Butler v. Jones ex rel. State

• Decision Date: 10 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. 108820.,108820.
• Citation: 321 P.3d 161
• Parties: Jerry Dale BUTLER, Petitioner/Appellee, v. Justin JONES ex rel., STATE of Oklahoma ex rel., OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent/Appellant.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

321 P.3d 161

Jerry Dale BUTLER, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.Justin JONES ex rel., STATE of Oklahoma ex rel., OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 108820.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Dec. 17, 2013.

Rehearing Denied March 10, 2014.

On Appeal from the District Court of Oklahoma County; the Honorable Patricia Parrish District Judge.

¶ 0 Petitioner/Appellee, Jerry Dale Butler, pled guilty to two counts of “Sexual Abuse of a Minor Child” pursuant to 10 O.S., § 7115 and received two consecutive five-year deferred sentences. After receiving an expungement of his criminal history record he filed a Petition for Injunction to enjoin the Respondent/Appellant, Justin Jones ex rel., State of Oklahoma ex rel., Oklahoma Department of Corrections from requiring him to continue registering pursuant to the Sex Offenders Registration Act, 57 O.S., § 581 et seq. Butler alleged he had been denied equal protection of the law. The Department filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging Butler's deferred sentences and expungement were unlawful. The district court granted a permanent injunction against the Department finding Butler's case presented an unusual and narrow circumstance and he was denied equal protection of the law. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.

James Alexander Drummond, Norman, Oklahoma, for Petitioner/Appellee.

Larry Foster, II, Oklahoma Department of Corrections, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent/Appellant.

COMBS, J.

¶ 1 On June 28, 2000, Petitioner/Appellee, Jerry Dale Butler (hereinafter “Butler”) pled guilty to two counts of “Sexual Abuse of a Minor Child” pursuant to 10 O.S., § 7115 in Sequoyah County, Oklahoma and received two five-year deferred sentences which ran consecutively.¹ Sometime thereafter, Butler began registration under the Sex Offenders Registration Act, 57 O.S., § 581 et seq. (hereinafter “SORA”).² On April 1, 2010, the district court in Sequoyah County issued an order expunging Butler's plea from the record in accordance with 22 O.S., § 991c, thereby deleting all references to his name from the docket sheet, deleting the public index of the filing of the charge, and providing no information concerning the confidential file shall be revealed or released without order of a judge or district court.

¶ 2 On June 18, 2010, Butler filed a Petition for Injunction to permanently enjoin the Respondent/Appellant, Justin Jones ex rel., State of Oklahoma ex rel., Oklahoma Department of Corrections (hereinafter “Department”) from requiring him to continue registering under SORA. He argued requiring him to register violates his rights to equal protection of the laws and to due process of law “under the Constitutions of the United States, Amendments V and XIV, and of the State of Oklahoma, Art. 2, §§ 2 and 7, and Article 5, § 59.” His main and most developed argument is his equal protection challenge. He alleged 57 O.S., § 582(E) violates his right to equal protection because it treats persons with expunged records in Oklahoma differently from persons whose records were expunged in other states. Subsection E of § 582 was added in 2009 and provided:

E. The provisions of the Sex Offenders Registration Act shall not apply to any such person who has received a criminal history records expungement for a conviction in another state for a crime or attempted crime which, if committed or attempted in this state, would be a crime or an attempt to commit a crime provided for in any said laws listed in subsection A of this section.

2009 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 404, § 2 (eff.Nov.1, 2009).

Butler also asserted § 582(E) offended Article 5, § 59 of the Oklahoma Constitution which concerns special laws and he is being denied due process of the law available to persons whose criminal history records were expunged in other states. He asserted there is no legitimate state purpose for denying Oklahoma defendants in deferred sentence cases the same privilege as that accorded to citizens of Oklahoma whose criminal history records were expunged in any of the other states.

¶ 3 On July 13, 2010, the Department filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing Butler's constitutional challenges should be denied because his deferred sentence and expungement were unlawful. The Department cites to “22 O.S. § 991c (G), HB 2711, c. 6, § 5, emerg. Eff. March 20, 2000,” the law in effect when Butler pled, which provided:

G. The deferred judgment procedure described in this section shall not apply to defendants who plead guilty or nolo contendere to a sex offense. The term “sex offense” shall not include a violation of paragraph 1 of subsection A of Section 1021 of title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes.

