Barlow v. Marriott Corporation
Decision Date | 30 June 1971 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 70-710. |
Citation | 328 F. Supp. 624 |
Parties | Milton A. BARLOW et al. v. MARRIOTT CORPORATION. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Paul R. Connolly, Frank X. Grossi, Jr., and Williams & Connolly, Washington, D. C., and C. Edward Jones, Baltimore, Md., for plaintiffs.
Robert W. Barker, Pierre J. LaForce and Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, Washington, D. C., and Robert R. Bair and Venable, Baetjer & Howard, Baltimore, Md., for defendant.
Article 14.13 of the plan states:
This plan is intended to qualify as a tax exempt Profit Sharing Plan pursuant to the provisions of Section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 together with any amendments thereto.
In accordance therewith, defendant sought and obtained a ruling from the Internal Revenue Service that the plan qualified under sections 401 et seq. of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.1
That discrimination, plaintiffs urge, disqualifies the plan under 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (4).2 Accordingly, plaintiffs contend, the actions of defendant's board of directors, in enacting such amendments, constituted not only a breach of trust but a violation of federal rights created by the Congress in favor of plaintiffs and other employees covered by the plan.
The plaintiffs, alleging that two of them are citizens of Maryland, two of Florida, one of Connecticut, and one of Utah, seek to institute this action as a class suit pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of themselves and other employees of defendant. Two of the plaintiffs, Barlow and Curtis, are said to have claims each exceeding Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00). Defendant is alleged to be a Delaware corporation with its principal offices located in Maryland. No claim of diversity jurisdiction is asserted by plaintiffs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Rather, plaintiffs assert the existance of federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1340. Section 1331 (a) provides:
Section 1340 provides:
Defendants have moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, contending, inter alia, that the complaint does not pose a federal question. This Court hereby "assumes jurisdiction to decide whether the allegations state a cause of action on which the court can grant relief * * *," Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946), and upon so doing, holds, for the reasons set forth infra, that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. Therefore, this Court does not reach the question of whether plaintiffs have stated an appropriate class action, either with or without reference to principles enunciated in Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 89 S.Ct. 1053, 22 L.Ed.2d 319 (1969). See also Dierks v. Thompson, 414 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1969); and C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts 315-316 (1970 ed.).
Nor does this Court reach the question of whether the $10,000 requirement is or is not to be read into 28 U.S.C. § 1340 or whether Snyder v. Harris, supra, has any different application with regard to § 1340 than § 1331 or § 1332. And finally, at this time, there is no need for this Court to determine whether the relief sought herein is declaratory in nature and/or is barred by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2201, which provides:
If plaintiffs had alleged, without more, only a breach of trust by defendant, such allegations would not premise federal question jurisdiction. But plaintiffs contend that they leap that barrier because their claims of breach of trust are based upon their view that the trustees are required by the trust plan and/or by 26 U.S.C. § 401 to administer the plan so as to continue in force and effect the initial qualification of the plan for the tax benefits of that statute. See Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F.Supp. 338, 342 (D.Minn.1967). See also Langer v. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 420 F.2d 365, 369-370 (8th Cir. 1970). To maintain that contention, an initial determination, construing the plan as incorporating such a requirement, is needed at the threshold. But even assuming that determination in plaintiffs' favor, plaintiffs cannot successfully assert federal jurisdiction under § 1331 or § 1340 without establishing a federal right which is alleged to have been violated— and no such right exists in plaintiffs' favor in this case.
In Gully v. First National Bank of Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 57 S.Ct. 96, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936), Mr. Justice Cardozo wrote:
C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts 58 (1970 ed.).
Judged under any of those tests, the within action is...
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