Good Shepherd Manor Foundation v. City of Momence

• Decision Date: 24 March 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-3536.,02-3536.
• Citation: 323 F.3d 557
• Parties: GOOD SHEPHERD MANOR FOUNDATION, INC., an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, Good Shepherd Manor Group Homes, Inc., an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, Good Shepherd Manor, Inc., an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF MOMENCE, a municipal corporation, William Peterson, James Saindon, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

323 F.3d 557

GOOD SHEPHERD MANOR FOUNDATION, INC., an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, Good Shepherd Manor Group Homes, Inc., an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, Good Shepherd Manor, Inc., an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF MOMENCE, a municipal corporation, William Peterson, James Saindon, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-3536.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued February 26, 2003.

Decided March 24, 2003.

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Edward J. Whalen (argued), Hedberg, Tobin, Flaherty & Whalen, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

John F. Martin (argued), Meachum & Martin, Danville, IL, Roger C. Elliott, Elliott & McClure, Momence, IL, for Defendants-Appellees.

F. Willis Caruso, John Marshall Law School Fair Housing Legal Clinic, Chicago, IL, for Amicus Curiae.

Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Chief Judge.

The City of Momence ("the city") shut off the water supply to a property lot, claiming that the owners had refused to fulfill an agreement to extend the property's water and sewage lines to the northern border of the property. Good Shepherd Manor Foundation, Inc., Good Shepherd Manor Group Homes, Inc., and Good Shepherd Manor, Inc. (collectively "Good Shepherd"), who own the property and use it to provide housing for developmentally disabled adults,¹ brought suit against the city, its mayor, and its aldermen alleging various federal claims. The district court allowed most of the claims to proceed to jury trial, but it limited the theories under which Good Shepherd could press two of their claims. The jury found in favor of the city. Good Shepherd now appeals, arguing that the district court erred in three ways: 1) limiting the theories of liability that Good Shepherd could present to the jury; 2) refusing certain jury instructions that Good Shepherd had submitted; and 3) excluding the testimony of Good Shepherd's expert witness. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.

I. Background

Good Shepherd provides housing and related services for developmentally disabled adults. Pursuant to a State of Illinois mandate, Good Shepherd has moved the disabled adults that it cares for from a shelter care facility to a group home environment. Group home environments are highly beneficial for certain developmentally disabled adults.

Prior to 1998 Good Shepherd constructed six group homes. It obtained a grant to extend the city's water and sewer lines to these homes and the city provided water and sewage services. In 1998 Good Shepherd purchased an additional lot for two new homes. They applied to the city for water and sewage permits. The city requested that Good Shepherd extend the water lines on their property to the northern boundary to provide service to a lot that was owned by a Jehovah's Witness Congregation. According to Good Shepherd the lines were to be extended only on the condition that the Congregation would pay for the expense of extending the lines. Good Shepherd and the Congregation were unable to reach an agreement about paying the costs, and the lines were never extended to the northern border of Good Shepherd's property. Good Shepherd built the new homes, and the city turned on the water in March 2001. On April 26, 2001, after learning that the lines had not been extended and just prior to the grand opening of the homes, the city turned off the water to these two homes. The city claims that it shut off the water because Good Shepherd would not extend the lines to the northern border as agreed upon. Because there was no water service, Good Shepherd was unable to secure occupancy permits for the homes.

Good Shepherd brought suit alleging violations of the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Constitution. Good Shepherd sought injunctions as well as declaratory relief and damages. The court granted an emergency Motion for Mandatory Preliminary Injunction. Pursuant to this injunction, on May 11, 2001, the city turned on the water. The city filed lawsuits in state court attempting to prevent the county from issuing permanent occupancy permits. These attempts failed.

In the federal district court both parties moved for summary judgment. These motions were denied. The district court did however limit the theories under which Good Shepherd could pursue its FHAA and ADA claims. Good Shepherd was seeking liability for discrimination under the theory of discriminatory intent and impact and under a theory that the city failed to provide reasonable accommodations. The district court ruled that the reasonable accommodation analysis was not applicable to the facts of the case and thus precluded Good Shepherd from presenting that theory at trial.

