Anderson, In re

Citation321 A.2d 516,272 Md. 85
Decision Date01 September 1974
Docket NumberNo. 8,8
PartiesIn the Matter of William ANDERSON et al. ,
CourtCourt of Appeals of Maryland

Peter S. Smith, Baltimore (Michael S. Elder, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellants.

James G. Klair, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., and Clarence W. Sharp, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Before MURPHY, C. J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE and O'DONNELL, JJ.

SMITH, Judge.

Petitions were filed at various times in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, Division for Juvenile Causes (Juvenile Court), charging that William Anderson, Michael A. Epps, Larry Smith, and Donald Brady (the juveniles) were delinquents. See Maryland Code (1957, 1973 Repl.Vol.) Art. 26, §§ 51-71 for the statute then applicable.

A 'delinquent child' was defined in § 70-1(h) as 'a child who commits a delinquent act and who requires supervision, treatment, or rehabilitation.' A 'delinquent act' was defined in § 70-1(g) as 'an act which is in violation of Article 66 1/2 of (the Maryland) Code, any other traffic violation, or an act which would be a crime if done by a person who is not a child.' 1

Pursuant to the provisions of Maryland Rule 908 e 1, testimony was presented to a master in each case. In each instance he submitted a recommendation to the judge presiding in that court that an order be entered dismissing the petition. The State's attorney, as authorized by Rule 908 e 2, filed written exceptions to the master's recommendation on behalf of the petitioner in each case. Rule 908 e 3 provides:

'In the absence of exceptions, the master's findings and recommendations shall promptly be confirmed, modified or remanded by the judge. If, within the specified time, exceptions are filed, the judge shall hear the entire matter or such specific matters as set forth in the exceptions de novo.'

The juveniles challenged the exceptions. They contended that the provision for a hearing de novo was in conflict with the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The trial judge (Hammerman, J.) made a finding favorable to them.

The State appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. In Matter of Anderson, 20 Md.App. 31, 315 A.2d 540 (1974), that court reversed the lower court and remanded the cases with directions that the petitions be heard de novo by the juvenile judge. We granted certiorari in order that we might consider the contentions of the juveniles (1) that the State had no right of appeal, (2) that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment is applicable to juvenile proceedings, and (3) that Rule 908 e 2, 'to the extent that it permits the State to except to a master's finding of non-delinquency and obtain a de novo trial, violates the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.'

I

The juveniles urge here, as they did in the Court of Special Appeals, that the State has no right of appeal. They base this contention upon their reading of Code (1957, 1973 Repl.Vol.) Art. 26, §§ 70-1(e) and 70-25, in effect at the time the orders for appeal to the Court of Special Appeals were filed in these cases. Provision is made for appeal in § 70-25. It states in pertinent part:

'An aggrieved party may appeal from any final order, judgment, or decree of the juvenile court to the Court of Special Appeals in the manner prescribed by the Maryland Rules.'

'Party' is defined in § 70-1(e) as 'a child named in a petition, or his parent, guardian or custodian.' Although not mentioned by the juveniles, reference to Chapter 432 of the Acts of 1969, completely revising the juvenile law in Maryland and providing the statutory base for § 70-1 and § 70-25, reveals that as originally introduced in the General Assembly no definition of 'party' appeared. It was introduced in the form in which it came from a special subcommittee of the Legislative Council. See 1 Legislative Council of Maryland, Report to the General Assembly of 1969, at 131-42 (1968). The present definition was added by amendment in the General Assembly.

Chapter 2 of the Acts of 1973 of the First Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly enacted new provisions of the Maryland Code dealing with courts and the judiciary, being now codified as Code (1974) Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Matters dealing with appeals were placed in Title 12 of that article. Sec. 12-301 provides, with exceptions not here pertinent, that 'a party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court.' 'Circuit court' is defined in § 12-101(d) as including the Circuit Court of Baltimore City. The appeals to the Court of Special Appeals in these cases were taken prior to the effective date of the new code. The right of appeal must be determined under the law in effect at the time of the appeals.

