Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Smith
| Decision Date | 26 February 1945 |
| Docket Number | No. 371,371 |
| Citation | 89 L.Ed. 830,324 U.S. 177,65 S.Ct. 591 |
| Parties | COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. SMITH |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Mr. J. Louis Monarch, of Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
Mr. Clarence D. Phillips, of Portland, Or., for respondent.
Respondent's employer gave to him, as compensation for his services, an option to purchase from the employer certain shares of stock of another corporation at a price not less than the then value of the stock. In two later tax years, when the market value of the stock was greater than the option price, respondent exercised the option, purchasing large amounts of the stock in each year. The question for decision is whether the difference between the market value and the option price of the stock was compensation for personal services of the employee, taxable as income in the years when he received the stock, under § 22(a) of the Revenue Act of 1938, c. 289, 52 Stat. 447, and § 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 22(a), 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, § 22(a).
Upon a petition to review the Commissioner's finding of a tax deficiency against respondent for those years, the Tax Court sustained the Commissioner. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, 142 F.2d 818, holding that there was no finding and no evidence to support a finding, that the option was intended to enable respondent to make a 'bargain purchase' or that the stock was issued to him as compensation for services. It concluded that the exercise of the option was a mere purchase of a capital investment which could result in taxable income only upon sale of the stock. We granted certiorari, 323 U.S. 696, 65 S.Ct. 84, on a petition which asserted conflict of the decision below with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Connolly's Estate v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 64, 146 A.L.R. 1387.
The Tax Court found that for many years, and at all relevant times, respondent was employed by the Western Cooperage Company. In 1934 Western took over the management of the Hawley Pulp and Paper Co. pursuant to a plan for its reorganization. Hawley was then in financial difficulties, with an indebtedness amounting to $2,790,150. Under its contract with Hawley, Western was to retire annually a certain amount of Hawley's indebtedness. In the event of success in this undertaking, and when the amount of Hawley's indebtedness had been reduced by the sum of $1,400,000, Western was to receive specified amounts of the Hawley Company's capital stock as compensation for the services thus rendered.
Respondent, in the course of his employment by Western, was active in the reorganization of the Hawley Company. As compensation for his services, the president of Western, in December 1934, gave respondent an oral option to purchase a part of the Hawley stock, to be acquired by Western under its contract. This action was confirmed by resolution of the Board of Directors of Western, pursuant to which Western, as of December 10, 1934, and 'in consideration of services rendered' by respondent prior to that date, agreed in writing to sell to respondent at his option, at 10 cents a share, a specified proportion of such shares of common stock as it might be entitled to receive under its contract with Hawley. On March 18, 1938, Western became entitled to the stipulated number of shares of the Hawley stock as provided by the contract with Hawley. In that and the following year respondent, by the exercise of his option, acquired from Western large amounts of the stock on payment of the option price.
The Tax Court found that at the date of the option the market price of the stock did not exceed the option price, but that in 1938 the market value of the stock then acquired by respondent exceeded its option price by $81,021, and the value of that acquired in 1939 exceeded the option price by $71,663. The court found from the option itself, the resolution of Western's Board of Directors, and from petitioner's own testimony, that 'Western gave the option to petitioner (respondent here) as compensation for services rendered in effecting the reorganization plan of Hawley.' It held that the excess of the market value of the shares over the option price in the years when the shares were received by respondent, was compensation for his services, taxable as income in those years.
Since the Tax Court found that the market price of the stock on the date of the option did not exceed the option price, it is evident that its finding that the option was given as compensation for respondent's services, had reference to the compensation to be derived from exercise of the option after the anticipated advance in market price of the stock. Respondent testified that if the option could have been sold at the time he received it, it would have been for only a 'negligible' or 'nominal' amount. He has never contended that the option itself had value when given and there was no finding by the Tax Court that it then had value. The Tax Court, in stating...
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