Bjustrom v. Trust One Mortgage Corp.

Decision Date20 March 2003
Docket NumberNo. 01-36076.,01-36076.
Citation322 F.3d 1201
PartiesMary E. BJUSTROM, individually and on behalf of all others similary situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRUST ONE MORTGAGE CORP., Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Barry G. Reed and Hart L. Robinovitch, Zimmerman Reed, Scottsdale, AZ; John H. Bright, Mark A. Griffin, and Alexander Perkins, Keller Rohrback, Seattle, WA, for the plaintiffs-appellants.

Thomas M. Hefferon, Goodwin Procter, Washington, DC; Scott Weaver, Jameson, Babbitt, Stites & Lombard, Seattle, WA; James W. McGarry, Boston, MA, for the defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington; Marsha J. Pechman, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-00-01166-MJP.

Before HILL,* GOULD, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by HILL; Concurrence by Judge BERZON.

OPINION

HILL, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment to Trust One Mortgage Corporation (Trust One) in a class action involving residential mortgages. The class is composed of all mortgagors whose Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage loans were funded by Trust One and whose mortgage brokers were paid compensation in excess of 1% of the aggregate loan amount (the Bjustrom class). See note 6 infra.

Mary E. Bjustrom is the representative class member. The Bjustrom class asserted two causes of action: (1) breach of contract; and (2) violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2607. Bjustrom, in her individual capacity, asserted a third cause of action under the Washington State Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (state consumer protection act), Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Trust One on all three claims. We affirm the judgment of the district court as to the two claims made by the Bjustrom class, breach of contract and violation of RESPA. However, we conclude that the court erred in including Bjustrom's state consumer protection act claim in its order of summary judgment. Such claim was not contained in Trust One's motion for summary judgment. We remand that claim to the district court for further proceedings as to Bjustrom, individually only. We also sua sponte vacate the order granting certification to the Bjustrom class.

I.

There are no disputed facts. Trust One is an Irvine, California, mortgage lending institution that funds FHA loans. It primarily operates through the use of mortgage brokers who refer loans to Trust One for funding. Typically, the mortgage broker performs a variety of functions, providing legitimate goods, facilities and services, in order to "package" loan applications for funding, i.e., paying fees for recording, title examinations, credit reports, surveys, appraisals, etc.

Mortgage brokers are paid for this work. The amount of compensation they receive is regulated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the agency charged with FHA oversight. Typically, mortgage brokers charge a 1% loan origination fee paid directly to the broker by the borrower. The Bjustrom class maintains that, for FHA loans, an FHA regulation forbids lending institutions, such as Trust One, from paying mortgage brokers any compensation for any service in excess of 1% of the mortgage amount, and bar mortgage brokers from receiving any such additional compensation See 24 C.F.R. § 203.27(a)(2)(i).1

At issue are the lender-paid broker fees denominated as yield spread premiums (YSP)2 and service release premiums (SRP).3 Both are disclosed to a borrower on a HUD-1 Settlement Statement.

For example, in Bjustrom's case, in order to purchase real property in 1999, she obtained an FHA loan from Trust One, through her mortgage broker, Mortgage Specialists, Inc. (Mortgage Specialists), in the amount of $140,542.00 at an interest rate of 8%.4 As security for the loan, Bjustrom executed a Deed of Trust in the subject property in favor of Trust One.

Bjustrom's HUD-1 Settlement Statement reflects a total of $7,478.27 in settlement charges. Among these charges are various taxes and fees, including a $1,374.00 origination fee, paid directly to Mortgage Specialists. The HUD-1 Statement also reflects a YSP of $702.71 and a SRP of $1,786.78 to be paid to Mortgage Specialists, albeit in a separate category, not listed in a category of services to be paid by the borrower.

Bjustrom contends that the 1% origination fee operates as a cap, both under a breach of contract theory, implicitly incorporating 24 C.F.R. § 203.27(a)(2)(i) into paragraph 8 of her Deed of Trust, and under RESPA, 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a)-(c), governing illegal kickbacks by lenders to brokers. Because she paid Mortgage Specialists its 1% origination fee of $1,374.00, Bjustrom argues it is ipso facto barred from receiving any additional monies, i.e., both the $702.71 YSP and the $1,786.78 SRP from Trust One.5

The district court certified the Bjustrom class, finding that a question of law concerning the FHA loan 1% origination fee cap was a sufficient uniform factual and legal issue applicable to each Bjustrom class member's loan.6 After hearing on the merits of the breach of contract and RESPA claims, the district court granted summary judgment for Trust One.7 This appeal follows.

