Hall v. Ge Plastic Pacific Pte Ltd., 02-20377.

CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
Citation327 F.3d 391
Docket NumberNo. 02-20377.,02-20377.
PartiesClifton HALL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GE PLASTIC PACIFIC PTE LTD., et al., Defendants, General Electric Company, Defendant-Appellee.
Decision Date03 April 2003

Joe William Meyer, Nathan A. Steadman, Keith Landis Woods (argued), Meyer, Knight & Williams, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Heidi Kaye Hubbard (argued), Oliver Garcia, Williams & Connolly, Washington, DC, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before JONES, WIENER and DeMOSS Circuit Judges.

DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:

Clifton Hall, Jr. ("Hall"), the plaintiff-appellant, brought a personal injury lawsuit, in Texas state court, against GE Plastic Pacific PTE Limited and General Electric Company (collectively, "GE") claiming GE had manufactured an extension cord that was allegedly the cause of a fire in which Hall was severely burned. The matter was removed to federal court and then referred to a magistrate judge. GE moved for summary judgment based on judicial estoppel. The magistrate judge applied federal law and recommended granting GE's motion. After de novo review, the district court adopted the magistrate's memorandum and recommendation and granted GE's motion and entered final judgment. Hall now appeals claiming state law should have been applied and judicial estoppel was inappropriate.

BACKGROUND

This is the second lawsuit that Hall has filed to recover for injuries he suffered on July 30, 1996, when he was burned in a fire at his grandparents's home. In July of 1998 Hall, then 15 years old, and other injured parties, brought the first lawsuit in a Texas state court. As discovery proceeded in the lawsuit, Hall, through a next friend, alleged that the fire was caused by a faulty electrical extension cord, that the cord was purchased at a Wal-Mart store, and that various companies were responsible as manufacturer of the cord. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas and placed before Judge Vanessa Gilmore, the same judge who presided over the present case.

On May 14, 1999, Hall amended his complaint to include claims against Pacific Electricord Company ("Pacific") and Woods Industries, Incorporated ("Woods"). Ultimately, Hall obtained an affidavit indicating that the cord was purchased from a Wal-Mart store and answers from Wal-Mart to interrogatories indicating that Wal-Mart only sold cords manufactured by Pacific and Woods. Pacific persuaded Hall that it did not manufacture the cord and Hall agreed to dismiss claims against Pacific.

Hall then moved for Interlocutory Summary Judgment against Wal-Mart and Woods, claiming "Woods is the only remaining manufacturer." Woods also moved for summary judgment claiming it did not manufacture the cord and supported its claim with an affidavit from an expert who suggested that GE may have manufactured the cord. In his Response and in his Supplemental Response to Woods's Motion for Summary Judgment, Hall challenged this evidence claiming, "Woods remains as the only possible and viable manufacturer and/or supplier" and "[t]he remnant cord is a Woods product." Additionally, on May 8, 2000, in an affidavit Hall's attorney stated, "Plaintiffs believe that the combination of the documents and the deposition testimony of [Woods's expert] will show from Woods' [sic] own resources that Woods or one of Woods' [sic] manufacturers, distributors or suppliers was the creator of the extension cord which is the subject of this litigation."1

While these motions were pending, Woods moved for leave to file a third party complaint against GE. Hall opposed this motion and argued that "[t]he totality of the evidence discovered demonstrates Woods supplied the subject extension cord" and that GE was not a necessary and indispensable party because there could be only one manufacturer of the extension cord. On July 19, 2000, the district court denied Woods's motion for leave to file a third party complaint against GE. The next day, in a minute entry, the court denied both Hall's and Woods's motions for summary judgment.

On August 25, 2000, Judge Gilmore held a pretrial hearing. At the hearing the court questioned why the case should go to trial if Hall could not prove Woods was the manufacturer. Hall's attorney insisted that he could prove that Woods was the manufacturer. The court then asked the parties if they had tried to talk about the case and resolve the matter. The court then indicated the case should be set for trial.

