Johnson v. California

Decision Date25 February 2003
Docket NumberNo. 01-56436.,01-56436.
PartiesGarrison S. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of CALIFORNIA; James H. Gomez, Director, Department of Corrections; James Rowland, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Sara Turner, Deputy Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, argued the cause for the defendants-appellants and filed a brief; Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Paul D. Gifford, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Allen R. Crown, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, were on the brief.

Tanya Forsheit, Proskauer Rose, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, argued the cause for the plaintiff-appellee; Bert H. Deixler, Lois D. Thompson, Aaron P. Allan, Proskauer Rose, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, filed briefs.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; Consuelo B. Marshall, Chief Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-95-01192-CBM.

Before HUG, JR., BRUNETTI and O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge.

We must decide whether a prison reception center housing policy, which uses race as one factor in assigning a new inmate's initial cell mate for 60 days, violates the Equal Protection Clause.

I

Garrison Johnson is an African-American prisoner in the California Department of Corrections ("CDC"), serving his sentence for murder, robbery, and assault with a deadly weapon. On June 22, 1987, he was received at the California Institution for Men in Chino, California, and since that time has been transferred to a number of different facilities within the CDC. He has been through the inmate reception centers at Chino, Folsom, Calipatria, and is currently incarcerated at Lancaster. At each facility he was double-celled with another African-American inmate.

According to the staff testimony in the record, when an inmate arrives at a CDC institution either as a transfer from another facility or as a new inmate, he1 is initially housed in a reception center. At the reception center, the inmate goes through a classification process. The CDC evaluates the inmate's physical, mental, and emotional health. The inmate must also provide vocational and educational goals that he wants to accomplish while incarcerated. Finally, the inmate is given a battery of tests. In making its decision, the CDC reviews the inmate's history in jail and any previous commitments to determine his security needs and classification level. The CDC also looks to see if the inmate has any enemies in the prison, such as people who testified against him in the past or in his criminal case, co-defendants, or inmates with whom he may have had disputes during previous incarcerations.

To determine the double-cell housing placement at the reception center, the CDC looks at several factors including, but not limited to, gender, age, classification score, case concerns, custody concerns, mental and physical health, enemy situations, gang affiliation, background, history, custody designation, and race. Although race is only one of many factors, it is a dominant factor; according to the CDC, the chances of an inmate being assigned a cell mate of another race is "[p]retty close" to zero percent. The CDC considers race when making an initial housing assignment because, in its experience, race is very important to inmates and it plays a significant role in antisocial behavior.

Generally, inmates are listed in four general ethnic categories, black, white, Asian, and other. Within each of these categories, officials at the reception center further divide inmates, for example Japanese and Chinese inmates are generally not housed together, nor are Laotians, Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Filipinos. Also, Hispanics from Northern California and Hispanics from Southern California are not housed together because, in the administrators' experience, they tend to be at odds with one another.

Linda Schulteis, the Associate Warden at California State Prison-Lancaster, testified that if race were not considered in making this initial housing assignment, she is certain that there would be racially based conflict in the cells and in the yard. She stated, "I am therefore not willing to knowingly disregard the factors and place an inmate into jeopardy and would not compromise an inmate [sic] or group of inmates [sic] safety by taking steps that I know would result in violence and conflict." This view is unanimously seconded by other prison officials.

Although the rest of the prison is fully integrated — there is no distinction based on race as to jobs, meals, yard and recreation time, and vocational and educational assignments — according to the administrators, the confined nature of the cells makes them different from the other areas of the prison. Staff cannot see into the cells without going up to them, and inmates are capable of placing coverings over the windows so that staff cannot see in them at all. Moreover, inmates are confined to their cells for much of their day. Because of the current levels of racial violence occurring in areas where the staff can easily observe the inmates, the administrators are concerned that they would not be able to protect inmates who are confined in their cells. Thus, the administrators argue that they need 60 days to analyze each inmate on an individual basis to determine whether the inmate poses a danger to others.

After 60 days, the inmate either is assigned a cell within the current institution where he will be permanently housed or is transferred to another institution where his classification indicates that he would be more suited. If the inmate is transferred, he again goes through the initial housing screening process. If the inmate stays at the institution and has the appropriate security classification, he may be transferred to a dormitory or a single cell.

Inmates assigned to a dormitory are considered nonviolent, and, thus, inmates of all races are housed together. The CDC does not use race as a factor to determine who is assigned to a dormitory, but within each dormitory it attempts to maintain a racial balance so as to reduce the likelihood of racial violence. Single-cell housing decisions are made completely independent from race. Johnson does not allege that either of these two housing policies violate equal protection.

If the inmate remains in a double cell, the CDC's goal is for inmates to select their own cell mate, so as to maximize the inmates' compatibility and to reduce the possibility of violence. There are designated forms that both inmates must sign indicating that they would like to share a cell together. Unless there are security reasons for not granting an inmate's request to share a cell with another inmate, the CDC will usually grant these requests. Race is not a consideration in such decisions.

