Anderson v. Larson

Citation327 F.3d 762
Decision Date30 April 2003
Docket NumberNo. 02-2071.,02-2071.
PartiesThomas J. ANDERSON, and Karen L. Anderson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Jeffrey L. LARSON, Individually and as County Attorney for Shelby County, Iowa; Durwood Eugene Cavenaugh, Individually and as Sheriff of Shelby County, Iowa; Mark Hervey, Individually and as Deputy Sheriff of Shelby County, Iowa; and Todd G. Jones, Individually and as Special Agent of the Iowa Division of Narcotics Enforcement, Shelby County, Iowa, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

D.C. Bradford, argued, Omaha, NE, for appellant.

Jeffrey D. Farrell, argued, Asst. Atty. Gen., Des Moines, IA, for appellee Todd Jones.

John P. Mullen, argued, Omaha, NE, for appellees Larson, Cavenaugh, Hervey and Shelby County, IA.

Before McMILLIAN, FAGG and BYE, Circuit Judges.

BYE, Circuit Judge.

Thomas J. Anderson, an attorney, and his wife Karen L. Anderson brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against three officers and a prosecutor for their actions during an investigation and prosecution that resulted in Anderson's conviction for solicitation of a felony. Thomas Anderson alleges violations of his Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution and pendant state law claims. Karen Anderson claims loss of consortium. The district court1 determined the Defendants were immune from the federal and state law claims and granted summary judgment. On appeal the Andersons argue the district court erred in its treatment of the evidence and in holding the Defendants immune. We affirm.

I

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Andersons, the record reveals the following facts. Todd G. Jones, a Special Agent with the Iowa Division of Narcotics Enforcement, was investigating Steven Schuemann for drug offenses in late 1997. Jones posed as a drug dealer and befriended Schuemann. While Jones was undercover Schuemann suggested Jones hire Thomas Anderson, who represented Schuemann, because Anderson accepted drugs as payment for legal services. Schuemann told Jones Anderson had accepted drugs from Schuemann as payment for legal services a few weeks earlier. Jones and Mark Hervey, a Shelby County Deputy Sheriff, later arrested Schuemann for a host of drug offenses.

On February 24, 1998, Schuemann agreed to cooperate with the investigation in exchange for reduced charges. Jeffrey L. Larson, Shelby County Attorney, prepared the cooperation agreement and signed it on behalf of Shelby County. When questioned, Schuemann reaffirmed what he told Jones earlier; his attorney, Anderson, had in the past accepted drugs as payment for legal services and would likely do so again. In accordance with the cooperation agreement, Schuemann introduced Jones, again undercover, to Anderson by telephone. Schuemann told Anderson that Jones had been charged with a crime in another county and needed Anderson's legal services. Schuemann implied Jones was affiliated with another man who had committed a notorious murder in a nearby county a month earlier.

On March 18, 1998, Jones called Anderson on the pretext of discussing the fake charge against him. During that recorded telephone call Jones told Anderson he owed Schuemann a big favor and, to settle it, wanted to pay for Schuemann's legal bills. Jones then told Anderson he would come to Anderson's office and bring "half a Z" (slang for one half-ounce of cocaine) with him. Jones asked whether Anderson knew what that meant and Anderson responded that he knew.

Jones then went to Anderson's office and recorded the conversation. Jones wore leather and long hair and appeared to be a member of a motorcycle gang. Anderson claims Jones had a bulge in his pants and he believed it to be a gun, but Jones was not in fact armed. When Jones asked about Schuemann's legal bills, Anderson explained the legal services for which Schuemann owed him money. When Anderson told Jones the exact amount Schuemann owed, Jones stood up, pulled a bag of cocaine from his pocket, and placed it on Anderson's desk. Anderson picked it up, examined it, untied it, smelled it, and in response to Jones's inquiry, said it was worth six or seven hundred dollars off Schuemann's total bill of $1360. Jones and Anderson then discussed future delivery of drugs to settle the rest of the bill. Anderson kept the cocaine when Jones left his office.