On September 27, 2000, Hall's attorney sent letters to two expert witnesses informing them that the case had settled but requesting that they keep their files open because he "anticipate[d] further prosecution of this case against General Electric." Some time in October of 2000, Hall and the other plaintiffs reached formal settlement with Woods, Wal-Mart, and the defendants's insurance underwriter, Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company ("Wausau"). The defendants collectively settled for $15 million and the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the claim. On October 4, 2000, the district court entered final judgment giving counsel the right to reinstate the suit if the settlement was not consummated.

On November 24, 2000, Hall filed the current lawsuit against GE in Texas state court. Hall, the sole plaintiff, now claims that GE, not Woods, manufactured the extension cord. In mid-December, while the suit was pending in state court, Hall entered into a "reimbursement agreement" with Wausau. Wausau agreed to cover Hall's expenses in this current litigation in return for Hall sharing proportionately any recovery with Wausau up to Wausau receiving a maximum amount equal to the amount Wausau paid Hall to settle the previous suit.

On January 5, 2001, GE removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds and the case was assigned to Judge Gilmore who referred all pretrial matters to Magistrate Judge Mary Milloy. On May 11, 2001, GE moved for summary judgment. GE argued that Hall was judicially estopped from pursuing the second suit because Hall was arguing a position that is inconsistent with his earlier claim that only Woods was the manufacturer of the extension cord. Hall successfully asserted this earlier claims, and Hall should not be allowed to manipulate the court system into allowing him double recovery. Hall argued that state law should apply and judicial estoppel is inappropriate.

On January 23, 2002, the magistrate judge issued a Memorandum and Recommendation that first considered whether federal law should apply and then applied federal law concerning judicial estoppel and concluded that judicial estoppel is applicable and GE's motion should be granted. Hall filed several objections but on February 28, 2002, after de novo review, Judge Gilmore adopted the Memorandum and Recommendation in full and entered final judgment.

Hall timely filed notice of appeal and claims the district court erred because Texas, not federal, law concerning judicial estoppel should apply in this case and that the "elements" of judicial estoppel have not been satisfied and therefore GE's motion for summary judgment should not have been granted. GE argues that applying federal law is appropriate, although irrelevant because Texas law requires Hall's claims to be estopped as well, and the district court was correct in finding judicial estoppel and granting GE's motion.

DISCUSSION
I. Whether the district court erred in applying federal, not state, law on the issue of judicial estoppel.

Whether the district court applied the proper law is subject to de novo review. Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 358 (5th Cir.1999). "Federal courts apply state substantive law when adjudicating diversity-jurisdiction claims, but in doing so apply federal procedural law to the proceedings." Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 42 F.3d 948, 950 (5th Cir.1995) (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938)). To determine whether an issue is substantive or procedural, this Court must consider the "twin aims" of Erie: the discouragement of forum shopping and the avoidance of the inequitable administration of the laws. Cates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 928 F.2d 679, 687 (5th Cir.1991).

Application of federal law was appropriate in this case for two reasons that are consistent with the aims of Erie. First, in the instant case, the application of federal law is not outcome determinative because Texas law would likely require the same result and therefore applying federal law does not encourage forum shopping. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Corp., 356 U.S. 525, 537, 78 S.Ct. 893, 2 L.Ed.2d 953 (1958) (outlining the role of outcome in the Erie analysis); see also Zipp Indus. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 39 S.W.3d 658, 665 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no writ) (stating that under Texas law "if a party takes an affirmative position in a proceeding and is successful in having the court adopt its position, the party doing so may be judicially estopped from later taking an inconsistent position in that or in another proceeding, even though the prior action is not a sworn declaration"). Second, although many courts have simply assumed that either federal or state law applies and therefore have applied either federal or state law without analysis, the majority of cases to consider the question have concluded that federal law should apply because a federal court should have the ability "to protect itself from manipulation" and this ability should not vary in a diversity action because it is a matter of federal procedure and not a substantive concern. Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 602-04 (9th Cir.1996) (discussing diversity cases applying federal and state law on judicial estoppel); see also New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001) (stating the purpose of judicial estoppel is "to protect...

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