The Department further asserted, § 582(E) rationally and legitimately excludes persons with expungements in another state because no record of the offense exists to support a requirement to register under SORA.

¶ 4 On September 9, 2010, the district court entered its order finding Butler had fully complied with his deferred sentences and his records had been fully expunged. The court found there exists no rational basis behind 57 O.S., § 582(E)'s discrimination against deferred judgments expunged in Oklahoma from those expunged in other states. The court emphasized that the amendment to 22 O.S., § 991c (G), March 20, 2000, which it determined prohibited granting a deferred judgment to a person pleading guilty to a sex offense, took effect only “three months and eight days” before Butler pled. It found:

under this cases's [sic] unusual and narrow circumstance, where the deferred sentence which may have violated § 991(c) [sic] (G) has nonetheless been served and discharged, requiring Mr. Butler now to register denies him equal protection of the law under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and under Art. 5, § 59, Oklahoma Constitution. (Emphasis added).

The district court did not address Butler's due process argument nor did it specifically address his claim 57 O.S., § 582(E) was a special law. The court granted a permanent injunction against the Department and ordered the Department to remove Butler from the SORA registry. On October 14, 2010, the Department appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 5 Issues of a statute's constitutional validity, construction and application are questions of law to be reviewed de novo. Gilbert v. Security Finance Corp. of Oklahoma, Inc., 2006 OK 58, ¶ 2, 152 P.3d 165, 171. On appeal, this Court assumes “plenary independent and non-deferential authority to reexamine a trial court's legal rulings.” Kluver v. Weatherford Hospital Auth., 1993 OK 85, ¶ 14, 859 P.2d 1081, 1084. The Department also asserts the trial court abused its discretion. The Department cites Steltzlen v. Fritz, 2006 OK 20, ¶ 20, 134 P.3d 141, 147, which found “[t]o reverse the trial court on grounds of abuse of discretion, it must be found that the trial court made clearly erroneous conclusions and judgment, against reason and judgment.”

ANALYSIS

¶ 6 On June 28, 2000, Butler pled guilty to two counts of sexual abuse of a minor child, pursuant to 10 O.S., § 7115. Effective, November 1, 1999, over eight months prior to his plea, 57 O.S., § 584(H)(2) was enacted and provided as follows:

2. On or after November 1, 1999, any person who has been convicted of a crime or an attempt to commit a crime, received a suspended sentence or any probationary term for a crime provided for in Section 7115 of Title 10 of the Oklahoma Statutes, if the offense involved sexual abuse or sexual exploitation as these terms are defined in Section 7102 of Title 10 of the Oklahoma Statutes, Section 885, 888, 1111.1, 1114 or 1123 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes shall be subject to all the registration requirements of this act and shall be designated by the Department of Corrections as an aggravated sex offender. An aggravated sex offender shall be required to register for the lifetime of the aggravated sex offender.

HB 1390, 1999 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 336, § 3 (eff. Nov.1, 1999).

This amendment required a person like Butler who received “any probationary term” for a crime provided for in 10 O.S., § 7115, to be designated an “aggravated sex offender” and register under SORA for his or her lifetime. Even if deferred sentencing of a sex offender and the subsequent expungement of the offender's criminal records were lawful, which it is not and was not, this law is clear, an aggravated sex offender must register under SORA for his or her lifetime. This law was in place prior to Butler's plea and controls his SORA registration.

¶ 7 In his Response Brief, Butler alleged his plea agreement was a contract and both sides kept their end of the bargain until he was required to register under SORA. He claimed it was a violation of due process to require him to register when his case was dismissed pursuant to a plea bargain. However, the plea agreement was not made part of the record in this case and we have no way of knowing its contents. Regardless, the plea agreement could not bargain away what the law required at the time of Butler's plea. As mentioned, over eight months prior to his plea, 57 O.S., § 584(H)(2) required “aggravated” sex offenders to register under SORA for life. This is not something that could be bargained away by a later plea agreement.

¶ 8 The district court misinterpreted the significance of the Department's citation to the March 20, 2000, version of 22 O.S., § 991c. The district court placed great weight on the misconception that this version was the one that prohibited deferred sentences from being granted to sex offenders. It then found this prohibition had only been in existence for “three months and eight days” prior to Butler's plea. It determined because of the close proximity of the amendment to Butler's plea this case presented an “unusual and narrow circumstance.”

¶ 9 The March 20, 2000, version of 22 O.S., § 991c,...