Wright v. Blue Mountain Hospital Dist.

• Citation: 214 Or. 141,328 P.2d 314
• Parties: William C. WRIGHT, Evelyn Edmunson and Ernest Ricco, Appellants, v. BLUE MOUNTAIN HOSPITAL DISTRICT, a municipal corporation, and E. T. Stanbro, Charies Talbott, Sigmund Ellingson, Tom Negus and Francis Cole, as officers and directors thereof, Respondents.
• Decision Date: 23 July 1958
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Page 314

328 P.2d 314

214 Or. 141

William C. WRIGHT, Evelyn Edmunson and Ernest Ricco, Appellants, v. BLUE MOUNTAIN HOSPITAL DISTRICT, a municipal corporation, and E. T. Stanbro, Charies Talbott, Sigmund

Ellingson, Tom Negus and Francis Cole,

as officers and directors

thereof, Respondents.

Supreme Court of Oregon.

Argued June 11, 1958.

Decided July 23, 1958.

Michael S. Mogan, Canyon City, argued the cause and filed briefs for appellants.

Howard A. Rankin, Portland, argued the cause for respondents. On the brief were Gordon Wilson, John Day, and Shuler, Sayre, Winfree & Rankin, Portland.

Before PERRY, C. J., and ROSSMAN, LUSK, WARNER, McALLISTER and SLOAN, JJ.

WARNER, Justice.

This is an action for a declaratory judgment, challenging the validity of the formation of the Blue Mountain Hospital District (called the District), a municipal corporation, in Grant county. From a decree declaring the District to be a valid and subsisting corporation, the plaintiff taxpayers appeal.

Following the procedures provided by Oregon Laws 1949, ch. 548 (now ORS 441.205 to 441.410, inclusive), an election was had on November 8, 1949, and the District was declared to be incorporated as of November 15, 1949, and has continuously functioned and operated a hospital facility in Grant county ever since the fiscal year 1950-51.

The parties have stipulated that the sole question presented for our resolution is whether the 90-day residential provision for electors voting at the election on November 8, 1949, is in conflict with the Oregon Constitution.

This provision was established by Oregon Laws 1949, ch. 548, § 3, p. 880 and later codified as ORS 441.245 and as we will hereinafter refer to it. It reads:

'No person may vote at an election under ORS 441.230 unless he is an elector of this state and has resided in the district [the proposed hospital district] for a period of not less than 90 days next preceding the election.'

The justiciable controversy arises from the plaintiffs' contention that ORS 441.245 is unconstitutional, thereby invalidating the election of November, 1949. The defendants argue to the contrary.

There is always a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. Until the contrary is shown beyond a reasonable doubt, it is the duty of the courts to assume that the challenged statute is valid. City of Portland v. Goodwin, 187 Or. 409, 416, 210 P.2d 577; State v. Anthony, 179 Or. 282, 301, 169 P.2d 587; Smallman v. Gladden, 206 Or. 262, 279, 291 P.2d 749; State v. Bailey, 115 Or. 428, 434, 236 P. 1053.

It is also a canon of statutory construction that if a legislative enactment can be given any reasonable construction consistent with its validity, such interpretation should be adopted. Gantenbein v. West, 74 Or. 334, 340, 144 P. 1171; Federal Cartridge Corp. v. Helstrom, 202 Or. 557, 565, 276 P.2d 720; City of Portland v. Goodwin, supra, 187 Or. at page 416, 210 P.2d 577.

Our constitution, like all other state constitutions, is not to be regarded as a grant of power, but rather a limitation upon the powers of the legislature. The people in adopting it, committed to the legislature the whole law making power of the state, which they did not expressly or impliedly withhold. Plenary power in the legislature for all purposes of civil government is the rule and a prohibition to exercise a particular power is an exception. It is, therefore, competent for the legislature to enact any law not forbidden by the constitution or delegated to the federal government or prohibited by the Constitution of the United States. Jory v. Martin, 153 Or. 278, 284, 56 P.2d 1193, and cases there cited; Marr v. Fisher, 182 Or. 383, 387, 187 P.2d 966; State ex rel. Powers v. Welch, 198 Or. 670, 672, 259 P.2d 112. Such freedom of legislative action within such bounds is applicable to election laws. Loe v. Britting, 132 Or. 572, 574, 287 P. 74.