Chief Judge Orth pointed out for the Court of Special Appeals that in Welch v. Humphrey, 200 Md. 410, 90 A.2d 686 (1952), this Court said:

'It is true that a codification of previously enacted legislation, eliminating repealed laws and systematically arranging the laws by subject matter, becomes an official Code when adopted by the Legislature, and, since it constitutes the latest expression of the legislative will, it controls over all previous expressions on the subject, if the Legislature so provides. However, the principal function of a Code is to reorganize the statutes and state them in simpler form. Consequently any changes made in them by a Code are presumed to be for the purpose of clarity rather than change of meaning. Therefore, even a change in the phraseology of a statute by a codification thereof will not ordinarily modify the law, unless the change is so radical and material that the intention of the Legislature to modify the law appears unmistakably from the language of the Code. Welsh v. Kuntz, 196 Md. 86, 97, 75 A.2d 343, 347.' Id. at 417, 90 A.2d at 687.

Judge Orth then concluded that the State had the right to appeal from the orders dismissing the charges against the juveniles, saying:

'There being no limitation on the meaning of 'party', and the State as a party in juvenile causes not being within the exceptions designated in § 12-302, the State may appeal from a final judgment entered in a juvenile case by a circuit court. As this was the clear legislative intent in enacting § 12-301, it was the intent of Art. 26, § 70-25.' Id. at 20 Md.App. 40, 315 A.2d at 545.

We agree with the conclusion of the Court of Special Appeals that a right of appeal on the part of the State existed, but we reach our conclusion by a somewhat different route. Code (1957, 1968 Repl.Vol., 1973 Cum.Supp.) Art. 5, § 6, in effect at the time of these appeals, stated in pertinent part:

'Any party may appeal to the Court of Appeals from any final decree, or order in the nature of a final decree, entered by a court of equity unless the final decree or order is entered in a case or proceeding subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Special Appeals, in which event any party may appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from any such decree or order.'

The parties are under the impression that the equity courts when sitting as juvenile courts are exercising 'a special or limited jurisdiction' and are not acting 'according to the ordinary course of the common law' as those terms are used in Simpler v. State, Use of Boyd, 223 Md. 456 460-461, 165 A.2d 464, 466 (1960), and thus that the right of appeal can come only under § 70-25. We do not see it that way. Equity has long been concerned with infants. For instance, Barnard v. Godfrey, 157 Md. 264, 145 A. 614 (1929), concerned what is now Code (1957, 1973 Repl.Vol.) Art. 16, § 66 providing that '(t)he several equity courts of this State shall have original jurisdiction in all cases relating to the custody, guardianship, maintenance and support of legitimate and illegitimate children . . ..' Judge W. Mitchell Digges there said for the Court:

'This section in declaratory of the inherent power of courts of equity ever minors . . ..' Id. at 267, 145 A. at 615.

To like effect, see, e. g., Taylor v. Taylor, 246 Md. 616, 619, 229 A.2d 131 (1967), and Coleman v. Coleman, 228 Md. 610, 613, 180 A.2d 875 (1962). Cf. Montchester v. Honga River, 257 Md. 79, 84-85, 262 A.2d 312, 314 (1970). We there said that Art. 15, relating to bounding lands as enacted by Chapter 33 of the Acts of 1786, probably involved 'a regular exercise of the court's general jurisdiction in the ordinary course of the common law, from which an appeal would normally lie under Article 5, Section 1.'

Divorce was a subject not cognizable by our chancery courts prior to the enactment of Chapter 262 of the Acts of 1841. Rubin v. Rubin, 233 Md. 118, 124, 195 A.2d 696, 99 A.L.R.2d 256 (1963); Foote v. Foote, 190 Md. 171, 176, 57 A.2d 804 (1948); and Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 589, 87 A. 1033 (1913). Similarly, prior to enactment of Chapter 220 of the Acts of 1947, Maryland equity courts were without power, upon granting a divorce, to determine ownership of personal property of the parties and to apportion the property between them. Gebhard v. Gebhard, 253 Md. 125, 129-130, 252 A.2d 171 (1969); Brucker v. Benson, 209 Md. 247, 250-251, 121 A.2d 230 (1956); and Lopez v. Lopez, 206 Md. 509, 515-517, 112 A.2d 466 (1955). Yet, it is under Art. 5, § 6, that appeals from those actions are taken.

The view that creation of additional equity jurisdiction does not necessarily create 'a special or limited jurisdiction' is reinforced by reference to Williams v. Williams, 7 Gill 302 (1848). By Chapter 181 of the Acts of 1833 provision was made, relative to mortgages in Baltimore City, for the mortgagors to assent in each instrument to the passage of a decree for sale of the mortgaged premises and for the appointment of a trustee to make...

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