Davignon v. Clemmey

Decision Date04 March 2003
Docket NumberNo. 02-1293.,No. 02-1346.,No. 01-1862.,01-1862.,02-1293.,02-1346.
Citation322 F.3d 1
PartiesNeal DAVIGNON and Patricia Kelley, Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, Amanda Davignon and Chelsea Davignon, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Karl D. CLEMMEY and Karl D. Clemmey, Jr., Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, Town of Mansfield, Massachusetts, Arthur O'Neil, etc. Defendants-Appellees, Clemmey, Inc., et al., Defendants. Neal Davignon and Patricia Kelley, Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, Amanda Davignon and Chelsea Davignon, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Karl D. Clemmey and Karl D. Clemmey, Jr., Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, Town of Mansfield, Massachusetts, Arthur O'Neil, etc. Defendants-Appellees, Clemmey, Inc., et al., Defendants. Neal Davignon and Patricia Kelley, Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, Amanda Davignon and Chelsea Davignon, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Karl D. Clemmey and Karl D. Clemmey, Jr., Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, Town of Mansfield, Massachusetts, Arthur O'Neil, etc. Defendants-Appellees, Clemmey, Inc., et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Michael J. Traft, with whom Carney & Bassil, P.C. was on brief for defendants-appellants.

Leonard H. Kesten, with whom Deidre Brennan Regan, Patricia Malone Campbell, and Brody, Hardoon, Perkins & Kesten were on brief for plaintiffs-appellees and defendants-appellees.

Before TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge, CYR and STAHL, Senior Circuit Judges.

CYR, Senior Circuit Judge.

Defendants Karl D. Clemmey ("Karl") and Karl D. Clemmey, Jr. ("Dan") appeal from a district court judgment, entered following a jury verdict, directing them to pay $2,850,000 in damages to Neal Davignon, Patricia Kelley, and their two minor children, for intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, and various violations of their civil rights. In turn, Davignon and Kelley cross-appeal from a district court ruling that their jury verdict against Karl Clemmey, totaling $2,000,000, for intentional infliction of emotional distress, is barred by res judicata. We affirm the jury verdict.

I BACKGROUND

The relevant background facts are recited in the light most consistent with the jury verdict. See Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.1999). On January 9, 1998, Karl and Dan Clemmey, owners of Clemmey Auto Body in Mansfield, Massachusetts, abruptly discharged their mechanic, Neal Davignon, physically assaulted him, and thereafter threatened his life and the lives and physical safety of his family. At the time, Davignon, Patricia Kelley, and their two minor children were tenants in a residence owned by Karl Clemmey's real estate company — 360 Chauncey Street LLC.

Twenty minutes after he was fired, Davignon returned to the auto body shop, with Kelley and their children, in order to retrieve some personal tools which had been wrongfully confiscated from Davignon by the Clemmeys during the earlier assault. After Dan Clemmey refused to allow Davignon to enter, claiming that Davignon had assaulted his fatherKarl Clemmey — Kelley and the children left in tears to seek police assistance. Subsequently, Dan Clemmey advised the police officer that Karl Clemmey had decided not to press assault charges against Davignon and Kelley. Thereafter, Neal Davignon signed an assault-and-battery complaint against Karl Clemmey.

One week later, the Clemmeys commenced a long and relentless campaign of harassment and intimidation against Davignon and Kelley, beginning with their filing of criminal charges of assault and threats of arson. Subsequently, Karl Clemmey actively opposed Davignon's pending claim for unemployment compensation. Additionally, Karl Clemmey's real estate company, 360 Chauncey Street LLC, commenced eviction proceedings in state housing court against Davignon and Kelley. Davignon and Kelley counter-claimed for intentional infliction of emotional distress and thereafter included Karl Clemmey as a party defendant. Ultimately, in July 1998, Davignon, Kelley, and 360 Chauncey Street LLC entered into an Agreement for Judgment, which ceded possession of the leased premises to 360 Chauncey Street LLC, effective October 1, 1998, and stated that "the parties agree to waive all claims and counter-claims regarding this matter with prejudice."