During this encounter Hervey and Cavenaugh were waiting outside Anderson's office but could not hear the exchange between Jones and Anderson. When Jones left Anderson's office he told Hervey and Cavenaugh Anderson had accepted the drugs. Hervey and Cavenaugh entered Anderson's office and arrested him approximately two minutes after Jones left the office. The cocaine was in Anderson's coat pocket.

Anderson was charged with the lone offense of solicitation of a felony pursuant to Iowa Code § 705.1. The Iowa trial court denied his motions to dismiss the charges and to suppress the drug evidence. Anderson claimed innocence but was convicted on December 8, 1998, in a jury trial. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground there was insufficient evidence of solicitation because Anderson had merely responded to Jones's invitation to accept drugs. Iowa v. Anderson, 618 N.W.2d 369, 373-74 (Iowa 2000). In a footnote, the Iowa Supreme Court said, "[w]e do not mean to imply that the defendant committed no crime, only that, whatever offense he committed, it was not solicitation of a felony." Id. at 373, n. 2.

Anderson and his wife brought this action against the county prosecutor and three officers involved in the investigation, arrest and prosecution. They allege in Count 1, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, violations of Anderson's Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution; in Count 2 pendant state law claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, outrageous conduct, invasion of privacy, negligence, gross negligence, negligent hiring and retention and supervision; and in Count 3 a pendant state law claim of intentional interference with Anderson's contractual relationship with Schuemann.

The district court granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims. With regard to the federal causes of action, the district court determined Larson, the prosecutor, was shielded by absolute immunity for his actions. The court further found Anderson could not establish Cavenaugh, Hervey or Jones violated his constitutional rights and they were entitled to qualified immunity. The court held all the Defendants were immune from the state law claims pursuant to Iowa Code § 669, the Iowa Tort Claims Act. The Andersons appeal the district court decision with respect to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment and state claims only.

II

"We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Duffy v. McPhillips, 276 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Lynn v. Deaconess Med. Ctr.-West Campus, 160 F.3d 484, 487 (8th Cir.1998). "We may uphold a grant of summary judgment for any reason supported by the record, even if different from the reasons given by the district court." Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir.1999).

The Andersons complain the district court did not view all the evidence in their favor. They point to two instances of improper weighing of evidence: the district court's discussion of the Iowa Supreme Court decision and its treatment of Anderson's asserted fear of Jones.

The Andersons argued below and on appeal the Iowa Supreme Court's holding supports their assertion Defendants had no probable cause to believe Anderson committed any crime when they investigated, arrested and prosecuted him. The district court noted the Iowa Supreme Court's holding concerned the definition of solicitation, and quoted its footnote explaining the holding did not mean Anderson was innocent of all crimes. The district court's treatment of the Iowa Supreme Court's opinion was relevant to rebut the Andersons' over broad reading of it. Proper interpretation of the Iowa Supreme Court's decision was a question of law, not the improper weighing of factual evidence. Moreover, it was the only correct interpretation of the Iowa court's decision. It was not improper under the summary judgment standard.

In its memorandum and order granting summary judgment, the district court noted: "Anderson now states that he was so intimidated by Jones that he thought his life was in imminent danger unless he accepted the drugs." Anderson interprets the that sentence as suggesting he did not assert he was afraid of Jones before the suit was filed. The Andersons protest the district court's "finding of fact" as improper because Anderson had always claimed to be fearful of Jones. The Andersons, however, read far too much into the district court's use of the word "now." It is clear from the sentence and from the context that whether Anderson's explanation for taking the drugs was new or old is irrelevant to the court's analysis. It certainly was not improper weighing of disputed evidence.

III

The Andersons contend the district court's grant of absolute immunity to Larson was error, and we agree in part. Prosecutors are protected by absolute immunity from civil liability under § 1983 for prosecutorial functions such as the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution, the presentation of the state's case at trial, and other conduct that is intimately associated with the...

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