Midstate Horticultural Co v. Pennsylvania Co, 40

Citation88 L.Ed. 96,320 U.S. 356,64 S.Ct. 128
Decision Date22 November 1943
Docket NumberNo. 40,40
PartiesMIDSTATE HORTICULTURAL CO., Inc., v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Mr. Theo. J. Roche, of San Francisco, Cal., for petitioner.

Mr. John Dickinson, of Philadelphia, Pa., for respondent.

Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE delivered the opinion of the Court.

The case is here on certiorari to the Supreme Court of California. Respondent sued to recover the full amount of freight charges on twenty-one carloads of grapes shipped by petitioner over its own and connecting carriers' lines from California to stated destinations in New York and New Jersey. The ultimate question is whether the action was brought in time under Section 16(3)(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act. This provided:

All actions at law by carriers subject to this Act for recovery of their charges, or any part thereof, shall be begun within three years from the time the cause of action accrues, and not after.1

In the application presented by this record, the question turns on whether the section's limitation can be waived by express agreement made before the period ends. The agreement was made, at petitioner's request, three days before the term expired for suing on account of the first shipment. By its terms, in consideration of respondent's forbearance to sue for a specified time, petitioner undertook not to 'plead in any such suit the defense of any gen- eral or special statute of limitations.'2 Two months later, but within the extended time, petitioner finally declined to pay and respondent began this action.3

In all stages of the litigation petitioner has contended that the statute prohibits maintenance of the action, notwithstanding its agreement. Respondent has taken the contrary view as have the California District Court of Appeal, one judge dissenting (124 P.2d 902), and the California Supreme Court (21 Cal.2d 243, 131 P.2d 544). We think petitioner's position must be sustained. In short this is that the agreement is invalid as being contrary to the intent and effect of the section and the Act.

In classical statement, the question has been posed as whether the section operates, with the lapse of time, to extinguish the right which is the foundation for the claim or merely to bar the right which is the foundation for the claim or merely to bar the remedy for its enforcement;4 and in this case, consistently with the pattern, the debate has moved back to whether the cause of action is one created by the statute or one arising from the common law,5 with the attributed consequence in the one case that the bar is absolute and invariable by any act of the parties, in the other that it may be waived by contract or otherwise.6 Petitioner urges that the carrier's common law right to collect transportation charges from the shipper, which was strictly contractual, no longer exists, but has been replaced with one prescribed by the Act. This, it says, now fixes the character and dimensions of the carrier's recovery, including the time within which it may be had. Respondent however insists the Act has not superseded, but has merely modified its common law contractual right; and in this respect it asserts a distinction between cases, like this one, in which the carrier seeks the full amount of the transportation charges and others in which the suit is for only a part of them7 or in which the shipper sues the carrier to recover excess charges paid or damages for the charging of unreasonable rates.8

We do not think the decision should turn on refinements over whether the residuum of freedom to contract which the Act leaves to the parties or the quantum of restriction it imposes9 constitutes the gist of the action. Origin of the right is not per se conclusive whether the limitation of time 'extinguishes' it or 'merely bars the remedy' with the accepted alternative consequences respecting waiver. Source is merely evidentiary, with other factors, of legislative intent whether the right shall be enforceable in any event after the prescribed time, which is the ultimate question.10 The test of creation may aid when origin is clear.11 It is not conclusive when the source is hybrid, as is true of the carrier's contract, which has become a complex or resultant of the former freedom of contract and statutory restrictions. It does not follow from the survival of the common law elements, as respondent maintains, that Congress did not intend the limitation to be absolute. And this seems impliedly conceded when the debate shifts, as it has to whether the policy of interstate commerce legislation contemplates the one result or the other. This is the controlling question. Respecting it the consistent patterns of legislation followed in the Act and of judicial decision in treating problems of time limitation and related questions arising under it furnish the more persuasive indicia of Congress' intention.

Section 16 is an integral part of the Interstate Commerce Act and of the comprehensive scheme of regulation it imposes. The Act is affected throughout its provisions, with the object not merely of regulating the relations of carrier and shipper inter se, but of securing the general public interest in adequate, nondiscriminatory transportation at reasonable rates.12 Accordingly, in respect to many matters concerning which variation in accordance with the exigencies of particular circumstances might be permissible, if only the parties' private interests or equities were involved, rigid adherence to the statutory scheme and standards is required. This 'obviously may work hardship in some cases, but it embodies the policy which has been adopted by Congress in the regulation of interstate commerce in order to prevent unjust discrimination.' Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 97, 35 S.Ct. 494, 495, 59 L.Ed. 853, L.R.A.1915E, 665.

