State of North Carolina v. United States Davis v. Same

• Decision Date: 11 June 1945
• Docket Number: 561,Nos. 560,s. 560
• Citation: 89 L.Ed. 1760,65 S.Ct. 1260,325 U.S. 507
• Parties: STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. DAVIS, Economic Stabilization Director, v. SAME
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

325 U.S. 507

65 S.Ct. 1260

89 L.Ed. 1760

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA et al.

v UNITED STATES et al.

DAVIS, Economic Stabilization Director,

v. SAME.

Nos. 560, 561.

Argued and Submitted April 23, 24, 1945.

Decided June 11, 1945.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 8, 1945.

See 66 S.Ct. 9.

Messrs. F. C. Hillyer, of Jacksonville, Fla., and J. C. B. Ehringhaus, of Raleigh, N.C., for appellants State of North Carolina and others.

Messrs. Richard H. Field, David F. Cavers, and Malcolm D. Miller, all of Washington, D.C., for Wm. H. Davis and another.

Mr. J. Stanley Payne, of Washington, D.C., for appellees United States and Interstate Commerce Commission.

Mr. Charles Clark, of Washington, D.C., for appellees Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. and others.

Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

The North Carolina State Utilities Commission brought suit to enjoin enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission. 258 I.C.C. 133. The Federal Economic Stabilization Director acting through the Price Administrator sought and was granted the right to intervene as a party plaintiff. A federal district court of three judges denied the injunction, 56 F.Supp. 606, and the case is here on direct appeal under § 210 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(27) note.

This clash between state and federal agencies came about because the State Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission each claimed the paramount power to fix railroad rates in North Carolina. The North Carolina Commission ordered railroads doing business in the state to charge no more than 1.65 cents per mile for carrying intra-state coach passengers from one point in the state to another. Despite this State Commission order, the Interstate Commerce Commission authorized the same railroads to charge 2.2 cents per mile for the same type of carriage.¹

The Interstate Commerce Commission asserted its power to prescribe these purely intra-state rates under § 13(4) of the Interstate Commerce Act. 49 U.S.C. § 13(4), 49 U.S.C.A. § 13(4). That section, which is set forth below, ² empow- ers the Interstate Commerce Commission to prescribe intrastate railroad rates under certain conditions, despite conflicting state orders as to the same rates. The conditions that Congress imposed as a prerequisite to Commission action are that the Commission shall hold a 'full hearing' and find that the state-prescribed rates either caused (1) undue or unreasonable advantage, preference, or prejudice, as between persons or localities in intra-state commerce on the one hand, and interstate commerce on the other hand, or (2) undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate commerce. The Commission held hearings which are challenged on various grounds as falling short of 'full' hearings. It made findings and concluded that the 1.65 state rate was unduly prejudicial to interstate passengers, and that the state rate constituted an undue and unjust discrimination against interstate commerce. These conclusions are attacked on the ground that they are supported neither by findings nor evidence. The crucial question nvolved in all these contentions is whether the indispensable prerequisites to the exercise of the Federal Commission's power over intra-state rates have been shown to exist with sufficient certainty. Before making any detailed reference to the hearings, findings or evidence, it would be helpful to set out certain guiding principles which lead us to a resolution of the crucial question.

Section 13(4) does not relate to the Commission's power to regulate interstate transportation as such. As to interstate regulation, the Commission is granted the broadest powers to prescribe rates and other transportation details. See United States et al. v. Penn. R.R. Co., et al., 323 U.S. 612, 65 S.Ct. 471. No such breadth of authority is granted to the Commission over purely intra-state rates. Neither § 13 (4), nor any other congressional legislation, indicates a purpose to attempt wholly to deprive the states of their primary authority to regulate intra-state rates. Since the enactment of § 13(4), as before its enactment, a state's power over intra-state rates is exclusive up to the point where its action would bring about the prejudice or discrimination prohibited by that section. When this point—not always easy to mark—is reached, and not until then, can the Interstate Commerce Commission nullify a state-prescribed rate.

