United States v. Detroit Cleveland Navigation Co

• Decision Date: 05 November 1945
• Docket Number: No. 22,22
• Citation: 66 S.Ct. 75,90 L.Ed. 38,326 U.S. 236
• Parties: UNITED STATES et al. v. DETROIT & CLEVELAND NAVIGATION CO. et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

326 U.S. 236

66 S.Ct. 75

90 L.Ed. 38

UNITED STATES et al.

v DETROIT & CLEVELAND NAVIGATION CO. et al.

No. 22.

Argued Oct. 9, 10, 1945.

Nov. 5, 1945.

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan.

Mr. Charles H. Weston, of Washington, D.C., for appellants, the United States and Interstate Commerce Commission.

Mr. Sparkman D. Foster, of Detroit, Mich,. for appellants, T. J. McCarthy Steamship Co., and others.

Messrs. Ernest S. Ballard, of Washington, D.C., and S. S. Eisen, of New York City, for appellees.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Interstate Commerce Commission pursuant to § 309(c) of Part III of the Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 941, 49 U.S.C. § 909(c), 49 U.S.C.A. § 909(c), granted to T. J. McCarthy Steamship Co. and Automotive Trades Steamship Co. (whom we will call the applicants) a certificate of convenience and necessity to operate as common carriers in the transportation by water of motor vehicles from Detroit, Michigan to ports on Lake Erie and Lake Superior.¹ 260 I.C.C. 175. The appellees, who were protestants in the proceeding before the Commission and who are common carriers of motor vehicles by vessels on the Great Lakes, challenged that order before a district court of three judges. That court set aside the Commission's order. 57 F.Supp. 81. The case is here on appeal.²

World War II caused the cessation of the production of motor vehicles for civilian use. Prior to that time appellees as common carriers had transported motor vehicles by vessels from Detroit to various ports on the Great Lakes. The applicants owned three vessels equipped as automobile carriers. These vessels were used extensively prior to the war in transporting automobiles from Detroit to Lake Erie ports. They were for the most part under charter to one of the appellees from 1936 through 1941. With the advent of the war the United States requisitioned many of the vessels of the appellees, using some of them for carrying bulk commodities on the Great Lakes and removing others to the salt water. As a result, two of the appellees at the time of the hearing³ in June, 1943, had no automobile carriers and were not operating; the third was operating nine vessels of which five were owned by and operated for the United States. In contrast, the applicants owned their three vessels free and clear of any incumbrance; and while those vessels had been converted for carrying bulk traffic, all of the equipment necessary for reconversion into automobile carriers had been preserved. The Commission found that prior to the war there were insufficient facilities for the movement of automobiles on the Great Lakes during certain peak periods even with the carrying capacity of applicant's vessels included. There was testimony of automobile manufacturers and of motor common carriers that the carrying capacity of applicants' vessels would be needed when the manufacture of automobiles was resumed. The Commission found that prior to the war there was a definite need for the carrying capacity of applicants' vessels in this transportation and that there was a reasonable certainty that a like need for that capacity would arise when the production of automobiles for civilian use was resumed. It found that while the applicants could readily reconvert their vessels to handle automobile traffic, there was considerable uncertainty as to the length of time it would take the appellees to procure and place in operation the additional vessels which would be needed when production of automobiles for civilian use was resumed. It concluded that the public interest would be adversely affected if, after production was resumed, appellees were delayed in acquiring the additional facilities needed to meet the transportation demands. On that basis it held that the proposed service would be required by future public convenience and necessity.

The District Court held that the Commission's order could not be sustained in absence of evidence that applicants' vessels were the only vessels available to appellees to meet the prospective transportation demands beyond that furnished by their own vessels. It concluded that not only was there no finding that if applicants' vessels were not chartered there was no other carrying capacity which could have been acquired but that the record established the contrary.

The case, however, is not one where there is a service presently being rendered and a newcomer seeks entry into the field. Whether in that event the ruling of the District Court would be correct is a question we do not reach. While the authority of appellees to serve as carriers...