With setting in such a statute, Section 16 expresses the specific policy of the Act with reference to the assertion of stale claims. On the section's face, this policy is one of uniformity and equality of treatment, as between carrier and shipper. The section contains not one, but several limitations. All are of short duration.13 They apply to various kinds of relief allowed in relation to matters governed by the Act. These include proceedings before the Commission and in the courts, by both shippers and carriers. The several provisions are cast in uniform terms.14 Not all were brought into the section at the same time. But the legislative history shows a constant tendency toward making them uniform in time and the purpose of placing the carrier and the shipper on equal terms in this respect.15 Upon the face of the section nothing suggests that the limitations are to be given other than identical effects, except as the language specifies variations. In particular, contrary to respondent's contention, there is no indication that, in applying the section, the carrier shall be given an advantage not allowed to the shipper or one, in some instances, when the carrier is plaintiff, which it cannot enjoy in others. Rather, the section's terms, particularly in subdivision (a),16 their uniformity in all the limitations, its legislative history, and its setting in a statute designed certainly as much for the shipper's as for the carrier's benefit and in so many respects to avoid discriminatory practices and effects, all point to uniform construction of the limitations imposed. And this, we think, is the effect of the decisions which have construed them or predecessor provisions.17

With a single exception, Pennsylvania R.R. v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., D.C., 23 F.2d 499, the federal courts have not decided squarely whether an agreement such as is presented here is valid. In that suit to recover demurrage charges the court sustained and gave effect to the contract. But we think this is contrary to the general course of decision which has construed the section and predecessor limitations.

With the one exception, the decisions have fixed the pattern, in respect to a variety of issues relating to application of the limitations, that lapse of the statutory period 'not only bars the remedy, but destroys the liability.' That is true of this Court's decisions18 and those of the inferior federal courts.19 It is true of suits by shippers against carriers and of suits by carriers against shippers.20 It is true with respect to every limitation imposed by Section 16, unless that of subdivision (a) in favor of the carrier is to be excepted when its suit is for the full amount of its charges, though not when it is for only part of them.21

The purport of the decisions is that Congress intended, when the period has run, to put an end to the substantive claim and the corresponding liability. The cause of action, the very foundation for relief, is extinguished. Thus, in A. J. Phillips Co. v. Grand Trunk Western Ry., this Court held the objection to the timeliness of the shipper's suit properly was raised by demurrer, and said that 'the lapse of time * * * destroys the liability * * * whether complaint is filed with the Commission or suit is brought in a court of competent jurisdiction.' 236 U.S. 662, 667, 35 S.Ct. 444, 446, 59 L.Ed. 774. And is assigned as a reason for this view 'the requirements of uniformity which, in this, as in so many other instances, must be borne in mind in construing the commerce act,' including the carrier's obligations to adhere to the legal rate, make only lawful refunds, and refrain from discriminating among shippers 'by silence or by express waiver, to preserve to the Phillips Company a right of action which the statute required should be asserted within a fixed period.' Ibid. In United States ex rel. Louisville Cement Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 246 U.S. 638, 38 S.Ct. 408, 62 L.Ed. 914, the conception of the Phillips case was applied to proceedings before the Commission, as the Phillips opinion had forecast. The Court held that the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
147 cases
  • Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • August 28, 1962
    ...213 F.2d 284 (7th Cir.1954); The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 7 S.Ct. 140, 30 L.Ed. 358 (1886); Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 320 U.S. 356, 64 S.Ct. 128, 88 L.Ed. 96; Scott v. Railroad Retirement Board, 227 F.2d 684 (7th Cir.1955); United States v. Borin, 209 F.2d 145 (5th......
  • Bull v. Logetronics, Inc., Civ. A. No. 4196.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
    • January 5, 1971
    ...or waiver. Cf. Phillips Co. v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 236 U.S. 662, 35 S.Ct. 444, 59 L. Ed. 774; Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 320 U.S. 356, 361, 64 S.Ct. 128, 88 L.Ed. 96; Brooklyn Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704, 65 S.Ct. 895, 89 L.Ed. 1296. It follows that the patent ......
  • Kansas City, Missouri v. Federal Pacific Electric Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri
    • August 4, 1962
    ...48 L.Ed. 1067; The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 7 S.Ct. 140, 30 L.Ed. 358. Federal statutes involved: Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 320 U.S. 356, 64 S.Ct. 128, 88 L.Ed. 96; William Danzer & Co. v. Gulf & Ship Island R. R., 268 U.S. 633, 45 S.Ct. 612, 69 L.Ed. 1126; United S......
  • Jones-Booker v. U.S.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • February 27, 1998
    ...v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 426, 85 S.Ct. 1050, 13 L.Ed.2d 941 (1965) (citing Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 320 U.S. 356, 360, 64 S.Ct. 128, 88 L.Ed. 96 (1943)). "In order to determine congressional intent, [this Court] must examine the purposes and polici......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Bankruptcy - the Honorable W.h. Drake, Jr. and Christopher S. Strickland
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 50-4, June 1999
    • Invalid date
    ...has subject matter jurisdiction. See Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410 (1998); Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 320 U.S. 356, 358-59 (1943); william L. norton, Jr., norton bankruptcy law and practice Sec. 4:1 (2d ed. 1991). Because subject matter jurisdiction cannot......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT