Mims v. Duval County School Board
Decision Date | 23 June 1971 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 4598. |
Citation | 329 F. Supp. 123 |
Parties | Alta Oveta MIMS et al., Plaintiffs, v. The DUVAL COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, a body corporate, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
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Drew S. Days, III, New York City, Norris D. Woolfork, III, Orlando, Fla., for plaintiffs.
Yardley D. Buckman, Jacksonville, Fla., for defendants.
This case is here on remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. This Court is instructed to enter a final judgment setting forth a plan for the assignment of students in the Duval County school system consistent with the dictates of the Supreme Court's decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). That case requires the immediate elimination of the vestiges of the de jure segregated school system in Duval County.
In undertaking this task, it is necessary to review the history of the school system and the previous attempts to desegregate it. Prior to 1954 it was traditional in Florida, as in other states in the South, to operate separate public schools for blacks and whites. The Florida Constitution of 1885, Article 12, Section 12, F.S.A., specified that "White and colored children shall not be taught in the same school, but impartial provision shall be made for both." This concept of "separate-but-equal" schools was later approved by the Supreme Court of the United States in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896).
Pursuant to the 1885 Constitution, the Florida Legislature, by statute, prohibited the teaching of white persons and Negroes in the same building or classes in any public, private or parochial school.1 Another enactment required school boards to establish separate attendance zones for white and Negro students.2 Even though children lived in the same "neighborhood", they were required to attend separate schools. There was no such thing as a "neighborhood school" for all the children in the neighborhood. The idea of separation was so entrenched that school superintendents were required "to keep separately the books * * * used in white and Negro schools."3 It was under this body of law that schools were operated in Duval County.
The legal foundation for this tradition of separate schools for the white and Negro races suddenly collapsed on May 17, 1954, with the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education.4 Overturning the Plessy v. Ferguson "separate-but-equal" doctrine, the Court held that state-imposed segregation of children in public schools, solely on the basis of race, violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The Court declared that "segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children" and "has a tendency to retard the educational and mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racially-integrated school system."5 A year later, in the second Brown decision, the Court commanded all affected school boards to "effectuate a transition to a racially non-discriminatory school system" and to admit their pupils to schools "on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed."6 Almost six years passed, however, before any steps were taken to integrate the Duval County schools.
Accordingly, the defendants were permanently enjoined from continuing to operate a compulsory bi-racial school system in Duval County and were ordered to submit to the Court "a complete plan for the removal of dual attendance zones for the system-wide opening of all schools on a non-racial basis."7
The School Board's plan, filed with the Court on October 30, 1962, provided for a "single system of geographical school districts", drawn around the various schools in the county. Beginning September, 1964, the children in the first and second grades in each district were to attend the school in their district. In September, 1965, and every year thereafter, one additional grade would be integrated in each district so that by 1974 all twelve grades would be integrated. At the same time, each child in the county was given "freedom of choice", that is, the right to "apply for admission to or transfer to the school of his or her choice." An order implementing this plan was entered by Judge Simpson on May 8, 1963.8
On March 19, 1965, plaintiffs complained that under the grade-a-year plan On July 9, 1965, the defendant School Board and Superintendent consented to the entry of an order accelerating the planned desegregation so that the first four grades of each elementary school would be integrated for the 1965-66 school year and all six elementary grades for the 1966-67 school year.
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