Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm'n v. Brain

• Citation: 322 P.3d 139,234 Ariz. 322,683 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 43
• Decision Date: 02 April 2014
• Docket Number: No. CV–13–0341–PR.,CV–13–0341–PR.
• Parties: ARIZONA CITIZENS CLEAN ELECTIONS COMMISSION; Louis J. Hoffman; Victoria Steele; Arizona Advocacy Network, Petitioners, v. The Honorable Mark H. BRAIN, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Maricopa, Respondent Judge, Ken Bennett, in his Official Capacity as Secretary of State; Andy Biggs, in his Official Capacity as President of the Arizona State Senate; Andrew M. Tobin, in his Official Capacity as Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives, Real Parties in Interest.
• Court: Supreme Court of Arizona

234 Ariz. 322

322 P.3d 139

683 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 43

ARIZONA CITIZENS CLEAN ELECTIONS COMMISSION; Louis J. Hoffman; Victoria Steele; Arizona Advocacy Network, Petitioners,

v.The Honorable Mark H. BRAIN, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Maricopa, Respondent Judge,Ken Bennett, in his Official Capacity as Secretary of State; Andy Biggs, in his Official Capacity as President of the Arizona State Senate; Andrew M. Tobin, in his Official Capacity as Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives, Real Parties in Interest.

No. CV–13–0341–PR.

Supreme Court of Arizona.

April 2, 2014.

Joseph A. Kanefield (argued), Brunn W. Roysden III, Ballard Spahr LLP, Phoenix, for Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Commission.

Mary R. O'Grady, Timothy J. Eckstein, Christina C. Rubalcava, Osborn Maledon, Phoenix; and Timothy M. Hogan, Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest, Phoenix, for Louis J. Hoffman, Victoria Steele, and Arizona Advocacy Network.

Richard Rice, Acting Attorney General, David Weinzweig, Senior Litigation Counsel, Daniel P. Schaack (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, for Ken Bennett.

Michael T. Liburdi (argued), Kelly A. Kszywienski, Snell & Wilmer LLP, Phoenix; Gregrey G. Jernigan, Office of the President, Arizona State Senate, Phoenix; Peter A. Gentala, Pele Peacock, Office of the Speaker, Arizona House of Representatives, Phoenix, for Andy Biggs and Andrew M. Tobin.

Andrew S. Gordon, Roopali H. Desai, Melissa A. Soliz, Coppersmith Brockelman PLC, Phoenix, for Amici Curiae Arizona Chamber of Commerce and Industry, et al.

James E. Barton II, Torres Law Group, PLLC, Tempe, for Amici Curiae League of Women Voters, et al.

Paul V. Avelar, Timothy D. Keller, Institute for Justice, Tempe, for Amicus Curiae Institute for Justice.

Justice TIMMER, opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 In 1998, Arizona voters enacted the Citizens Clean Elections Act to establish public funding for political candidates in statewide and state legislative elections. The Act prohibits a candidate who opts not to receive public funding from accepting contributions greater than eighty percent of the campaign contribution limits specified in A.R.S. § 16–905. The issue here is whether the Act fixes campaign contribution limits at eighty percent of the amounts that existed in 1998 or instead provides a formula for calculating limits. We hold that the Act provides a formula for calculating contribution limits.

I. BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Both Arizona voters and the legislature have taken an active role in developing campaign financing laws. In 1986, voters enacted by initiative A.R.S. § 16–905, which established campaign contribution limits for state, county, and local elected officials. The legislature amended § 16–905 in 1993, 1994, 1997, and 2007 to increase those limits. 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 226, § 4 (1st Reg.Sess.); 1994 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 379, § 2 (2d Reg.Sess.); 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 201, § 6 (1st Reg.Sess.); 2007 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 277, § 1 (1st Reg.Sess.).

¶ 3 In 1998, voters passed an initiative to create the Citizens Clean Elections Act, A.R.S. §§ 16–940 to –961 (“CCEA” or “Act”), which established an alternative campaign financing system for primary and general elections and created the Citizens Clean Elections Commission to administer it. Under this system, candidates for statewide and state legislative offices who agree to limit fundraising and campaign spending (“participating candidates”) receive public campaign financing. Eligible candidates who choose not to participate (“nonparticipating candidates”) can accept private campaign contributions up to eighty percent of the limits established by A.R.S. § 16–905(A)–(E), as adjusted periodically for inflation. A.R.S. § 16–941(B). In an apparent effort to “level the playing field,” the Act also originally provided that once expenditures by or on behalf of a nonparticipating candidate exceeded a publicly funded opponent's initial funding allotment, that opponent would be given roughly one dollar for every additional dollar spent by or on behalf of the nonparticipating candidate, capped at three times the initial public funding allotment.¹A.R.S. § 16–952 (1998); see Bennett, 131 S.Ct. at 2813. Candidates for countywide and municipal offices are not eligible to participate in the Clean Elections system.

