Barkley v. United States

Decision Date13 June 1963
Docket NumberNo. 17206.,17206.
Citation323 F.2d 804,116 US App. DC 334
PartiesAlvin F. BARKLEY, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Mr. William F. Reed, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Robert B. Hirsch, Washington, D. C. (both appointed by this court) was on the brief, for appellant.

Mr. Gerald A. Messerman, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David C. Acheson, U. S. Atty., Frank Q. Nebeker and Tim Murphy, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and BURGER and McGOWAN, Circuit Judges.

Petition for Rehearing En Banc Denied October 31, 1963.

Petition for Rehearing by the Division Denied October 31, 1963.

McGOWAN, Circuit Judge.

Appellant was indicted for first degree murder in consequence of the slaying of his wife, was convicted by a jury of the lesser included offense of second degree murder, and was sentenced to ten to thirty years imprisonment.

The trial involved no issue with respect to whether appellant committed the act charged. Counsel for appellant, in his opening statement, made this crystal clear. He said: "At this point I want to make clear to you one thing, that there is no question as to whether or not Mr. Barkley, the defendant, was involved in this affair the shooting of the wife. * * * In brief, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the defense in this case is insanity."1

The central issue urged upon us is that, upon the evidence adduced by both prosecution and defense with respect to appellant's sanity at the time of the slaying, the government's burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt was not sustained, and that it was error for the trial court to have permitted the jury to determine the issue. As part of this contention, it is asserted that lay witnesses should under no circumstances be permitted to testify as to sanity; and that, if they are, careful instructions should be given with respect to the weight to be given such testimony.

At the trial the defense offered two expert, and one lay, witnesses on the sanity issue. One psychiatrist testified that, on the basis of her examination of appellant, it was her opinion that he had been suffering from mental disease at the time of the crime, and that, if so, the latter had probably been caused by such disease. The other psychiatrist stated that he had no evidence to establish that appellant had been mentally ill at the time of the crime, and that his opinion was that the mental illness found to exist four months after the crime was "very largely a reaction to the enormous emotional impact of what had happened." The lay witness was appellant's sister who had lived with him for several years up to a time about a year before the crime and who testified to her personal observation of several strange and bizarre acts on appellant's part, suggesting mental or emotional instability.

The government brought forward ten lay witnesses. Four were policemen who had observed appellant shortly after the crime and who stated that they saw nothing unusual about his demeanor. Two were men who had been fellow employees of appellant for a few months immediately preceding the killing. They testified that they had seen nothing about appellant's appearance or conduct to suggest irrationality. A seventh witness was a fellow-employe of appellant's wife who had seen him frequently over a period of years and who had noticed nothing strange. The last three witnesses were appellant's inlaws — his wife's parents and her brother. Because of their relationship, they had had occasion to see appellant frequently in the years before the crime, and they, too, testified that they had seen nothing in appellant's manner or conduct to suggest any mental disturbance.

Assuming proper instructions, we are of the view that, on this record, it was proper for the court to allow the jury to pass upon the sanity question, and that there is no occasion for us to disturb the jury's decision to reject the sanity defense. Lay testimony with respect to sanity has long been admissible in this jurisdiction,2 and we see no occasion to depart from that rule in this case. Appellant himself has relied upon it heavily in the testimony of his sister. In McDonald v. United States, 114 U.S. App.D.C. 120, 312 F.2d 847 (1962), we said that "The jury must determine for itself, from all the testimony, lay and expert * * *" the issues raised by the insanity defense. We did not say, of course, that there are no cases where a directed verdict of acquittal may not be warranted, as evidenced by our citation in McDonald of Isaac v. United States, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 34, 284 F.2d 168 (1960). But where, as here, there is evidence of substance looking both ways, the matter is for resolution by the jury. In Hawkins v. United States, 114 U.S. App.D.C. 44, 310 F.2d 849 (1962), we sustained submission to the jury when the Government put in no evidence on the sanity issue and the expert testimony advanced by the defense was "meager." It thus appears all the more proper here — where considerable evidence was adduced on both sides — to regard the question as safely within the jury's province.3

Our only concern here is with the matter of instructions. Early in the trial the court expressly asked counsel for both sides to submit requested instructions before the trial ended in order that the court might study them. After the taking of evidence was ended, and before the closing arguments, the court announced its purpose to give an instruction on expert testimony. At that point ...

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6 cases
  • Harrison v. United States, 20280
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • May 18, 1967
    ...U.S.App.D.C. 241, 328 F.2d 542, cert. denied 377 U.S. 972, 84 S.Ct. 1655, 12 L.Ed.2d 741 (1964); Barkley v. United States, 116 U.S.App. D.C. 334, 335-336 n. 1, 323 F.2d 804, 805-806 n. 1 (1963). 51 See cases cited supra notes 48 to 50. See also Inge v. United States, 123 U.S. App.D.C. 6, 35......
  • Smith v. United States, 17466
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • September 26, 1963
    ...v. United States, 106 U.S.App. D.C. 163, 166, 270 F.2d 915, 918 (1959) (dissenting opinion); see also Barkley v. United States, 116 U.S.App.D.C. ___, 323 F.2d 804, p. 805 (1963) n. Here no confessions or utterances of the appellants were used against them; tangible evidence obtained from ap......
  • USA. v. Williams, 99-3058
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • May 30, 2000
    ...at least some mitigation of any prejudice ... which might have arisen from the prosecutor's closing remarks"); Barkley v. United States, 323 F.2d 804, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (no plain error for failure to give cautionary instruction on lay testimony in absence of request and where general cre......
  • Kaufman v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • October 18, 1965
    ...States, 302 F.2d 214, 242 (8 Cir. 1962), cert. denied 371 U.S. 872, 83 S.Ct. 123, 9 L.Ed.2d 110, and Barkley v. United States, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 334, 323 F.2d 804, 806-807 (1963). We therefore conclude that, on the record evidence, Judge Regan's denial of the defense motion for an acquittal ......
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