Young v. City of Ann Arbor

Decision Date08 December 1982
Docket NumberNo. 52031,52031
Citation119 Mich.App. 512,326 N.W.2d 547
PartiesMary Lorraine YOUNG, Personal Representative of the Estate of Kenneth Lewis Young, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The CITY OF ANN ARBOR, a municipal corporation; Chief of Police Walter Krasny; Captain Robert Conn; Sergeant G. Miller; Officer Burke and Officer Vail, jointly and severally, Defendants- Appellees.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Donald B. Greenspon, Detroit, and Fred Surkow, Belleville, for plaintiff-appellant.

John K. Van Loon, Chief Asst. City Atty., for defendants-appellees.

Before CAVANAGH, P.J., and MAHER and GLASER *, JJ.

CAVANAGH, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiff's husband committed suicide by hanging himself with his belt while held in a detention cell at the Ann Arbor Police Station. Plaintiff sued defendants, claiming that the cells in the station were maintained by the city in an unsafe condition and that the individual defendants had been negligent in performing their ministerial duties. At the close of plaintiff's proofs, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of one of the arresting officers, the chief of police, and the City of Ann Arbor. The jury subsequently returned a verdict in favor of the remaining three defendants. A motion for a new trial having been denied, plaintiff appeals by right from the judgments in favor of defendants.

There are two issues on appeal. First, did the trial court err by holding that the regulations promulgated by the Michigan Department of Corrections (hereinafter "the Department") did not apply to the cell in which plaintiff's decedent was confined? Second, did the trial court erroneously direct a verdict of no cause of action on plaintiff's "defect in a public building" claim against the city?

The trial court ruled that the Department's rules concerning the removal of belts from prisoners and the frequency of visual supervision of prisoners did not apply to the cell in which plaintiff's decedent was confined. The rules were allowed into evidence only as possible standards against which the jury could determine the reasonableness of the actions of the individual police officers. The basis for the trial court's ruling was its finding that the Ann Arbor facility was not a "lockup", as defined in the Department's regulations, but rather was a "holding cell", which was not subject to the Department's rules.

Under its enabling act, the Department is charged with the following responsibilities:

"The department shall supervise and inspect local jails and houses of correction for the purpose of obtaining facts in any manner pertaining to the usefulness and proper management of said penal institutions and of promoting proper, efficient and humane administration thereof, and shall promulgate rules and standards with relation thereto." M.C.L. Sec. 791.262; M.S.A. Sec. 28.2322. (Emphasis added.)

Defendants argue that the statute gives the Department authority to promulgate rules governing the practices in jails alone and does not give the Department jurisdiction over all local penal facilities. The statute does not define what constitutes a "local jail". The Department has defined a "jail" to be:

"Rule 503. * * *

"(3) 'Jail' means a facility operated by a unit of local government for the physical detention and correction of persons charged with or convicted of criminal offenses." 1979 AC, R 791.503.

We note this definition differs only slightly from the Department's definition of a "lockup", which is:

"(4) 'Lockup' means a facility operated by a unit of local government used to detain persons charged with or convicted of criminal offenses for a period of less than 48 hours." 1979 AC, R 791.503.

The purpose of the statute authorizing the Department to supervise and inspect local penal institutions is to promote proper, efficient and humane administration of those facilities by drawing upon the experience and expertise of the Department. There is no reason to believe that the Legislature intended such authority to extend only to local facilities which detain charged or convicted persons for more than 48 hours, that which distinguishes a "jail" from a "lockup". We conclude that the Legislature intended to give the Department the authority to supervise and inspect all local penal institutions, however specifically designated. We hold that the statutory term "local jail" was meant to encompass any facility operated by a unit of local government for the physical detention of persons charged with or convicted of a criminal offense. This includes, at least, city and county jails and local lockups.

Defendants argue that, even if the Department has the authority to promulgate rules for lockups, such authority does not extend to a "holding cell" which is not within a lockup, such as the cell where plaintiff's decedent died. A "holding cell" is defined by the Department as:

" * * * a cell used to hold 1 or more persons temporarily while awaiting processing, booking, court appearance or discharge." 1979 AC, R 791.502(4).

Since we conclude that the Department has authority to supervise, inspect and promulgate rules for all local penal facilities, we find it unnecessary to determine whether the Ann Arbor facility was specifically a "lockup" or a "holding cell". The Department's rules clearly apply to a lockup and to a holding cell within a lockup. See 1979 AC, R 791.511(1) and 791.557. It would be inconsistent to hold that the Department's rules apply to a holding cell within a lockup, as specifically defined by the rules, but not to a holding cell within a local penal facility which does not meet the specific definition of a jail or lockup. Inmates confined to a holding cell should be given the same rights and protections regardless of the label placed on the holding facility.

Furthermore, if the Department's rules mandatorily apply only to lockups, and not to holding cells which are not contained in lockups, then those persons who are merely detained temporarily while awaiting processing would be afforded less protection than inmates convicted of criminal offenses who are confined in lockups. We decline to give legal sanction to defendants' "holding cell" versus "lockup" exercise in verbal gymnastics when the result would be to deny equal care to those citizens who, if anything, are entitled to greater protection. It has repeatedly been held that the state owes a higher degree of care to those incarcerated in its jails who have not been tried than to those who have already been convicted of criminal offenses. People v. Bland, 52 Mich.App. 649, 656, 218 N.W.2d 56 (1974).

In light of our finding that the Ann Arbor facility was required to follow the Department's rules, the trial court erred in denying plaintiff's request to instruct the jury on the mandatory applicability of the supervisory rules which required belts to be removed from inmates and visual inspection of inmates at least once every sixty minutes. See 1979 AC, R 791.632 and 791.635. The testimony presented at trial clearly showed that defendants did not comply with either of these two rules. Plaintiff was entitled to a jury instruction that failure to comply with these rules was evidence of negligence. See SJI2d 12.05; GCR 1963, 516.6(2); Javis v. Ypsilanti Bd. of Ed., 393 Mich. 689, 697, 227 N.W.2d 543 (1975).

In addition, we hold that the trial court erred in directing a verdict in favor of defendant Police Chief Walter Krasny. As chief of police this defendant was responsible for overseeing and enforcing all policies and practices in the Ann Arbor facility. His testimony at trial indicated that he did not require his staff to enforce the pertinent Department regulations. Since we find that the Ann Arbor facility was required to follow the Department's rules, it was incumbent upon defendant Krasny to enforce the regulations. This was a ministerial duty of his office, a violation of which is not protected by any official immunity. Walkowski v. Macomb County Sheriff, 64 Mich.App. 460, 236 N.W.2d 516 (1975). As this Court said in Antkiewicz v. Motorists Mutual Ins. Co., 91 Mich.App. 389, 397, 283 N.W.2d 749 (1979), vacated on other grounds 407 Mich. 936 (1979):

"The liability of a public officer for tortious acts committed in the scope of his employment is determined by deciding whether the acts of the officer are 'discretionary' or 'ministerial'. Discretionary acts are normally protected under governmental immunity; ministerial acts are not. Prosser Torts (4th ed.), Sec. 132, pp. 989-990.

"The difference between discretionary and ministerial acts is one of degree. Discretionary acts are those of a legislative, executive, or judicial character. * * *

"Ministerial acts are those where the public officer has little decision-making power during the course of...

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