Brown v. Scott
| Decision Date | 26 July 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-10160-BC.,02-10160-BC. |
| Citation | 329 F.Supp.2d 905 |
| Parties | Gary BROWN, Plaintiff, v. Resident Unit Manager SCOTT, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Gary Brown, Standish, MI, pro se.
Julia R. Bell, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Lansing, MI, for Defendants.
The plaintiff, Gary Brown, presently incarcerated at the Standish Maximum Correctional Facility, in Standish, Michigan, has filed a pro se complaint against the defendant, Ivan Scott, a resident unit manager at the St. Louis Correctional Facility in St. Louis, Michigan, alleging a deprivation of his constitutional rights under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, via 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff contends that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to his health and safety as an inmate when he did not accede to the plaintiff's request to transfer him away from a cell mate who was rumored to be a predatory homosexual rapist. The plaintiff was forcibly raped by the cell mate three days after he made his request of the defendant. The defendant has filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment on the basis that he is entitled to qualified immunity from the plaintiff's suit.
On July 24, 2003, Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder, operating under an order of reference to conduct all pretrial proceedings, filed a report recommending that the defendant's motion to dismiss and for summary judgment be denied. The defendant has filed an objection to the recommendation, and the Court has conducted a de novo review of the motion papers, the report and recommendation, and the defendant's objections. The Court finds that the plaintiff has stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment and has demonstrated a genuine factual dispute relating to whether the defendant committed acts that allegedly violated clearly established rights. The Court will therefore adopt the report and recommendation and deny the defendant's motion to dismiss and for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
The defendant has not objected to the summation of the relevant facts provided by the magistrate judge, which the Court adopts and reiterates as follows:
This case arises out of an incident that occurred while the plaintiff was incarcerated at the St. Louis Correctional Facility in St. Louis, Michigan. The plaintiff claims that on February 4, 2000, after learning of a new cell assignment, he was warned by another inmate that his new cellmate was a known homosexual, "who used his superior size and strength to force other prisoners into sexual acts with him." Compl. at ¶ 13. The plaintiff therefore went to see the defendant, the resident unit manager at the prison, and asked for another cell assignment, making "it very clear to him I was very much concerned and in fear for my safety due to being housed with this other prisoner." Id. at ¶ 15. The plaintiff claims that the defendant asked him whether his cellmate had solicited him for sex, or threatened him with harm if he would not engage in sexual acts, and the plaintiff told the defendant that neither of these had occurred as of yet. According to the plaintiff, the defendant stated that he would look into the situation. On February 7, 2000, however, the plaintiff was sexually assaulted by this cellmate. See Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss and for Summ. J. Ex. B (Incident Report).
The plaintiff filed his pro se complaint on May 23, 2002 alleging that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to his health and safety by failing to protect him from his cellmate. The complaint originally named other defendants, but all of the defendants except for defendant Scott were dismissed from the case pursuant to an order from this Court on December 17, 2002. The plaintiff requests in his complaint the issuance of declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) and for summary judgment under Rule 56(b) on the ground of qualified immunity. In his motion, the defendant argues that the undisputed facts do not demonstrate a violation of the plaintiff's clearly established Eighth Amendment rights. The defendant filed a supporting affidavit in which he avers that after he had approved a change in the plaintiff's housing assignment, the plaintiff approached him and "indicated that he did not want to lock in his assigned cell and wanted to move to a different cell" because the plaintiff "had heard a rumor about his new cell mate and feared a possible attack." Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss and for Summ. J., aff. of Ivan Scott at ¶ 5. The defendant states that he asked the plaintiff "if he had been solicited for sex or threatened with harm to perform sex and whether he was requesting protection from his cell mate," to which the plaintiff answered, "no." Id. at ¶ 6. The defendant then informed the plaintiff that he would look into his concern about the cell mate. Id. at ¶ 7. The defendant reviewed the plaintiff's cell mate's file and found that the cell mate was not designated a homosexual predator and, pursuant to Michigan Department of Correction (MDOC) policy, the cell mate was eligible to be placed in a multiple occupancy setting. Under the MDOC policy, a prisoner designated as a homosexual predator could not be placed in a "double-bunked" cell or room. See Def.'s Mot. Ex. A (MDOC Policy Directive 05.01.140) at ¶ KK. The policy defines "homosexual predator" as "a prisoner who has a documented conviction, finding of guilt on a major misconduct, or other verifiable supporting documentation contained in the prisoner's file (e.g. jail reports) which establishes the use of force or threat of force to commit or attempt to commit a non-consensual sexual act with a victim of the same sex who is at least 14 years of age." Id. at ¶¶ LL.
The defendant contends that his actions in not placing the plaintiff in a different cell were a reasonable response to the plaintiff's concerns about the rumor he heard, and that at no time did he violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights by consciously disregarding a known substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff's health or safety. The defendant states that had the plaintiff requested protection, the plaintiff immediately would have been removed from his cell pursuant to MDOC policy. Pursuant to MDOC policy, Def.'s Mot. Ex. C (MDOC Policy Directive 04.05.120) at ¶ Q. However, according to the defendant, the plaintiff did not seek protection, but rather he requested a change in cell assignment based upon an unverified statement he had heard from another prisoner.
In response to the defendant's motion, the plaintiff asserts that material facts are in dispute that prevent the Court from granting summary judgment. The plaintiff contends that members of the correctional facility staff have a duty to identify prisoners who are assaultive or predatory, and that the defendant failed to so identify the cell mate in question even though he was affiliated with a group called the "Moabites," who, according to the plaintiff, are "well known for preying upon `young[,]' white[,] vulnerable inmates." Pl.'s Br. in Opposition to Def.'s Mot. at 2. The plaintiff states:
[The] defendant was put on notice that there was indeed a high risk that plaintiff could pretty well be sexually assaulted by a well known member of the "MOABITES" who the entire prison system has long ago been duly aware that these particular individuals [are] known for either assaulting or having some young vulnerable white inmate assaulted; still he did nothing by way of even remotely preventing said assault (i.e. by either moving plaintiff or the offender; failed to segregate plaintiff; as well as failed to alert staff of a possibility of an assault).
Id. at 3 (punctuation altered). The plaintiff also contends that "[s]imply because nothing with the [cell mate's] file listed him as a predatory rapist" did not mean that the cell mate was not a homosexual predator, and even though the plaintiff did not request voluntary segregation, the defendant should have placed him in involuntary segregation upon hearing the plaintiff's concerns for his safety.
In his report and recommendation, the magistrate judge suggested that the plaintiff's version of the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to him, supported the inference that the defendant had knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff's health or safety and that he did not respond reasonably to that risk. The magistrate judge also suggested that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the defendant should have taken additional steps, such as questioning the other inmate who warned the plaintiff that he was in danger of sexual assault, to learn the basis for the warning. The magistrate judge further suggested that the right of an inmate to be protected from an attack was a clearly established right. Thus, the magistrate judge concluded that the plaintiff's version of the facts could be viewed to state an Eighth Amendment violation, and because the plaintiff's rights were clearly established, the defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity.
In his objections to the recommendation, the defendant argues that the risk to the plaintiff's safety...
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