Meanwhile, the Clemmeys, acting in concert, repeatedly intimidated and harassed the Davignons from February to August of 1998. For instance, while Davignon was visiting a friend at another auto repair garage, he observed that Karl Clemmey was taking his photograph. On the same occasion, Karl Clemmey warned Neal Davignon that no unemployment-compensation hearing would ever be held because "[y]ou'll be dead by then, you and your family."

In due course, Neal Davignon reported these threats to the Mansfield Police Department. Whereupon, Karl Clemmey was arrested and charged with the January 9 assault, and the state court entered a "stay-away" order as a condition of bail. Thereafter, Karl Clemmey submitted several additional false criminal complaints against Davignon, alleging assault and threatened assault.

Another witness saw Dan Clemmey break open a trash bag and strew its contents over the Davignons' lawn. In a similar vein, Patricia Kelley observed as Karl Clemmey drove past the Davignon residence. Later, upon returning home from an errand, Kelley found that the front door had been broken. On yet another occasion, a Mansfield police officer saw Karl as he was driving by the Davignon home. By way of further harassment, Karl falsely reported to the Mansfield Fire Department that the Davignons were storing explosives and other hazardous materials at their home. Upon investigation, the latter allegation proved to be unfounded as well.

In April 1998, an anonymous telephone report was received by the Massachusetts Department of Social Services, to the effect that Davignon and Kelley were abusing and/or neglecting their children. Following an investigation, which included interviews of the Davignon children, the allegations were determined to have been unfounded.

On several other occasions, Patricia Kelley and another person witnessed the Clemmeys surveilling the Davignon residence from their parked car. In August 1998, Davignon saw Karl Clemmey as he was driving away from the Davignon residence, and immediately thereafter found the rock which had been thrown through the window of his residence moments earlier. On yet another occasion, Karl Clemmey brought his car to a stop on the street beside the Davignon residence and (i) called out to the Davignon children: "Assholes"! and (ii) ranted that their parents were "pieces of shit." These outbursts brought the Davignon children to tears.

Subsequently, Karl Clemmey was convicted in state court for having assaulted Davignon on January 9, 1998; at the same time, Kelley was acquitted of the charge that she had assaulted Dan Clemmey. Thereafter, the numerous remaining criminal complaints brought by the Clemmeys against Davignon and Kelley were dropped.

In September 1999, Davignon, Kelley, and their children commenced the instant action against the Clemmeys in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, demanding damages for (i) assault and battery; (ii) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (iii) various civil rights violations. The Clemmeys counterclaimed against Davignon and Kelley, and instituted a cross-claim against the Town of Mansfield and its police chief for facilitating Davignon's and Kelley's alleged harassment of the Clemmeys.1 Following the nine-day trial, the jury awarded Davignon $350,000 on the assault and battery charge; as well as $1,000,000 each to Davignon and Kelley, and $1,250,000 to each Davignon child, on their respective claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil rights violations.

On June 1, 2001, at the behest of Davignon and Kelley, the district court certified its partial judgment as final, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), and the Clemmeys timely filed their notice of appeal. On June 11, the district court extended the time for submitting applications for counsel fees, as well as motions for judgment as a matter of law, new trial, and remittitur. The Clemmeys did not file their post-trial motions until June 29, more than ten days after the entry of final judgment on June 1.

Although the district court rejected the Clemmeys' motions for new trial and remittitur, it vacated the $1,000,000 jury awards to Davignon and Kelley for intentional infliction of emotional distress as well as various civil rights violations. The district court determined that these claims had been fully litigated and waived by Davignon and Kelley pursuant to the July 1998 Agreement for Judgment in the housing-court eviction proceedings, which included a release stating that "the parties agree to waive all claims and counterclaims regarding this matter with prejudice."

The Clemmeys now appeal from the district court rulings which rejected their post-trial motions. Davignon and Kelley cross-appeal from the district court order which vacated their respective $1,000,000 awards for intentional infliction of emotional distress and various civil rights violations.

II DISCUSSION
A. The Clemmey Appeal
1. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4)

The district court permitted Jeffrey Parks — a family therapist and social worker not licensed to practice medicine — to testify concerning statements made to him by the Davignons during family-therapy sessions relating to the extreme emotional distress experienced by the Davignon children.2 The Clemmeys contend that the district court erred in permitting Parks to testify regarding these statements because (i) Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) provides an exception to the...

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