¶ 4 In 1998, the voters also passed another initiative, unrelated to the CCEA, which adopted the Voter Protection Act (“VPA”). Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(6). The VPA limits the legislature's authority to modify laws enacted by voters at or after the November 1998 general election. Cave Creek Unified Sch. Dist. v. Ducey, 233 Ariz. 1, 4 ¶ 9, 308 P.3d 1152, 1155 (2013); Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1, Historical Notes (West 2014).

¶ 5 In April 2013, the legislature passed and the Governor signed House Bill (“H.B.”) 2593, which amended § 16–905 by increasing campaign contribution limits for statewide, countywide, and local offices, eliminating restrictions on the aggregate amount of money candidates can receive from political committees, and eliminating restrictions on the amount of money individuals can contribute to political committees that give money to candidates. 2013 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 98, § 2 (1st Reg.Sess.). The effective date for H.B. 2593 was September 13, 2013.

¶ 6 In July 2013, the Citizens Clean Elections Commission and others (collectively, the “Commission”) sued Arizona's Secretary of State, asking the superior court to declare H.B. 2593 unconstitutional, as applicable to nonparticipating candidates, and to enjoin the Secretary from implementing it. The Commission alleged that the CCEA fixed campaign contribution limits as they existed in 1998 for nonparticipating candidates, and that the legislature could not alter those limits by amending § 16–905 without complying with the VPA. The court permitted the President of the Senate, Andy Biggs, and the Speaker of the House, Andrew M. Tobin, (collectively, “Intervenors”) to intervene and join in defending H.B. 2593.

¶ 7 The superior court denied the Commission's motion to preliminarily enjoin implementation of H.B. 2593, finding that the Commission did not have a strong likelihood of success on the merits. See Shoen v. Shoen, 167 Ariz. 58, 63, 804 P.2d 787, 792 (App.1991) (setting forth factors to consider in ruling on a motion for preliminary injunction). The court reasoned that § 16–905 is probably not subject to the VPA because (1) the CCEA referred to § 16–905 only as part of a formula for computing contribution limits, (2) subjecting cross-referenced statutes to the VPA could “create havoc,” and (3) it was uncertain whether a majority of voters in 1998 intended that the VPA apply to the CCEA. The court also found that, “in light of ... First Amendment issues presented” by Intervenors, it could not conclude that irreparable harm would occur or that the balance of hardships or public interest favored a preliminary injunction.

¶ 8 In an ensuing special action, the court of appeals accepted jurisdiction and granted relief to the Commission. Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm'n v. Brain, 233 Ariz. 280, 282 ¶ 1, 311 P.3d 1093, 1095 (App.2013). The court did not address the parties' VPA-related or First Amendment arguments. Instead, it held that, “as a matter of statutory construction, when the voters enacted the [CCEA] in 1998, they fixed campaign contribution limits as they existed in 1998 ... [and] did not adopt a mere formula that would allow the Legislature to easily amend the § 941 limits.” Id. at 288 ¶ 31, 311 P.3d at 1101. Based on that determination, the court of appeals further concluded that because § 16–941(B) applies “[n]otwithstanding any law to the contrary,” it “preempts” and renders “ineffective” those provisions of H.B. 2593 that altered campaign contribution limits applicable to nonparticipating candidates. Id.

¶ 9 In light of its interpretation of § 16–941(B) as providing fixed limits rather than a formula, the court of appeals vacated the superior court's order denying the Commission's motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 290–91 ¶ 41, 311 P.3d at 1103–04. Because the superior court acknowledged but did not sufficiently address Intervenors' arguments that fixed limits violate the First Amendment, however, the court of appeals instructed the superior court to revisit that issue. Id. Pending that determination, the court of appeals maintained the preliminary injunction against H.B. 2593's implementation, as applicable to nonparticipating candidates. Id. at 292 ¶ 46, 311 P.3d at 1105.

¶ 10 Pursuant to our jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution, and as a matter of statewide importance, we granted review to decide this single statutory issue: whether A.R.S. § 16–941(B) provides a formula for calculating campaign contribution limits for nonparticipating candidates or instead fixes those limits. We previously vacated the court of appeals' opinion and lifted the preliminary injunction, indicating that this opinion would follow.

II. DISCUSSION

¶ 11 Our primary objective in interpreting a voter-enacted law is to effectuate the voters' intent. See Ariz. Early Childhood Dev. & Health Bd. v. Brewer, 221 Ariz. 467, 470 ¶ 10, 212 P.3d 805, 808 (2009). If the statute is subject to only one reasonable interpretation, we apply it as written without further analysis. Id. But if the statute is ambiguous, we consider secondary principles of statutory interpretation, such as “the context of the statute, the language used, the subject matter, its historical background, its effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose.” Wyatt v. Wehmueller, 167 Ariz. 281, 284, 806 P.2d 870, 873 (1991) (citation omitted). We review the interpretation of statutes de novo as an issue of law. State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 576 ¶ 19, 278 P.3d 1276, 1279 (2012).

A.

¶ 12 Before addressing the statutory issue before us, we make clear that two...