II.

The parties agree that the facts are not in dispute. We review de novo pure questions of law decided on summary judgment. See Jensen v. Lane County, 222 F.3d 570, 573 (9th Cir.2000).

III.

Under the breach of contract claim made by the Bjustrom class, Bjustrom contends that by signing her Deed of Trust, the FHA regulation that provides a cap of 1% of the original principle amount of the mortgage, 24 C.F.R. § 203.27(a)(2)(i), is implicitly incorporated into paragraph 8 of the Deed of Trust, and that Trust One breached the contract by charging fees in excess of 1% when it paid a YSP and SRP to Mortgage Specialists.

This breach of contract claim fails under the unambiguous language of the regulation itself which limits only fees "collect[ed] from the mortgagor" (the Bjustrom class) by the mortgagee (Trust One). 24 C.F.R. § 203.27(a)(2)(i). The YSPs and the SRPs at issue here were not collected from Bjustrom class members, but were instead collected from Trust One by Mortgage Specialists.

We agree with the persuasive analysis set out in Part II of the opinion by the district court that a plain reading of the regulation itself means directly collected, not indirectly collected. See Bjustrom, 178 F. Supp.2d at 1190 (to assert "that all borrowers ultimately pay for the yield service and service release premiums through higher interest rates is too strained a reading of `collect' to compel inclusion of such indirect payments").8 Cf. Geraci v. Homestreet Bank, 203 F.Supp.2d 1211, 1214-15 (W.D.Wash.2002) (VA loan).

IV.

There have been many lawsuits and class actions filed against residential mortgage lenders, alleging that their payment of YSPs to mortgage brokers violated RESPA. Section 8(a) of RESPA prohibits kickbacks and referral fees. See 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a).9 Section 8(c) of RESPA allows payment "for services actually performed in the making of a loan." See 12 U.S.C. § 2607(c).10 However, the plain language of RESPA does not directly address whether the payment of a YSP (or a SRP in this case) is a violation.

In response to these complaints from borrowers that they may have been required to pay more for their loan than authorized, HUD released its RESPA Statement of Policy 2001-1: Clarification of Statement of Policy 1999-1 Regarding Lender Payments to Mortgage Brokers, and Guidance Concerning Unearned Fees Under Section 8(b), (HUD/SOP II) to "eliminate any ambiguity concerning [HUD's] position with respect to ... yield spread premiums and ... overcharges by settlement service providers...." 66 Fed. Reg. 53052 (October 18, 2001).11 HUD reiterated its earlier position "that yield spread premiums are not per se legal or illegal," id. at 53052, and, that they "can be a useful means to pay some or all of a borrower's settlement costs." Id. at 53054.

HUD/SOP II also confirmed the two-part test set forth in RESPA Statement of Policy 1999-1 Regarding Lender Payments to Mortgage Brokers, 64 Fed. Reg. 10080 (March 1, 1999) (HUD/SOP I). Under the two-part test, a court is required to consider (1) "whether goods or facilities were actually furnished or services were actually performed for the compensation paid" and (2) "whether the payments are reasonably related to the value of the goods or facilities that were actually furnished or services that were actually performed." Id. at 10084; HUD/SOP II at 53054.

V.

The district court in this case was writing on the proverbial clean slate with this issue of first impression, construing HUD/SOP II. Since that time there have been a number of cases on this subject, reaching the same result as reached by the district here, including one in this circuit, Schuetz v. Banc One Mortg. Corp., 292 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.2002). A more recent case, Lane v. Residential Funding Corp., 323 F.3d 739 (9th Cir.2003), with somewhat similar facts, relies on Schuetz and is consistent with what we hold today.

Other circuits have rung in, consistent with our opinion in Schuetz. See Glover v. Std. Fed. Bank, 283 F.3d 953 (8th Cir.2002); Heimmermann v. First Union Mortg. Corp., 305 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir.2002); cf. Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 314 F.3d 875 (7th Cir.2002); Haug v. Bank of Am., N.A., 317 F.3d 832 (8th Cir.2003); O'Sullivan v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 319 F.3d 732 (5th Cir.2003).

VI.

We find that the facts of Schuetz are virtually indistinguishable from the facts in the present case.12 In Schuetz, the plaintiff had obtained a federally related mortgage loan from a mortgage lender through a mortgage broker. Schuetz paid direct fees to the mortgage broker. In addition, the lender paid the mortgage broker a YSP....

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