II

On February 24, 1995, Johnson as a pro se plaintiff filed his original complaint, alleging that the CDC's reception center housing policy violated his constitutional rights by assigning inmates' cell mates on the basis of race. In January 1998, the district court dismissed Johnson's Third Amended Complaint without leave and Johnson appealed. We reversed the district court's dismissal in part on March 21, 2000 and remanded, holding that Johnson's allegations were "sufficient to state a claim for racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Johnson v. California, 207 F.3d 650, 655 (9th Cir.2000).

On remand, Johnson was appointed counsel and granted leave to amend his complaint. He filed his Fourth Amended Complaint on July 5, 2000, seeking monetary damages. He alleged that James Gomez and James Rowland, former CDC Directors, in their individual capacities violated his constitutional rights by formulating and implementing the CDC housing policy. He also sought injunctive relief against Stephen Cambra, the current CDC director. Discovery was conducted, and both parties moved for summary judgment on the equal protection claims. Both were denied. The district court denied the administrators' summary judgment motion because the court concluded that there was a question of material fact regarding what happens to double-celled inmates following the 60 days in the initial reception center.2

The district court also denied the administrators' qualified immunity-based motion for summary judgment. After the Supreme Court issued its decision in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), however, Rowland and Gomez successfully moved for reconsideration of the denial of summary judgment. This time, the district court granted the motion, holding that under Saucier the former administrators were entitled to qualified immunity because their actions were not clearly unconstitutional. Johnson now appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment for the administrators.

III

The Supreme Court in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), instructed that before we can determine whether state officials are entitled to qualified immunity, we must first address the merits of the alleged constitutional violation. The first question we must ask is whether "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the [officials'] conduct violated a constitutional right?" 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. If we answer this question in the negative, then the inquiry is over and the case should be dismissed: we never reach the issue of qualified immunity. It is only when "a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions" that a court evaluating a claim of qualified immunity should proceed to "the next, sequential step [of] ask[ing] whether the right was clearly established." Id. Thus, in accordance with Saucier, we first turn to the merits of the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
14 cases
  • Earline Cole v. Fed. Bureau Of Investigations
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Montana
    • 17 Junio 2010
    ...at 703). The central mandate of the equal protection clause “is racial neutrality in governmental decision making.” Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 796 (9th Cir.2003) (overruled on other grounds) (“ Johnson I ”). “[D]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by ......
  • Hernandez v. Cate
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Central District of California
    • 18 Enero 2013
    ...applied the “reasonableness” standard of Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). See Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791 (2003), rev'd,543 U.S. 499, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 160 L.Ed.2d 949 (2005). 8. The United States Marshal's office responded informally to the Cou......
  • Johnson v. California
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 23 Febrero 2005
    ...to apply strict scrutiny in the first instance. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Gottshall, 512 U. S. 532, 557-558. P. 515. 321 F. 3d 791, reversed and O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. GINSBURG, J., fil......
  • Johnson v. California, 01-56436.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 28 Julio 2003
    ...racial discrimination."). The panel concedes that the Court's decision in Lee has direct application in this case, Johnson v. Rowland, 321 F.3d 791, 797-98 (2003), but nevertheless determines that Turner is controlling. Id. at 798. The panel announces, without citing any support for its con......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
5 books & journal articles
  • The Supreme Court's "prisoner Dilemma:" How Johnson, Rluipa, and Cutter Re-defined Inmate Constitutional Claims
    • United States
    • University of Nebraska - Lincoln Nebraska Law Review No. 86, 2021
    • Invalid date
    ...U.S. at 503. 147. Id. at 504 (citing Johnson v. California, 207 F.3d 650, 655 (9th Cir. 2000)). 148. Id. 149. Id.; Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 798-99 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)). 150. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 504-05 (citing Johnson, 321 F.3d at 807 (ca......
  • Racial Desegregation in Prisons
    • United States
    • Prison Journal, The No. 88-2, June 2008
    • 1 Junio 2008
    ...and imprisonment. Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press.Jacobs v. Lockhart, 9 F.3d 187 (8th Cir. 1993).Johnson v. State of California, 321 F.3d 791 (2003).Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005).Khoo, A. (2005, March 28). The defiant ones: Johnson v. California. Daily Journal Extra,pp. 14-......
  • Johnson v. State of California.
    • United States
    • Corrections Caselaw Quarterly No. 26, May 2003
    • 1 Mayo 2003
    ...Appeals Court RACIAL DISCRIMINATION CLASSIFICATION EQUAL PROTECTION Johnson v. State of California, 321 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2003). An African-American state prison inmate brought an action against prison administrators, alleging that a prison policy of using race as a factor in assigning a n......
  • Johnson v. State of California.
    • United States
    • Corrections Caselaw Quarterly No. 26, May 2003
    • 1 Mayo 2003
    ...Appeals Court CELL ASSIGNMENT RACIAL DISCRIMINATION DOUBLE-CELLING Johnson v. State of California, 321 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2003). An African-American state prison inmate brought an action against prison administrators, alleging that a prison policy of using race as a factor in assigning a ne......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT