Adams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 02-1768.
Citation | 324 F.3d 935 |
Decision Date | 07 April 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 02-1768.,02-1768. |
Parties | Brinda ADAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) |
v.
WAL-MART STORES, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
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Robert R. Faulkner (argued), Evansville, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Susan M. Zoeller (argued), Barnes & Thornburg, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before DIANE P. WOOD, EVANS, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge.
Brinda Adams was fired by her former employer, Sam's Club/Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart), for allegedly stealing $12.65 from a co-employee. Believing that the real reason for her discharge was discrimination on the basis of her race (African-American), Adams brought this lawsuit. In addition to her discrimination claim, which she raised under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., she asserted a claim of false imprisonment under Indiana common law. The latter claim charged that Wal-Mart had violated her rights when company representatives locked Adams in her manager's office for several minutes while they investigated the charges brought against her. The district court granted Wal-Mart's motion for summary judgment on both theories. We affirm.
Normally, when both a district court and this court consider a motion for summary judgment, the facts are taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. When the non-movant fails to comply with the district court's procedures for handling summary judgment motions, however, the non-movant may as a practical matter lose much of the benefit of that rule. Here, Adams failed to respond specifically to Wal-Mart's statement of material facts, as S.D. Ind. L.R. 56.1 required her to do if she wished to contest those facts. Therefore, as authorized by the rule, the district court treated Adams as having admitted Wal-Mart's version of the material facts. See S.D. Ind. L.R. 56.1(e). We too consider the facts in this light, accepting as true the material facts submitted by Wal-Mart that Adams did not properly contest. Schneiker v. Fortis Ins. Co., 200 F.3d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 2000). Adams should not feel too bad about this, because it also appears that most of the relevant, material facts submitted by Wal-Mart on which the district court relied are not disputed. Moreover, where appropriate, the district court took into consideration Adams's statement of material facts, as do we. Id.
Adams began working for Sam's Club, a division of Wal-Mart, in 1986. She was hired as a sales associate for the Evansville, Indiana, store. Throughout the course of her employment, Adams generally received favorable performance reviews. The incident that led to her firing occurred on June 30, 1999. On that day, a co-employee and friend of Adams, Dytana Wilson, reported that someone had taken
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$12.65 from her as the money was lying on a table in the employee lunchroom.
Loss Prevention Supervisor Kevin Dabbs was called in to investigate the incident. Dabbs interviewed each employee who was in the lounge during the time of the theft and collected written statements from Wilson, Sherry Cheatem, and Monica Desjean. Desjean (who is Caucasian) was the only person who claims to have witnessed anything. According to Desjean, Wilson and Cheatem entered the lounge together to eat. Adams was already seated, and as of that time Desjean recalled that there was no money sitting on the table. Wilson then sat next to Adams and placed her food and money on the table. When Wilson got up to take a phone call, Adams cupped the money in the palm of her hand and left the lunchroom. Desjean did not think twice about the incident, because she thought Wilson had noticed, or that Adams would have returned the money to her. Later that day, however, Desjean learned from Wilson that the money was really missing and that Wilson was upset. Desjean reported the incident to one of her supervisors.
In the presence of General Manager Dennis Teal and another member of management, Joyce Young, Dabbs then interviewed Adams. Adams denied that she had taken Wilson's money and claimed that the money she had taken from the table (only a dollar and some change) was hers. Dabbs asked her to submit her side of the story in writing and left her alone in the office to do so. No one told Adams that she was not free to leave. When Adams got up to use the restroom, however, she found that the door was locked. Adams claims that she was locked in the room for three to five minutes before anyone returned, and that Dabbs used a key to open the door. She does not know whether the door could have been unlocked from the inside.
The Wal-Mart Associate Handbook states that "[d]ishonesty in any form will result in immediate termination." Based upon Dabbs's finding, the written statements of Desjean and Wilson, and the interview with Adams, Teal terminated Adams on July 8, 1999, for theft of a co-employee's money.
Adams filed her claim with the EEOC, which issued her a right-to-sue letter on July 27, 2000. On October 23, 2000, Adams filed this action in state court, and Wal-Mart later properly removed it to federal court. The district court granted Wal-Mart's motion for summary judgment, and Adams brought this appeal.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, examining the facts in the light most favorable to Adams as the non-moving party, and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor. Koski v. Standex Int'l Corp., 307 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir.2002). Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
A. Race Discrimination
A claim of race discrimination may be established in one of two ways — under the direct method or the indirect burden-shifting method. See Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1397 (7th Cir.1997). Under the direct method, the plaintiff must show either through direct or circumstantial evidence that the employer's decision to take the adverse job action was motivated by an
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impermissible purpose, such as her race or national origin. See id.; Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir.1994).
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