state prosecution that he challenges in this appeal. This court's decision in Robinson, however, which also involved Tennessee law, appears to have foreclosed this argument. If the question with which the Robinson opinion was concer......