United States v. McKnight

• Decision Date: 11 July 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. 07–mj–1218–SKG.
• Citation: 33 F.Supp.3d 577
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, v. April S. McKNIGHT, Defendant.

33 F.Supp.3d 577

UNITED STATES of America

v.April S. McKNIGHT, Defendant.

Case No. 07–mj–1218–SKG.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

Signed July 11, 2014.

April S. McKnight, Odenton, MD, pro se.

Gina M. Harasti, Gina M. Harasti PC, Severna Park, MD, for Defendant.

Memorandum Opinion

SUSAN K. GAUVEY, United States Magistrate Judge.

Now pending before the Court is Defendant, April McKnight's motion to expunge her criminal record—an arrest for, and charge of, theft of government property (shoplifting). (ECF No. 10). The government did not oppose the motion for expungement. (ECF No. 13). No hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md.2011).

This motion requires consideration of two issues: (1) whether federal ancillary jurisdiction extends to a claim for expungement of an arrest and charge—not on grounds of any illegality—but based solely on equitable considerations and (2) whether such relief is warranted here. Given that the Government does not object to Defendant's motion, the facts of the charge and disposition, and significant policy considerations in favor of her request, the Defendant's motion will be GRANTED.

I.

On December 20, 2006, Defendant was charged with theft of public property, 18 U.S.C. § 641, for events occurring on the grounds of Fort George G. Meade in Anne Arundel County, Maryland. The Statement of Probable Cause stated that the arresting officer witnessed Defendant, via VHS tape, take a Coach purse off of a display and place it in her shopping cart. Without paying, Defendant left the store, where the arresting officer detained her and subsequently found the purse, DVDs, a PlayStation, and a sweater concealed under her shopping cart.

Defendant consented to trial before a United States Magistrate Judge on April 23, 2007. On July 9, 2007, at the government's request, then-Magistrate Judge James K. Bredar granted a continuance of Defendant's hearing so that she could meet with the United States Probation and Pretrial Services (“Pretrial Services”) office to be screened for eligibility for the pretrial diversion program. Defendant was subsequently accepted into a pre-trial diversion program of the Pretrial Services on July 27, 2007. Defendant complied with all terms of the program. Accordingly, on September 10, 2008, the Government moved to dismiss the charges against her. That same day, the undersigned granted the Government's motion.

On July 25, 2013, Defendant wrote a letter to the Court requesting that this case be expunged from her record, which the Court treats as a motion. (ECF No. 10). In response to a letter from the Court requesting additional information, Defendant wrote, on October 4, 2013, that she accepted responsibility for her actions and wanted to continue her life as a productive member of society. (ECF No. 11). Defendant's third letter to the Court, dated October 10, 2013, provided that her arrest “can and will” affect her ability to obtain employment. (ECF No. 12). The Court requested the Government's position on the expungement request and in a November 18, 2013 letter, the Government, specifically Special Assistant United States Attorney, Erin McCarthy, stated that the Government had no objection to Defendant's request for expungement and “she believed that she will succeed in [her] endeavor [to be a productive member of society and obtain employment], and take full advantage of this second chance.” (ECF No. 13).

II.

There is no applicable statute providing for expungement in a case like this. Thus, the only available jurisdictional basis is the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and only possess that power authorized by the Constitution or by statute. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552, 125 S.Ct. 2611, 162 L.Ed.2d 502 (2005) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) ); Strawn v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 530 F.3d 293, 296 (4th Cir.2008) (citation omitted). Federal jurisdiction “is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673 (citing Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) ).

Ancillary jurisdiction is a concept that “recognizes federal courts' jurisdiction over some matters (otherwise beyond their competence) that are incidental to other matters properly before them.” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 378, 114 S.Ct. 1673. In 1990, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1367, codifying much of “the common-law doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction as part of supplemental jurisdiction.” Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 356, 116 S.Ct. 862, 867 n. 5, 133 L.Ed.2d 817 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, as both the Fourth Circuit and the leading treatise on federal practice and procedure explain, § 1367 did not codify this entire common-law concept:

Although § 1367 governs ancillary jurisdiction over claims asserted in a case over which the district court has federal subject matter jurisdiction, it does not affect common law ancillary jurisdiction “over related proceedings that are technically separate from the initial case that invoked federal subject matter jurisdiction,” which remains governed by case law.

Robb Evans & Assocs., LLC v. Holibaugh, 609 F.3d 359, 363 (4th Cir.2010) (quoting 13 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper and Richard D. Freer, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3523.2 at 213 (3d ed.2008) (emphasis in original)).

In Kokkonen,¹ the Supreme Court concluded that federal courts generally may invoke the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction in two circumstances: (1) where necessary to permit disposition by a single court of claims that are factually interdependent; and (2) “to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its proceeding, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80, 114 S.Ct. 1673.

While this decision has not excluded the federal courts from ancillary jurisdiction over all expungement proceedings,² it did lead to a pronounced Circuit split over whether jurisdiction exists where the sole basis for the request lies in equity:

One interesting issue is whether a district court that heard a criminal matter may exercise ancillary jurisdiction to entertain proceedings to expunge the criminal record. In limited circumstances, federal law expressly permits expungement, so ancillary jurisdiction is not necessary. When there is no such federal law, however, the courts clearly have ancillary jurisdiction to expunge records of unlawful convictions or arrests.

The courts disagree, however, on whether there is ancillary jurisdiction to entertain a proceeding to expunge based solely upon equitable considerations. For example, suppose a criminal Defendant is acquitted at trial. He may wish to have the record of his arrest expunged based upon equitable considerations, such as damage to his reputation. In a 2007 case, the First Circuit held that there is no ancillary jurisdiction on such facts. According to the court, none of the recognized reasons for ancillary jurisdiction—noted above—was present in such a case. In so holding, the First Circuit joined the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits in rejecting jurisdiction over expungement proceedings based upon equitable grounds. On the other hand, there is authority in the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits upholding ancillary jurisdiction for expungement based upon equitable grounds.

Wright, Miller, Cooper, & Freer, supra, § 3523.2 at 217–18 (footnotes omitted). In the 2013 supplement, the authors of the treatise state that the Sixth Circuit has joined the mentioned circuits in rejecting ancillary jurisdiction over expungement proceedings. Id. § 3523.2 at 59 (2013 Supp.). Of importance here, this supplement also cites two cases in this Circuit denying motions for expungement of criminal convictions based solely on equitable grounds, United States v. Harris, 847 F.Supp.2d 828, 831–35 (D.Md.2012) and United States v. Mitchell, 683 F.Supp.2d 427, 430 (E.D.Va.2010), which discuss the Fourth Circuit decision, Allen v. Webster, 742 F.2d 153 (4th Cir.1984). Wright, Miller, Cooper, & Freer, supra, § 3523.2 at 59–60 (2013 Supp.).

In Allen, a pre-Kokkonen decision, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court had “not abuse[d] its equitable discretion” by refusing to expunge the federal and state records of an arrest after the movant had been acquitted of drug charges in state court. Allen, F.2d at 155. Though the Defendant contended that he had been unable to obtain federal employment despite his acquittal, he had failed to exhaust administrative remedies that may have prevented his arrest records from being considered by prospective employers. Id. at 154.

By so holding, the Fourth Circuit did not foreclose the possibility that a district court may grant expungement based upon its “equitable discretion.” Id. at 155. However, as noted in Wright and Miller, a pair of district court decisions within the Fourth Circuit, Harris and Mitchell, have distinguished the Allen case in light of the Supreme Court's Kokkonen decision in the intervening time period. Because the Fourth Circuit has not re-visited the issue since Kokkonen, the Court is guided by these district court decisions.

The courts in Harris and Mitchell each applied Kokkonen to reach a narrow view of ancillary jurisdiction in expungement cases, finding themselves without jurisdiction to entertain the merits of such motions. However, a third district court decision, United States v. Steelwright, 179 F.Supp.2d 567, 571 (D.Md.2002), reached the opposite conclusion, holding that a magistrate judge has jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3401 and 28 U.S.C. § 636 to rule on the merits of a Defendant's motion for expungement if the Defendant consented to trial and sentencing before that magistrate judge. The tension between these decisions can be resolved upon an analysis of the facts...