Intra-state transportation is primarily the concern of the state. The power of the Interstate Commerce Commission with reference to such intra-state rates is dominant only so far as necessary to alter rates which injuriously affect interstate transportation. American Express Co. v. South Dakota, 244 U.S. 617, 625, 37 S.Ct. 656, 660, 61 L.Ed. 1352. A scrupulous regard for maintaining the power of the state in this field has caused this Court to require that Interstate Commerce Commission orders giving precedence to federal rates must meet 'a high standard of certainty.' Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 245 U.S. 493, 510, 38 S.Ct. 170, 176, 62 L.Ed. 425. Before the Commission can nullify a state rate, justification for the 'exercise of the federal power must clearly appear.' Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194, 211, 212, 51 S.Ct. 119, 123, 124, 75 L.Ed. 291. See also City of Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685, 64 S.Ct. 327, 88 L.Ed. 400. And the intention to interfere with the state's ratemaking function is not to be presumed, Arkansas Commission v. Chicago, etc., R.R., 274 U.S. 597, 603, 47 S.Ct. 724, 726, 71 L.Ed. 1224; nor must its intention in this respect be left in serious doubt. Illinois Commission v. Thompson, 318 U.S. 675, 684—685, 63 S.Ct. 834, 838, 87 L.Ed. 1075. The foregoing cases also stand for the principle that the Interstate Commerce Commission is without authority to supplant a state-prescribed intra-state rate unless there are clear findings, supported by evidence, of each element essential to the exercise of that power by the Commission. We hall now take up the two grounds upon which the Commission set aside the state order.

Prejudice Against Interstate Passengers. On this aspect of the case the Commission's findings were that the interstate 2.2 cents rate was just and reasonable; that the accommodations afforded interstate and intra-state passengers in North Carolina were 'substantially similar'; that in general these passengers traveled in the same trains and in the same cars; and from these, it concluded that since interstate passengers were forced to pay higher fares than intra-state passengers, there was an undue and unreasonable disadvantage and prejudice of interstate passengers. On these findings it issued the statewide order requiring all intra-state passengers to pay 2.2 cents per mile. We think these findings failed to give adequate support to the order.

In effect, the Commission's holding was, and its argument is here, that § 13(4) automatically requires complete uniformity in intra-state and interstate rates. That argument is in short that under our national transportation system interstate travelers and intra-state travelers use the same trains; for a state to fix a lower intra-state rate than the interstate rate is therefore an undue advantage to the intra-state passengers and an unfair discrimination against the interstate passengers. If Congress intended to permit such an oversimplified form of proof to establish 'unjust discrimination', then its requirement of a 'full hearing' was mere surplusage. In fact, it need have provided for no hearing at all since it could have easily stated in its legislation that intra-state rates shall never be lower than interstate rates. The argument of the Commission in this regard runs counter to the language of § 13(4), and would call for a declaration by us that Congress intended by this section to reverse the entire transportation history of the nation. The clause about 'persons' and 'localities' is as the legislative history shows, a practical enactment into law of a decision of this Court in the 'SHREVEPORT' CASE.³ HOUSTON, E. & w.t. ry. co. v. united sTATES, 234 u.s. 342, 34 S.Ct. 833, 58 L.Ed. 1341. In the 'Shreveport' case the Commission found from evidence that certain Texas intra-state rates to Texas points were far below the interstate rates charged to carry the same types of freight from Shreveport, Louisiana. The distances and conditions of both transportations were found to be substantially the same. The Court sustained the Commission's conclusion that the Texas intra-state rates constituted an unfair discrimination against Shreveport and persons doing business there. The Commission's order was not statewide, but only required removal of the discrimination against the particular localities and business groups affected by the discrimination.

In Wisconsin Railroad Commission v. C.B. & O.R.R. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 579, 580, 42 S.Ct. 232, 234, 235, 66 L.Ed. 371, 22 A.L.R. 1086, this Court refused to sustain a Commission order nullifying all state passenger rates because of a discrimination against interstate travelers and against localities. The Commission had found there as here that state and inte state passengers rode on the same trains in the same car and perhaps in the same seats. It had found there, as it did here, that this constituted an undue discrimination against interstate passengers, and it issued a general sweeping order against all intra-state passenger rates. This Court pointed out that the order went far beyond the principles announced in the Shreveport case, and declined to sustain the statewide order on this phase of the case. See also Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194, 208, 51 S.Ct. 119, 122, 75 L.Ed. 291. So here, the finding that interstate passengers paid higher fares than intra-state passengers for the same facilities is an inadequate support for nullifying state rates on the ground that they constitute...