Silver v. New York Cent. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 02 May 1952
• Citation: 105 N.E.2d 923,329 Mass. 14
• Parties: SILVER v. NEW YORK CENT. R. CO. et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 923

105 N.E.2d 923

329 Mass. 14

SILVER v. NEW YORK CENT. R. CO. et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued March 3, 1952.

Decided May 2, 1952.

T. D. Burns, Boston, for plaintiff.

W. N. Kernan, Boston, for New York Cent. R. Co.

Before LUMMUS, RONAN, WILKINS and SPALDING, JJ.

WILKINS, Justice.

On January 14, 1948, Frances Silver became a passenger, bound from Boston to Cincinnati, on a train operated by the defendant railroad. The following morning the Pullman car in which she had a berth was detached at Cleveland and stood for nearly four hours in the yard to await connection with the next train to Cincinnati. She was suffering from a circulatory ailment known as Raynaud's disease. The temperature in the car became too cold for her, and she experienced ill effects. Mrs. Silver, who will be referred to as the plaintiff, brought this action against the defendant railroad and the Pullman Company. Upon her death from a cause apparently unrelated to this case, the administrator of her estate was substituted as party plaintiff. At the trial it was stipulated that if there should be a judgment for the plaintiff, it should be against the railroad, and in that event there should be a judgment for the Pullman Company. The judge found for the plaintiff against the railroad. He also found for the Pullman Company pursuant to the stipulation. The exceptions of the railroad, which will be referred to as the defendant, are to the denial of certain of its requests for rulings and to the exclusion of evidence.

Certain basis facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff, who was 58 years of age, boarded the train at Boston, on January 14, 1948, at 4:50 p.m. She occupied a lower berth in the rear car, which was the only through car to Cincinnati. The train was scheduled to arrive in Cleveland at 6:20 a. m. the following day, but did not do so until 8:40 a. m., too late for the intended connection for Cincinnati. This necessitated a lay-over in Cleveland until the next train for Cincinnati, which left at 12:30 p. m. In Cleveland the weather bureau records show that the temperature at 5:35 a. m. was one degree below zero Fahrenheit and 26 degrees above zero at 9 p. m. The plaintiff reached Cincinnati without further event, but because of her tendency to develop Raynaud's syndrome and the exposure to cold in Cleveland the condition of her hands required that she be hospitalized. There was a discoloration of the right ring finger showing an area of impending gangrene to the tip; there was demarcation of the area of the left ring finger which was formerly occupied by a vesicle, and the tip of the finger was gray in color and cool to touch; she complained of pain, numbness, discoloration, and coldness of her fingers; and it was diagnosed as an obliterative arterial disease, or, in other words, the arteries of her upper extremities were structurally involved, causing a lack of proper circulation to the fingers.

Other facts could have been found by the judge. A woman 58 years of age can get the Raynaud syndrome at any temperature below body temperature and after exposure to cold of only a few minutes. Such attacks are brought on by changes of temperature, but also by absolute cold if below the temperature to which a person is accustomed. If a person is used to 72 degrees, and there is a sudden drop to 60 degrees, that could bring on an attack. Even a drop of one degree, from 70 to 69, if maintained for more than five minutes could have brought about the plaintiff's condition. A lay person looking at the plaintiff on January 15 could not have told that she had the disease.

Findings as to the plaintiff's experience at Cleveland could have been based upon statements she had made before suit was brought. She work up about 9 a. m. because she was cold. She rang for the porter but no one came. She was alone in the car, which was standing in the yard and not at a platform. The station was inaccessible. She went to the washroom and got dressed. She 'had to bundle up with her coat and furs, and put on a pair of woolen gloves. She rang twice more. Still no one came. She thought that the temperature was below freezing. She was extremely cold. She went back into her berth. The car remained in the same condition until connected with the Cincinnati train after 12 m. At that time the temperature outside was 10 to 15 degrees, and the car had been 'without any heat whatsoever' for about three hours with that temperature outside.

The judge ruled, in accordance with a request of the defendant, that the rights and liabilities of the parties are to be determined by the law of Ohio. This ruling is of no present importance, however, as we have seen no case in Ohio indicating any pertinent variation from the law of this Commonwealth.

