United States v. People of State of Illinois

• Decision Date: 14 April 1964
• Docket Number: No. 14352.,14352.
• Citation: 329 F.2d 354
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Walter HALL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. PEOPLE OF the STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

329 F.2d 354 (1964)

UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Walter HALL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. PEOPLE OF the STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 14352.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

March 19, 1964.

Rehearing Denied April 14, 1964.

M. Finley Maxson, Chicago, Ill., for appellant.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., of Illinois, Edward Berman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., William C. Wines, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel, for appellee.

Before HASTINGS, Chief Judge, and KNOCH and KILEY, Circuit Judges.

HASTINGS, Chief Judge.

Petitioner Walter Hall has appealed from a denial by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, without a hearing of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241.

In an indictment returned in the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois, petitioner was charged with the unlawful sale and possession of narcotic drugs, in violation of Illinois law. After a bench trial he was found guilty by the court and sentenced.

Petitioner was represented in the state court trial by court appointed counsel. No complaint has been made concerning the competency of his counsel.

In his state court trial, petitioner unsuccessfully asserted entrapment as a defense. Illinois has long recognized entrapment as a defense in cases of this character. People v. Strong, 21 Ill.2d 320, 172 N.E.2d 765 (1961). It has also recognized entrapment as a defense in criminal actions by the enactment of an appropriate statute. Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38 § 7-12 (1961).¹

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Illinois. He was ably represented on that appeal by separate counsel appointed by the court. As grounds for reversal, petitioner made the contentions "that his undisputed testimony established a defense of entrapment as a matter of law, and that the means by which the police secured his arrest and conviction denied him due process of law." After fully setting out the evidence surrounding the alleged entrapment, the court held there was no entrapment and affirmed the judgment of conviction. People v. Hall, 25 Ill.2d 297-301, 185 N.E.2d 143 (1962).

In considering the asserted defense of entrapment, the Supreme Court of Illinois applied to the facts the state standards as defined in People v. McSmith, 23 Ill.2d 87, 178 N.E.2d 641 (1961); People v. Strong, 21 Ill.2d 320, 172 N.E.2d 765 (1961); People v. Shannon, 15 Ill.2d 494, 155 N.E.2d 578 (1959); People v. Outten, 13 Ill.2d 21, 147 N.E.2d 284 (1958); and People v. Clark, 7 Ill.2d 163, 130 N.E.2d 195 (1955). The court further took notice of and applied federal standards as laid down in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932) and Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L. Ed.2d 848 (1958).

The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Hall v. Illinois, 374 U. S. 849, 83 S.Ct. 1912, 10 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1963).

Petitioner filed his instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court on forms approved by such court pursuant to its General Rule 23, for persons in state custody. It appears therein that petitioner relied on the same grounds he unsuccessfully pursued in the state courts.

On this appeal, petitioner contends that freedom from entrapment is a right protected under the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution and is thus properly raised in his federal habeas corpus petition. He then charges that the Illinois courts erred as a matter of law in holding that he was not entrapped.

We are met with the threshold question of whether jurisdiction lies in the federal district court to entertain this petition for habeas corpus grounded on an issue relating solely to the defense of entrapment in the state courts of Illinois.

This would appear to be a case of first impression on this constitutional issue. Entrapment has long been recognized as a defense in state and federal jurisdictions. However, no case has been cited to us and we have been unable to find one in which a federal court has reviewed or refused to review a state court determination concerning entrapment in a habeas corpus proceeding.

In this case, petitioner does not dispute or challenge the facts as determined by the Supreme Court of Illinois. The relevant facts surrounding the alleged entrapment are set out in its opinion. People v. Hall, 25 Ill.2d at 298-300, 185 N.E.2d 143. Petitioner asserts that such facts establish entrapment as a matter of law.

In federal habeas corpus, the standards governing review of state court convictions were fully established by the Supreme Court in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L. Ed.2d 770 (1963). "Where the facts are in dispute, the federal court in habeas corpus must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas applicant did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court, either at the time of the trial or in a collateral proceeding." Id., 372 U.S. at 312, 83 S.Ct. at 757, 9 L. Ed.2d 770. "Although the district judge may, where the state court has reliably found the relevant facts, defer to the state court's findings of fact, he may not defer to its findings of law. It is the district judge's duty to apply the applicable federal law to the state court fact findings independently. The state conclusions of law may not be given binding weight on habeas." Id., 372 U.S. at 318, 83 S.Ct. at 760, 9 L.Ed.2d 770. Accord, United States ex rel. Stacey v. Pate, 7 Cir., 324 F.2d 934, 935 (1963).

Thus, since the facts were reliably found by the state court, the district court here was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing. It was required only to make an independent application of federal law to such facts, if freedom from entrapment is a protected right under the federal Constitution.

To date, the defense of entrapment has been solely a matter of local concern. This is generally true of other recognized defenses to state defined crimes. It is a recognition of the power lodged in a state to punish the violation of proscribed conduct and establish defenses thereto.

Almost all states have recognized the defense of entrapment. This is based on the policy of not convicting persons who have no preconceived criminal disposition until such disposition is implanted by government agents. There would appear to be some question whether Tennessee² and New York³ have extended this recognition.

The Supreme Court first established the availability of entrapment as a defense to a federal crime in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932), following "the weight of authority in the lower federal courts" at that time. Id., 287 U.S. at 443, 53 S.Ct. at 213, 77 L.Ed. 413. While the Court was in agreement that entrapment was a complete defense to the crime charged (a violation of the National Prohibition Act), it disagreed on the definition of entrapment.

Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the majority in Sorrells, defined entrapment to exist "when the criminal design originates with the officials of the government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they may prosecute." Id., 287 U.S. at 442, 53 S.Ct. at 212, 77 L.Ed. 413. This appears to be generally accepted by most courts today. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 45(2) (1961).

Speaking for the minority, Mr. Justice Roberts would hold "that courts must be closed to the trial of a crime instigated by the government's own agents," without regard to the criminal disposition of the accused. Id., 287 U.S. at 459, 53 S. Ct. at 219, 77 L.Ed. 413.

The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Warren, reaffirmed the majority holding in Sorrells, in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S. Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958), and declined to follow the minority view as stated by Mr. Justice Roberts in Sorrells. Id., 356 U.S. at 376-377, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848. (See separate opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 356 U.S. at 378, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848).

In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), it was held that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the federal Constitution is inadmissible in a criminal trial in a state court, overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949), insofar as it held to the contrary. Petitioner contends here that entrapment is analogous to the rule concerning unlawful searches and seizures. It follows, he argues, that the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution precludes the admission of evidence obtained through entrapment in state court criminal trials. We disagree.

In Mapp, the Court was confronted with an inapposite situation from the one before us. Unlawful searches and seizures are condemned by the Fourth Amendment. The Court was dealing with an exclusionary rule laid down in 1914 in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652. Thirty-five years later, in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949), the Court found that thirty-one states had rejected the Weeks doctrine, resorting to other remedies, and that sixteen states had accepted it.

In "holding that the exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments" in Mapp (367 U.S. at 657, 81 S.Ct. at 1693, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081), the Court was moved by its finding that other methods employed by the states were "worthless and futile" (367 U.S. at 652, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 2d 1081), and did not satisfy due process.

There is no showing here, and we believe there can be none, that the several states have not assiduously afforded an accused the unfettered protection of the defense of entrapment, when the facts establish the coercive effect of the employment of lawless enforcement of the law. The same course of conduct has been observed by the federal judiciary in...