Wham-O-Mfg. Co. v. Paradise Manufacturing Co.
Citation | 327 F.2d 748 |
Decision Date | 31 January 1964 |
Docket Number | No. 18442.,18442. |
Parties | WHAM-O-MFG. CO., a corporation, Appellant, v. PARADISE MANUFACTURING CO., a corporation, Appellee. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
Christie, Parker & Hale, and Robert R. Thornton, Pasadena, Cal., for appellant.
William C. Babcock and G. Merle Bergman, Long Beach, Cal., for appellee.
Before MERRILL and KOELSCH, Circuit Judges, and BOWEN, District Judge.
Wham-O-Mfg. Co., the owner of Carrier patent U.S. Letters Patent #2982547, issued May 2, 1961 brought this suit against Paradise Manufacturing Co. for patent infringement and unfair competition. Both parties are corporations organized under the laws of California and have their principal places of business in that state.
The district court, concluding that the patent was invalid and not infringed, dismissed the infringement claim on defendant's motion for summary judgment; and at the same time the court acting sua sponte dismissed the claim for unfair competition. Plaintiff has appealed. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment.
The patent relates to an amusement device in the form of a slide. The patent claims comprise a combination consisting of a smooth strip of flexible material, such as vinyl plastic, and a sprinkler or "irrigating means" to moisten the surface of the material. The two components are integrated by attachment of the water conduit, either along a side or at an end of the strip. The contrivance is useful for a sport (?) referred to as "body planing." Thus, when the slide is laid out and the surface wetted a player can hurl his body in a horizontal plane upon it and slide like a flat stone skipping upon a pond.
The district court declared that the presumption of validity arising from the grant of the Carrier patent 35 U.S.C.A. § 282, Neff Inst. Corp. v. Cohu Electronics Inc., 298 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1962) was "upset" because the patent examiner had failed to consider the latest pertinent prior art during the prosecution of the patent application. Gomez v. Granat Bros., 177 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. den. 338 U.S. 937, 70 S.Ct. 351, 94 L.Ed. 578 (1950). We disagree. It appears that the Carrier patent did not list as references any patents which disclosed an irrigating means like the one comprising an element of the claimed combinations, but the defendant in support of its motion submitted as an exhibit an earlier patent to one Summers (U.S. Letters Patent #2,314,525 issued May 13, 1943). We do not understand how this omission could in any way affect the presumption. In Nordell v. International Filter Co., 119 F.2d 948 (7th Cir. 1949) and Himmel Bros. Co. v. Serrick Corp., 122 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1941), cases relied upon by the defendant, it appeared that the combination itself was anticipated by a single patent not listed as a reference in the patent under attack. See also A. R. Inc. v. Electro-Voice Inc., 311 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1952). That is not true here, for Summers at best discloses only one of the constituent parts of the patented combination.1 And indeed, plaintiff readily acknowledges that these parts individually are all old.
It has long been settled that the separate presence in the prior art of each of the elements of a combination will not prevent the finding of invention.2 But the question remains whether the concept of the joinder of the parts evidences invention. In Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Corp. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 150, 71 S.Ct. 127, 129, 95 L.Ed. 162 (1950) the Supreme Court said that: "While this Court has sustained combination patents, it has never ventured to give a precise and comprehensive definition of the test to be applied in such cases." And numerous decisions demonstrate that the Court's inquiries have proceeded along at least two different lines. For example, in Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corporation, supra, Hailes v. Van Wormer, supra, and Pickering v. McCullough, 104 U.S. 310, 26 L. Ed. 749, the Court looked to find whether all the component parts of the combination cooperated with one another to produce a single new and useful result and, having ascertained that each operated independently, held the claims invalid for lack of invention.3 However, in Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 62 S.Ct. 37, 86 L.Ed. 58 (1941), Altoona Publix Theatres v. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477, 55 S.Ct. 455, 79 L.Ed. 1005 (1937) and Concrete Appliance Corp. v. Gomery, 269 U.S. 177, 46 S.Ct. 42, 70 L.Ed. 222 (1925), the inquiry was not so much directed to the functioning of the various elements as it was to the degree of skill evidenced by their assemblage into the new combinations; and in those cases the Court invalidated the patents on the ground that to conceive such combinations required no more than ordinary mechanical skill (35 U.S.C.A. § 103).4
We need not pause in the case at bar to determine whether the material and the sprinkler operate in combination to produce the requisite new unitary result. Even if we were of the opinion — which we are not — See Grinnell Washing Machine Co. v. E. E. Johnson Company, 247 U.S. 426, 38 S.Ct. 547, 62 L. Ed. 1196 (1918) that they do, it is clear to us beyond any doubt that bringing them together did not evidence the "inventive genius," often spoken of by the Supreme Court as a test for invention. See Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 340 U.S. 154, 71 S.Ct. 131, 95 L.Ed. 162.
Slides, of course, are not novel and we have no hesitancy in recognizing that they were a common type of amusement device long before the date of Carrier's patent (May 2, 1961). The fact is likewise well known that a film of water will lower the co-efficient of friction of a smooth surface — in short, that a slide can be made more slippery than it otherwise would be by adding lubricant through means of a sprinkler. We think, as did the trial court, that the combination was obvious. Particularly apt are the following extracts from Glagovsky v. Bowcraft Trimming Co., 267 F.2d 479 (1st Cir. 1959), cert. den. 361 U.S. 884, 80 S.Ct. 155, 4 L.Ed.2d 120 (1959), a case very much like the one before us: (267 F.2d p. 480). (267 F.2d p. 482).
By its judgment the District Court also determined and decreed that defendant's slide, marketed under the name "Surf N'Glide" did not infringe any claims of the Carrier patent. In view of our conclusion that the patent was invalid, we do not reach the issue of infringement. A valid patent is essential to such a claim. Bergman v. Aluminum Lock Shingle Corp., 251 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1958); Diversey Corp. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 255 F.2d 60 (7th Cir. 1958).
The propriety of the district court's dismissal of the claim of unfair competition presents a more difficult question. Plaintiff had alleged in its complaint that the subject matter was within the pendent jurisdiction of the district court by virtue of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338(b). That section provides that a district court may entertain and adjudicate "a claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial and related claim under the * * * patent * * laws." The district court clearly was of the view that loss of jurisdiction over the dependent claim was a necessary corollary of its ruling of patent invalidity. It opined that "The second count being for unfair competition finds no jurisdictional support in 28 U.S.C.A. 1338 (b), inasmuch as judgment goes against the plaintiff on the first count i. e. patent infringement and hence there is no `substantial and related claim' under the patent law to support jurisdiction of the unfair competition count."5 In this the court erred.
The Supreme Court in Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 243, 53 S.Ct. 586, 77 L.Ed. 1148 (1933) said: "This court has held that the circuit court, having acquired jurisdiction by reason of the federal questions involved, `had the right to decide all the questions in the case, even though it decided the Federal questions adversely to the party raising them, or even if it omitted to decide them at all, but decided the case on local or state questions only.'" It is true that this statement was made with reference to a complaint disclosing two grounds, one federal and the other local, for recovery on a single cause of action and not to a complaint covering two distinct claims — one of which was non-federal. But Section 1338(b) was thereafter enacted. And as we noted in Stauffer v. Exley, 184 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir. 1950), ...
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