Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Flowers

Decision Date02 January 1946
Docket NumberNo. 145,145
Citation326 U.S. 465,90 L.Ed. 203,66 S.Ct. 250
PartiesCOMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. FLOWERS
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

See 326 U.S. 812, 66 S.Ct. 482.

Mr. J. Louis Monarch, of Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Mr. J. N. Ogden, of Mobile, Ala., for respondent.

Mr. Justice MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents a problem as to the meaning and application of the provision of s 23(a)(1)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code1 allowing a deduction for income tax purposes of 'traveling expenses (including the entire amount expended for meals and lodging) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business.'

The taxpayer, a lawyer, has resided with his family in Jackson, Mississippi, since 1903. There he has paid taxes, voted, schooled his children and established social and religious connections. He built a house in Jackson nearly thirty years ago and at all times has maintained it for himself and his family. He has been connected with several law firms in Jackson, one of which he formed and which has borne his name since 1922.

In 1906 the taxpayer began to represent the predecessor of the Gulf, Mobile & Ohio Railroad, his present employer. He acted as trial counsel for the railroad throughout Mississippi. From 1918 until 1927 he acted as special counsel for the railroad in Mississippi. He was elected general solicitor in 1927 and continued to be elected to that position each year until 1930, when he was elected general counsel. Thereafter he was annually elected general counsel until September, 1940, when the properties of the predecessor company and another railroad were merged and he was elected vice president and general counsel of the newly formed Gulf, Mobile & Ohio Railroad.

The main office of the Gu f, Mobile & Ohio Railroad is in Mobile, Alabama, as was also the main office of its predecessor. When offered the position of general solicitor in 1927, the taxpayer was unwilling to accept it if it required him to move from Jackson to Mobile. He had established himself in Jackson both professionally and personally and was not desirous of moving away. As a result, an arrangement was made between him and the railroad whereby he could accept the position and continue to reside in Jackson on condition that he pay his traveling expenses between Mobile and Jackson and pay his living expenses in both places. This arrangement permitted the taxpayer to determine for himself the amount of time he would spend in each of the two cities and was in effect during 1939 and 1940, the taxable years in question.

The railroad company provided an office for the taxpayer in Mobile but not in Jackson. When he worked in Jackson his law firm provided him with office space, although he no longer participated in the firm's business or shared in its profits. He used his own office furniture and fixtures at this office. The railroad, however, furnished telephone service and a typewriter and desk for his secretary. It also paid the secretary's expenses while in Jackson. Most of the legal business of the railroad was centered in or conducted from Jackson, but this business was handled by local counsel for the railroad. The taxpayer's participation was advisory only and was no different from his participation in the railroad's legal business in other areas.

The taxpayer's principal post of business was at the main office in Mobile. However, during the taxable years of 1939 and 1940, he devoted nearly all of his time to matters relating to the merger of the railroads. Since it was left to him where he would do his work, he spent most of his time in Jackson during this period. In connection with the merger, one of the companies was involved in certain litigation in the federal court in Jackson and the taxpayer participated in that litigation.

During 1939 he spent 203 days in Jackson and 66 in Mobile, making 33 trips between the two cities. During 1940 he spent 168 days in Jackson and 102 in Mobile, making 40 trips between the two cities. The railroad paid all of his traveling expenses when he went on business trips to points other than Jackson or Mobile. But it paid none of his expenses in traveling between these two points or while he was at either of them.

The taxpayer deducted $900 in his 1939 income tax return and $1,620 in his 1940 return as traveling expenses incurred in making trips from Jackson to Mobile and as expenditures for meals and hotel accommodations while in Mobile. 2 The Commissioner disallowed the deductions, which action was sustained by the Tax Court. But the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court's judgment, 148 F.2d 163, and we granted certiorari because of a conflict between the decision below and that reached by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Barnhill v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 913.