As part of its obligation to furnish suitable accommodations, it is the undoubted duty of a common carrier to provide the heat necessary for the health, comfort, and safety of passengers during performance of the transportation contract. 10 Am.Jur., Carriers, § 1337; 48 Am.Jur., Sleeping Car Companies, § 13; 13 C.J.S., Carriers, § 744, page 1398; 33 A.L.R. 168. The judge without objection by the plaintiff granted the defendants' second request, 'That the defendants were under a duty to exercise ordinary care for the comfort of its passengers.' This ruling became the law of the trial. Horton v. Town of North Attleborough, 302 Mass. 137, 19 N.E.2d 15; Dalton v. Post Publishing Co., 328 Mass. ----, 105 N.E.2d 385. Upon the assumption that that basis ruling is correct, we do not consider applying the 'single uniform standard of care' principle set forth in Holton v. Boston Elevated Railway Co., 303 Mass. 242, 244, 21 N.E.2d 251, 252, or relying upon the explanation of Moreland v. Boston & Providence Railroad, 141 Mass. 31, 6 N.E. 225, given in Dodge v. Boston & Bangor Steamship Co., 148 Mass. 207, 217-219, 19 N.E. 373, 2 L.R.A. 83.

This assumption is not decisive, however, as we think that, on either theory, there was evidence of the defendant's negligence. This testimony, however lacking in plausibility, was not too vague to permit a finding that, while the thermometer outside read at 10 to 15 degrees, the car stood for nearly three hours 'without any heat whatsoever,' and that the temperature within the car was below freezing. This was enough to warrant a finding that a person of ordinary good health might have been affected by the cold. If the temperature was low enough to cause harm to such a person, the plaintiff, although in a susceptible condition, could recover for all the injury she sustained as a result. Spade v. Lynn & Boston Railroad Co., 172 Mass. 488, 491, 52 N.E. 747, 43 L.R.A. 832; Webber v. Old Colony Street Railway Co., 210 Mass. 432, 442, 97 N.E. 74; Larson v. Boston Elevated Railway Co., 212 Mass. 262, 267, 98 N.E. 1048; Dellapenna v. Irwin, 291 Mass. 221, 223, 196 N.E. 839; Bryant v. Emerson, 291 Mass. 227, 228-229, 197 N.E. 2. See Murphy's Case, 328 Mass. ----, 103 N.E.2d 267.

The judge denied the defendants' fifth request, which reads: 'That the defendants cannot be liable to the plaintiff in this action unless they negligently permitted the car in which the plaintiff's intestate was a passenger on January 15, 1948, to get so cold that the health of persons of ordinary and normal health would be endangered thereby.' In this there was error. Except possibly where a common carrier has, or reasonably should have, particular knowledge of a passenger's delicate condition, it is under no liability for failure to heat a car unless a person of ordinary good health would suffer harm. Roark v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 163 Mo.App. 705, 708, 147 S.W. 499; Owen v. Rochester-Penfield Bus Co., Inc., 278 App.Div. 5, 103 N.Y.S.2d 137; Bulloch v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway, Co., Tex.Civ.App., 171 S.W. 808; Zoccolillo v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 53 Utah, 39, 49-52, 177 P. 201; Marcott v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Co., 147 Wis. 216, 219, 133 N.W. 37. See Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., v. Powell, 127 Ga. 805, 56 S.E. 1006, 9 L.R.A.,N.S., 769. As was said in Spade v. Lynn & Boston Railroad Co., 172 Mass. 488, 491, 52 N.E. 747, 748, 43 L.R.A. 832, 'Ordinary street cars must be run with reference to ordinary susceptibilities, and the liability of their proprietors cannot be increased simply by a passenger's notifying the conductor that he has unstable nerves.'

We omit unnecessary discussion of the defendants' other requests, and turn to questions of evidence that may arise again. The porter in the car next to that in which the plaintiff was a passenger was not permitted to testify as to temperature conditions in his car while at Cleveland. A woman passenger in a drawing room in a car on the same train, who may or may not have been shown to be in the same car with the...