325 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1963), 18970, Jackson v. Dickson

Docket Nº:18970.
Citation:325 F.2d 573
Party Name:Lawrence Akin JACKSON, Appellant, v. Fred R. DICKSON, Warden, San Quentin Prison, Appellee.
Case Date:December 30, 1963
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
 
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Page 573

325 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1963)

Lawrence Akin JACKSON, Appellant,

v.

Fred R. DICKSON, Warden, San Quentin Prison, Appellee.

No. 18970.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

December 30, 1963

Allan Brotsky, San Francisco, Cal., and Henry M. Elson, Berkeley, Cal., for appellant.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., for the State of Cal.; Albert W. Harris, Jr., and Robert R. Granucci, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.

Before BARNES, HAMLEY and DUNIWAY, Circuit Judges.

DUNIWAY, Circuit Judge.

Jackson appeals from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He is under sentence of death imposed by the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Riverside, for the commission of a rape-murder. His conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of California in People v. Jackson, 59 Cal.2d 375, 379 P.2d 937, 29 Cal.Rptr. 505. The essential allegation of his petition is as follows:

'Petitioner is now, and was at the time of the commission of the aforesaid rape-murder, a mentally abnormal sex offender as defined by the legislature of the State of California,1 in that he was and now is a person who, by an habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters, has

Page 574

evidenced an utter lack of power to control his sexual impulses, and who, as a result, has attacked, and inflicted death and injury upon the objects of his uncontrolled and uncontrollable desires.

'The conduct of petitioner in raping and killing the said Doris Keyes was uncontrollable and non-volitional. According to competent medical opinion, the uncontrollable and non-volitional character of the conduct of petitioner in raping and killing the said Doris Keyes was due to brain damage.

'By virtue of the foregoing, the imposition of the death penalty upon petitioner would constitute as to him cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the guarantees accorded him by Articles 8 and 14 of the Constitution of the United States.'

The trial court denied the petition without holding a factual hearing, and therefore we assume that the foregoing allegations, so far as they state facts, are true. The state, however, does not admit their truth.

In his briefs and oral argument before this court, Jackson makes two contentions: (1) that the carrying out of the sentence of death would deprive him of due process of law and (2) that it would amount to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He seeks a permanent stay of the death penalty, not release from prison.

It is conceded that, at the time of the commission of the...

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