327 U.S. 582 (1946), 448, American Federation of Labor v. Watson

Docket Nº:No. 448
Citation:327 U.S. 582, 66 S.Ct. 761, 90 L.Ed. 873
Party Name:American Federation of Labor v. Watson
Case Date:March 25, 1946
Court:United States Supreme Court
 
FREE EXCERPT

Page 582

327 U.S. 582 (1946)

66 S.Ct. 761, 90 L.Ed. 873

American Federation of Labor

v.

Watson

No. 448

United States Supreme Court

March 25, 1946

Argued February 8, 1946

[66 S.Ct. 762] APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Syllabus

1. Section 24(8) of the Judicial Code, granting federal district courts jurisdiction of all "suits and proceedings arising under any law regulating commerce," applies to a suit seeking to protect rights asserted under the National Labor Relations Act. P. 589.

2. Section 266 of the Judicial Code, providing that only a three-judge court may issue an interlocutory injunction suspending or restraining "the enforcement, operation, or execution of any statute of a State," applies to a suit in a federal court to enjoin the enforcement of a provision of a state constitution. P. 591.

(a) The policy underlying § 266 admits no distinction between state action to enforce a constitutional provision and state action to enforce an act of the legislature. P. 592.

(b) The word "statute" in § 266 is a compendious summary of various enactments, by whatever method they may be adopted, to which a State gives her sanction, and is at least sufficiently inclusive to embrace constitutional provisions. P. 592.

3. Where a state attorney general has construed a provision of the state constitution as outlawing all closed shop agreements with

Page 583

labor unions, has ordered law enforcement agencies to enforce it by criminal prosecution of labor unions, their officers and agents, and of employers having closed shop agreements, and has threatened and actually instituted quo warranto proceedings to cancel franchises of corporations having and observing closed shop agreements with labor unions, the situation involves a threat of "irreparable injury which is clear and imminent," so as to justify a federal court of equity in interfering with the enforcement of the state law notwithstanding § 267 of the Judicial Code, forbidding the maintenance of suits in equity in the federal courts "in any case where a plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had at law." P. 593.

(a) The disruption in collective bargaining which would be occasioned by holding closed shop agreements illegal would be so serious as to make it futile to attempt to measure the loss in money damages and any remedy at law in the federal courts would be inadequate. P. 594.

(b) The announcement of the state attorney general of a policy to prosecute criminally all violators of the law involved, and the actual institution of quo warranto proceedings against several corporations having closed-shop agreements, make the threat real and imminent. P. 594.

(c) The allegation that there is an imminent threat to an entire system of collective bargaining which, if carried through, will have such repercussions on the relationship between capital and labor as to cause irreparable damage states a cause of action in equity. P. 595.

4. However, in such a situation, the federal district court should not pass on the merits of the controversy until the state constitutional provision has been authoritatively construed by the state courts. Pp. 595-599.

(a) If it is construed so as to eliminate any conflict with the National Labor Relations Act, one of the constitutional questions alleged to exist in this case will disappear. P. 598.

(b) If it is construed as doing no more than to grant an individual working man a cause of action if he is denied employment unless he joins a union or to make closed shop agreements unenforceable between the parties, no case or controversy raising the due process question would be presented by this suit, in which no individual working man is asserting rights against unions or employers and no union is seeking to enforce a closed shop agreement against an employer. P. 598.

Page 584

(c) If it is construed not to be self-executing, suits seeking to raise any constitutional question would be premature until the State supplies sanctions for its enforcement. P. 598.

5. In such circumstances, the district court should retain the bill until a definite determination of the local law questions can be made by the state courts. P. 599.

6. Notwithstanding the fact that one of the principal grounds asserted for equitable relief is the continuance of litigation in the state courts, the purpose of a suit to enjoin enforcement of the state law will not be defeated by retaining the bill pending determination of proceedings in the state courts, since the resources of equity are not inadequate to deal with the problem so as to avoid unnecessary friction with state policies while selective cases go forward in the state courts for an orderly and expeditious adjudication of the state law questions. P. 599.

60 F.Supp. 1010 reversed, and the cause remanded.

Appellants sued to enjoin enforcement of a provision of the Florida constitution (quoted in the opinion) on the ground that it violated the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and the Contract Clause of Article I, § 10 of the Federal Constitution and was in conflict with the National Labor Relations Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act.

A district judge granted a temporary restraining order and caused a three-judge court to be convened pursuant to § 266 of the Judicial Code.

The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction of the controversy, but, without determining whether there was equity in the bill or whether the case should be held until an authoritative interpretation of the Florida law by the courts could first be obtained, proceeded at once to a consideration of the constitutional questions. It held that the Florida law did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendment or the Contract Clause of Article I, § 10 of the Federal Constitution, and that it would be time to consider any conflict with the National Labor Relations Act if and when it arose, since that Act and the Florida law did not, on their face, appear to be in conflict. It accordingly

Page 585

vacated the temporary restraining order and dismissed the bill. 60 F.Supp. 1010.

Reversed and remanded, with directions to retain the bill pending determination of proceedings in the state courts in conformity with the opinion of this Court. P. 599.

DOUGLAS, J., lead opinion

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

[66 S.Ct. 763] In 1944, Florida adopted an amendment to her Constitution1 which reads as follows:

The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or nonmembership in any labor union, or labor organization; provided, that this clause shall not be construed to deny or abridge the right of employees by and through a labor organization or labor union to bargain collectively with their employer.

Shortly thereafter, this suit was instituted to enjoin the enforcement of that provision on the ground that it violated the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and the Contract Clause of Article I, Section 10 of the federal constitution and was in conflict with the National Labor

Page 586

Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., and the Norris-La Guardia Act. 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.

The appellants (plaintiffs below) are various national and local labor organizations operating in Florida, individual employee members of those organizations who are citizens of the United States, and three employers doing business in Florida.2 Appellees are the Attorney General and other officials of Florida charged with duties of law enforcement and various employers.3 The theory of the bill is that the law in question outlaws any agreement which requires membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, all of which we refer to herein as the closed shop. It is alleged that the appellant labor organizations or their affiliates have been designated as the collective bargaining representatives of employees of numerous employers in Florida, and that a large number of those local and national unions either have,4 or desire

Page 587

or are about to become parties to, closed shop agreements with Florida employers. It is alleged that the closed shop agreement constitutes the most effective means possessed by organized labor to attain economic security, to deter practices destructive of public policy and the interests of wage earners, and effectively to bargain collectively. It is alleged that all of the defendant employers and two of the three plaintiff employers are parties to closed shop agreements with some of the appellant unions which expire at various dates in the year 1945 and thereafter continue in effect on a year-to-year basis. These contracts are alleged to be valuable property rights of the appellant unions and their members. It is alleged that one appellant employer (R. J. Gould) and some of the appellant unions are desirous of entering into a closed shop agreement, but are prevented from doing so by the Florida law. It is alleged that the same problem obtains with respect to other employers in Florida.

[66 S.Ct. 764] The bill alleges that appellee law enforcement officials have taken the position that closed shop agreements violate the Florida law, and that they intend to enforce compliance with it by civil and criminal proceedings. The bill alleges that appellee Watson threatens to institute quo warranto proceedings against various companies with whom appellant unions have collective bargaining agreements containing closed shop agreements, whereby it will be sought to cancel their corporate franchises unless the

Page 588

closed shop provisions of the agreement are not observed. And appellants' motion for a restraining order alleges...

To continue reading

FREE SIGN UP