Hamilton v. Love

Decision Date02 June 1971
Docket NumberNo. LR-70-C-201.,LR-70-C-201.
Citation328 F. Supp. 1182
PartiesGeorge HAMILTON et al., Plaintiffs, v. Monroe LOVE et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas

Steve Herman, Legal Aid Bureau of Pulaski County, Philip E. Kaplan, Walker, Kaplan, Lavey & Mays, Little Rock, Ark., Jack Greenberg and Stanley A. Bass, New York City, for plaintiffs.

Jim Guy Tucker, Pros. Atty., P. A. Hollingsworth, Deputy Pros. Atty., Little Rock, Ark., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

EISELE, District Judge.

Five inmates of the Pulaski County, Arkansas, jail filed the complaint in this action, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, on September 30, 1970, naming Monroe Love, the Sheriff of Pulaski County, O. A. Allen, Superintendent of the Pulaski County jail, and Frank Mackey, the Pulaski County Judge, as defendants.

The plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment, preliminary and permanent injunctions and "other appropriate relief" on the grounds that the conditions of their incarceration constitute violations of their rights to both procedural and substantive due process and amount to cruel and unusual punishment.

Jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S. C. Section 1343(3) and 28 U.S.C. Section 2201. The suit is in equity pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Plaintiffs allege deprivations, under color of state law, of rights, privileges and immunities, secured by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

With only insignificant exceptions, the Pulaski County jail is an institution used for the purpose of detaining persons who are awaiting trial. The inmates are either being detained because they cannot afford the fee for the bail bond set for them—the usual case—or because they have been accused of a capital or "non-bondable" offense. In all cases, such detainees are presumed innocent, in the eyes of the law, of the crime with which they have been charged. Their actual guilt or innocence remains for future determination.

The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs and the class they represent are being subjected to cruel and unusual punishment and are being denied the equal protection of the law because of certain practices and conditions—20 in number are listed—alleged to obtain at the jail. Illustrative of the charges are the following: all correspondence is censored; there is no ventilation and wholly inadequate bathing and toilet facilities; no provision for minimal medical and dental care; no recreational areas or programs; overcrowded, unsanitary and insecure cells; the presence of rats, roaches and poisonous insects; lack of protection against unprovoked assaults and homosexual attacks because of inadequacy of trained "free world" personnel; no classification system for the detainees or rational separation thereof; absence of or inadequate bedding; and absence of laundry facilities. The plaintiffs contend that these conditions also constitute a denial of due process.

The plaintiffs complain that they are not informed or apprised of the standards of conduct expected of them or of the punishment or discipline which might follow from their departure from such standards.

Paragraph 13 of the complaint alleges, "There is a wholly inadequate staff to protect the physical well-being of prisoners".

The original complaint went into considerable detail in challenging the use of the isolation cell referred to as "the hole", but this problem has become moot during the course of the proceeding.1

Paragraph 18 of the complaint sums up the challenges made by the plaintiffs in this action, as follows:

"The actions of defendants have deprived members of the plaintiff class of rights, privileges and immunities secured to them by the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, including, (a) the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, (b) the right to be free from arbitrary and capricious punishments, (c) the right to minimal due process safeguards in decisions determining fundamental liberties, (d) the right to be fed, housed, clothed, and receive medical treatment so as not to be subjected to loss of health or life, (f) the right to unhampered and uncensored access to counsel and the courts, (g) the right to be free from the abuses of fellow prisoners in all aspects of daily life, (h) the right to be free from racial segregation, (i) the right to minimal recreational opportunities, (j) the right to even minimal standards of comfort, and sanitary facilities."

On October 16, 1970, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that this was a suit, in essence, against the State of Arkansas and not maintainable in the federal courts. This motion to dismiss was overruled in open court at the commencement of the hearing upon the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order on October 22, 1970.2 Thereafter, on October 30, 1970, the defendants filed their answer renewing their motion to dismiss and generally denying the allegations of the complaint. A hearing on the merits was first scheduled for January 20, 1971, and later rescheduled for February 24, 1971.

On February 22, 1971, both the plaintiffs and the defendants moved that the Court visit and inspect the Pulaski County jail. The motion was granted and the Court did visit, and make a thorough inspection of, the Pulaski County jail, prior to the hearing.

Early in the hearing, on February 24, 1971, the defendants filed a stipulation, the first paragraph of which reads as follows:

"Defendants stipulate and agree that the general conditions presently existent at the Pulaski County jail (hereinafter referred to as the "jail") taken as a whole do not meet minimum federal constitutional requirements with respect to prisoners' rights to due process of law and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment."

The stipulation then goes on to set forth past, present and future actions on the part of the defendants, and others, which were, and are, intended to bring the operation of the jail within minimum constitutional standards. Among other things, the stipulation pointed out that the defendant Frank Mackey, Pulaski County Judge, had submitted an application to the Department of Justice for planning funds for a new Pulaski County Community Correctional Facility; that the timetable for the completion of the new jail facility (assuming voter acceptance of the necessary bond issue) contemplates that occupancy would be possible early in 1974; that there is gross overcrowding in the jail; that extraordinary efforts would be undertaken to bring the detainees in the jail to trial as soon as possible, including the obtaining of an order from the state Supreme Court assigning additional trial judges for this purpose; that such efforts should result in a 50 per cent decrease in the population of the jail within nine months; that, pending the completion of the new correctional facility, efforts would be made to initiate recreational programs for detainees; that defendants would change their mail censorship policies so that, in the future, there would be no opening of mail from courts of record or attorneys of record and that length and quantity of outgoing and incoming correspondence would not be limited; that the defendants would promptly provide adequate laundry facilities for the washing of the prisoners' clothes; that reasonable use of the telephone would be permitted and that no attempt would be made to monitor telephone conversations; that reasonable improvements would be made in the extermination program to limit the presence of rodents, roaches and poisonous insects; that the defendants would provide the detainees with more adequate cleaning and bathing materials in order to keep their physical environment and bodies in a more hygienic state; that defendants would provide more adequate lighting for the cells and would undertake a study of the ventilation problems with a goal of significant improvement, as far as is reasonably possible, by the summer of 1971; that the defendants would institute a reasonable classification system and a scheme for separating prisoners; that the defendants would discontinue the use of the solitary confinement cell known as "the hole"; that defendants would agree to have a physician available at the jail for weekly sick calls not less than once per week, and that all incoming prisoners would receive a physical examination at the first sick call following their admission to jail; that defendants would agree to enlargement of visitation privileges; that the defendants would provide each incoming detainee with a printed copy of all rules and regulations regarding conduct and privileges; and, finally, that the defendants agree that a consent order incorporating the matters set forth in the stipulation could be entered by the court.

On February 24, 1971, after the hearing, the court entered an "interim order" which provided, inter alia, that the defendants "are authorized and directed to proceed forthwith to implement the agreement set out in the stipulation filed this date in open court"; that the attorneys for the parties would each submit to the Court a report on the actual operation of the jail under the stipulation; that the attorney for the defendants would "advise the Court as to the steps which would be required under state law (including any actions that may be required by the Quorum Court) to obtain funds for the employment of additional security personnel at the county jail, which would permit the assignment of at least one deputy to serve in the jail area on both the first and second floors of the jail on an around-the-clock, 24-hour-a-day basis;" that the parties "will keep the Court advised as to any actions taken in the legislative or judicial areas which might tend to assist in the amelioration of the problems revealed by the evidence, and particularly those actions...

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