When we scan the constitution, we find only three sections that treat with the qualifications of voters. These are:

'Art. II, § 2: 'In all elections, not otherwise provided for by this constitution, every citizen of the United States, of the age of 21 years and upwards, who shall have resided in the state during the six months immediately preceding such election, and who shall be duly registered prior to such election in the manner provided by law, shall be entitled to vote, provided such citizen is able to read and write the English language. The legislature, or the people, through the initiative, may prescribe the means of testing the ability of such citizen to read and write the English language. Any act which has been passed by the legislative assembly, and which purports to execute and carry into effect the provisions of this section, shall be deemed to have been passed pursuant to, and in accordance herewith, and hereby is ratified, adopted and confirmed, the same as if enacted after the adoption of this amendment. The legislative assembly, or the people through the initiative, may by law require that those who vote upon questions of levying special taxes or issuing public bonds shall be taxpayers. * * *'

Art. II, § 8: 'The Legislative Assembly shall enact laws to support the privilege of free suffrage, prescribing the manner of regulating, and conducting elections, and prohibiting under adequate penalties, all undue influence therein, from power, bribery, tumult, and other improper conduct.'

Art. II, § 17: 'All qualified electors shall vote in the election precinct in the County where they may reside, for County Officers, and in any County in the State for State Officers, or in any County of a Congressional District in which such electors may reside, for Members of Congress.'

The only reference to the residential status of an elector is found in Art. II, § 17. There it will be observed that the situs for voting is established in the 'precinct in the County where they [the electors] may reside' when voting for (1) county officers in any county, and in any county of the state for (2) state officers or in any county of a congressional district in which the elector may reside when voting for (3) members of congress.

Notwithstanding that the constitution expressly recognizes the existence of municipal corporations (Art. XI, § 2), it is silent as to the residential requirements of voters living or being within the boundaries of these lesser governmental units. Nor does it contain any provision expressly limiting legislative action on the subject or contain provisions from whence such a limitation of legislative power may be implied. This is an area which is at large for reasonable regulatory legislative action.

That the legislature cannot add to the constitutional qualifications of voters, unless expressly provided therein, is too well established to admit of contradiction. Livesley v. Litchfield, 47 Or. 248, 83 P. 142; Loe v. Britting, supra; Peterkort & Co. v. East Washington County Zoning District, 211 Or. 188, 313 P.2d 773, 314 [214 Or. 147] P.2d 912; People ex rel. Van Bokkelen v. Canaday, 73 N.C. 198, 21 Am.Rep. 465; Jones v. School District No. 96, 144 Okl. 10, 289 P. 268; State ex rel. Knowlton v. Williams, 5 Wis. 308, 68 Am.Dec. 65; Quinn v. State, 35 Ind. 485, 9 Am.Rep. 754; 1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.), p. 140, n. 5, and cases cited.

We turn again to ORS 441.245, supra. How is it to be construed? Does the 90-day residential period fall within and become a part of the six-month constitutional residential period, or is it to be read as an additional residential qualification, that is, six months residence in the state, plus 90-days residence in the district?

Obviously, if it is to be taken as an additional period of residence beyond the constitutional period of six months, it is unconstitutional. With this conclusion the plaintiffs and defendants are in accord. Both concur in the construction which places the 90-day period as being an element of time encompassed by the six-month residential voter qualification. This conclusion is further fortified by the well-established rule of statutory construction that when one construction will make a statute void for conflict with the constitution, and another will render it valid, the latter will be adopted though the former at first view is otherwise the more natural interpretation of the language. As a corollary to this rule, every intendment should be made to favor the constitutionality of a statute and the legislature will be presumed to act in view of the constitution and not to intend a violation of its provisions or the enactment of an invalid law. Swift & Co. and Armour & Co. v. Peterson, 192 Or. 97, 108, 233 P.2d 216, and cases there cited; 2 Lewis' Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2d ed.) 927 § 498.

Although both parties very properly read the challenged 90-day residential period as being included in and as an element within the six-month period established by Art. II § 2, they part on the question of its constitutional validity. Plaintiffs call it a 'qualification' beyond the power of the legislature to enact. Defendants declare it a reasonable election regulation within the bounds of legislative authority.

The key to the solution of our problem is found by turning to the first sentence of Art. II, § 2 of the Constitution, wherein provision is made that in 'all elections, not otherwise provided for by this constitution, every citizen * * * who shall have resided in the statute during the six months immediately preceding such election * * * shall be entitled to vote. (Emphasis ours.) The test of a qualified voter under the constitution is not one who has resided in the state six months, but rather during the particular six months period terminating the day before any given election.

With this constitutional test in mind, we turn again to re-examine the language of the challenged statute (ORS 441.245). There we find the specific test to read residence in the district ...