A jury trial followed. The jury found in favor of the city. Good Shepherd appeals.

II. Discussion

Good Shepherd's primary challenge on appeal is to the district court's ruling that it could not present a theory of failure to reasonably accommodate. Additionally Good Shepherd challenges the district court's decision to exclude Good Shepherd's expert witness, and the district court's rejection of two of Good Shepherd's proposed jury instructions. We start our analysis with their primary challenge.

A. Reasonable Accommodation

As a preliminary matter the requirements for showing failure to reasonably accommodate are the same under the ADA and the FHAA so we can treat these issues as one. Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir.2002). These statutes require a public entity to reasonably accommodate a disabled person by making changes in rules, policies, practices or services as is necessary to provide that person with access to housing that is equal to that of those who are not disabled. Id.

Good Shepherd claims that the city failed to provide a reasonable accommodation when it refused to reconsider its ad hoc decision to shut off the water supply to the lot in question. The district court rejected this argument, basing its holding on Hemisphere Building Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 171 F.3d 437 (7th Cir.1999). In that case this court explained that we confine "the duty of reasonable accommodation in `rules, policies, practices, or services' to rules, policies, etc. that hurt handicapped people by reason of their handicap, rather than that hurt them solely by virtue of what they have in common with other people, such as a limited amount of money to spend on housing." Id. at 440. Focusing on this language, the district court noted:

In this case, the service of water is something that is needed by all people. Therefore, the City's failure to provide the "reasonable accommodation" of providing water to Plaintiff's group homes did not hurt Plaintiff's residents by reason of their handicap but, instead, hurt them solely by virtue of what they have in common with other people, the need of water.

This conclusion is correct, and is an appropriate application of the legal principle announced in Hemisphere, and therefore we do affirm.

It is worth noting the city in asking us to affirm inexplicably advances a separate—and unsound—argument, revealing a misunderstanding of that ruling and of the law of this circuit. The city suggests that when this court in Hemisphere said "by reason of their handicap" it was referring to the motivation behind the failure to accommodate. Thus, the city summarizes their argument as, "This is not a `reasonable accommodation' case since there is no evidence that the city's actions were taken because of the proposed residents' handicaps." This is an irrelevant argument. The Hemisphere language was referring to the harmful effect that the failure to accommodate has on the handicapped. For example if a city required all houses to have narrow doorways, and the city failed to waive this requirement, this might harm people in wheelchairs by reason of the fact that they are in wheelchairs. In such a case the city would be required to waive this rule for wheelchair-bound residents wherever such waiver was reasonable. This requirement to reasonably accommodate would exist regardless of the motivation behind the narrow-doorway rule. If the city unreasonably refused to waive the rule, the plaintiffs would be under no obligation to prove that the rule was motivated by an animus toward handicapped people. The error in the city's logic is all the more clear when we consider that reasonable accommodation is a theory of liability separate from intentional discrimination. If the motivation of the city in cutting off the water to Good Shepherd was based on their handicap, then Good Shepherd would have been entitled to judgment under the theory of intentional discrimination—this is precisely the question that was tried to the jury at the district court. "Failure to reasonably accommodate" is an alternative theory of liability. The theory would be entirely redundant if it required proof that the defendants' actions were motivated by animus towards the handicapped. Indeed for the reasonable accommodation theory to be meaningful, it must be a theory of liability for cases where we assume there is a valid reason behind the actions of the city, but the city is liable nonetheless if it failed to reasonably accommodate the handicap of the plaintiff.

Good Shepherd argues that the failure to accommodate in this case did harm the developmentally disabled adults "by reason of their handicap." Good Shepherd explains that developmentally disabled adults gain a specific benefit from group living. This point is uncontested and well established in our case law. See Brandt v. Village of Chebanse, 82 F.3d 172, 174 (7th Cir.1996) (noting that for many disabled residents "joint living arrangements are essential"); Oconomowoc, 300 F.3d at 787 ("[G]roup living arrangements can be essential for disabled persons ... and not similarly essential...