The portion of § 23(a)(1)(A) authorizing the deduction of 'traveling expenses (including the entire amount expended for meals and lodging) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business' is one of the specific examples given by Congress in that section of 'ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business.' It is to be contrasted with the provision of § 24(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, § 24(a)(1), disallowing any deductions for 'personal, living, or f mily expenses.' And it is to be read in light of the interpretation given it by Sec. 19.23(a)-2 of Treasury Regulations 103, promulgated under the Internal Revenue Code. This interpretation, which is precisely the same as that given to identical traveling expense deductions authorized by prior and successive Revenue Acts,3 is deemed to possess implied legislative approval and to have the effect of law. Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 59 S.Ct. 45, 83 L.Ed. 52; Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287, 66 S.Ct. 120. In pertinent part, this interpretation states that 'Traveling expenses, as ordi- narily understood, include railroad fares and meals and lodging. If the trip is undertaken for other than business purposes, the railroad fares are personal expenses and the meals and lodging are living expenses. If the trip is solely on business, the reasonable and necessary traveling expenses, including railroad fares, meals, and lodging, are business expenses. * * * Only such expenses as are reasonable and necessary in the conduct of the business and directly attributable to it may be deducted. * * * Commuters' fares are not considered as business expenses and are not deductible.'

Three conditions must thus be satisfied before a traveling expense deduction may be made under § 23(a)(1)(A):

(1) The expense must be a reasonable and necessary traveling expense, as that term is generally understood. This includes such items as transportation fares and food and lodging expenses incurred while traveling.

(2) The expense must be incurred 'while away from home.'

(3) The expense must be incurred in pursuit of business. This means that there must be a direct connection between the expenditure and the carrying on of the trade or business of the taxpayer or of his employer. Moreover, such an expenditure must be necessary or appropriate to the development and pursuit of the business or trade.

Whether particular expenditures fulfill these three conditions so as to entitle a taxpayer to a deduction is purely a question of fact in most instances. See Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 475, 64 S.Ct. 249, 254, 88 L.Ed. 171. And the Tax Court's inferences and conclusions on such a factual matter, under established principles, should not be disturbed by an appellate court. Commissioner v. Scottish American Co., 323 U.S. 119, 65 S.Ct. 169; Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 64 S.Ct. 239, 88 L.Ed. 248.

In this instance, the Tax Court without detailed elaboration concluded that 'The situation presented in this proceeding is, in principle, no different from that in which a taxpayer's place of employment is in one city and for reasons satisfactory to himself he resides in another.' It accordingly disallowed the deductions on the ground that they represent living and personal expenses rather than traveling expenses incurred while away from home in the pursuit of business. The court below accepted the Tax Court's findings of fact but reversed its judgment on the basis that it had improperly construed the word 'home' as used in the second condition precedent to a traveling expense deduction under § 23(a)(1)(A). The Tax Court, it was said, erroneously construed the word to mean the post, station or place of business where the taxpayer was employed—in this instance, Mobile—and thus erred in concluding that the expenditures in issue were not incurred 'while away from home.' The Court below felt that the word was to be given no such 'unusual' or 'extraordinary' meaning in this statute, that it simply meant 'that place where one in fact resides' or 'the principal place of abode of one who has the intention to live there permanently.' 148 F.2d at page 164. Since the taxpayer here admittedly had his home, as thus defined, in Jackson and since the expenses were incurred while he was away from Jackson, the ded ction was permissible.

The meaning of the word 'home' in § 23(a)(1)(A) with reference to a taxpayer residing in one city and working in another has engendered much difficulty and litigation. 4 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation (1942) § 25.82. The Tax Court4 and the administrative rulings5 have consistently defined it as the equivalent of the taxpayer's place of business. See Barnhill v. Commissioner, supra, 4 Cir. On the other hand, the decision below and Wallace v. Commissioner, 9 Cir., 144 F.2d 407, have flatly rejected that view and have confined the term to the taxpayer's actual residence. See also Coburn v. Commissioner, 2 Cir., 138 F.2d 763.

We deem it unnecessary here to enter into or to...

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