Marion Cnty. Auditor v. State

• Citation: 33 N.E.3d 398
• Decision Date: 22 May 2015
• Docket Number: No. 49T10–1406–TA–25.,49T10–1406–TA–25.
• Parties: MARION COUNTY AUDITOR, Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Respondent.
• Court: Tax Court of Indiana

33 N.E.3d 398

MARION COUNTY AUDITOR, Petitioner

v.STATE of Indiana, Respondent.

No. 49T10–1406–TA–25.

Tax Court of Indiana.

May 22, 2015.

Adriana Katzen, David J. Lichtenberger, Office of Corporation Counsel, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Petitioner.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Jessica E. Reagan, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Respondent.

ORDER ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

WENTWORTH

, J.

The Mahon County Auditor has filed an appeal with this Court challenging the constitutionality of Indiana Code § 6–1.1–15–12

. In response, the State of Indiana has moved to dismiss the Auditor's appeal on three alternative grounds: 1) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, 2) the Court lacks personal jurisdiction, or 3) the Auditor has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Being duly advised in all matters, the Court grants the State's motion.

BACKGROUND

Grandville Cooperative, Inc. owns a multi-family cooperative apartment complex in Indianapolis, Indiana. In November of 2012, Grandville filed several Petitions for Correction of an Error (Forms 133) claiming that for the 2010, 2011, and 2012 tax years, the Marion County Auditor failed to provide it with the homestead deductions to which it was lawfully entitled. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 2

–3, 12 –13, 22–23.)

The Auditor referred Grandville's Forms 133 to the Marion County Property Tax Assessment Board of Appeals (PTABOA) for resolution. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 4

, 14, 24 (indicating that both the Auditor and the Marion County Assessor believed that Grandville's property did not qualify as a homestead).) See also Ind.Code § 6–1.1–15–12(d) (2012)

(stating that when both a county assessor and an auditor do not approve a taxpayer's Form 133 claim, the matter shall be referred to the county PTABOA for resolution). After conducting a hearing on the matter, the PTABOA found that Grandville's property did in fact qualify as a homestead and reversed the determination of the Auditor. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 9, 19, 29.)

The Auditor subsequently appealed the PTABOA's decision by filing Grandville's Forms 133 with the Indiana Board of Tax Review. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 1

, 2, 5, 10, 12, 15, 20, 22, 25, 30.) On April 24, 2014, however, the Indiana Board dismissed the Auditor's appeal on the basis that Indiana Code § 6–1.1–15–12 did not provide her with standing to challenge the PTABOA's determination with the Indiana Board. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 61–63.)

The Auditor appealed to the Court on June 6, 2014, naming Grandville as the respondent. The Auditor's petition requested that the Court: (1) declare Indiana Code § 6–1.1–15–12

unconstitutional and (2) either remand the case to the Indiana Board to be heard on the merits or review and reverse the PTABOA's decision that Grandville's property qualified as a homestead on its own. (See Pet'r V. Pet. Judicial Review (“Pet'r Pet.”) at 5 ¶ 28.)

On August 27, 2014, the Auditor and Grandville notified the Court that they had reached a settlement. The Court subsequently granted the parties sixty days to finalize their settlement and file a stipulation of dismissal. On October 30, 2014, however, the Auditor amended her petition (with leave of Court) substituting the State of Indiana for Grandville as the respondent in the appeal. The amended petition sought only a declaration from the Court that “Indiana Code § 6–1.1–15–12

... violates the Indiana Constitution by failing to provide [the Auditor] with an avenue of judicial review for an administrative tax determination.” (See Pet'r Resp. Respt's Mot. Dismiss (“Pet'r Resp.”) at 1.)

On November 24, 2014, the State moved to dismiss the Auditor's appeal pursuant to Indiana Trial Rules 12(B)(1), 12(B)(2), and 12(B)(6)

. The Court conducted a hearing on the State's motion on March 27, 2015. Additional facts will be supplied as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

The State first argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Auditor's appeal and that the case must therefore be dismissed pursuant to Trial Rule 12(B)(1)

. (See Resp't Mot. Dismiss ¶¶ 12–17, 20–21.) The State is mistaken.

Subject matter jurisdiction “refers only to the power of a court to hear and decide a particular class of cases.” Pivarnik v. N. Indiana Pub. Serv. Co., 636 N.E.2d 131, 137 (Ind.1994)

(emphasis added and citations omitted). “[S]ubject matter jurisdiction does not depend upon the sufficiency or correctness of the averments in the complaint, the stating of a good cause of action, the validity of the demand, or the plaintiff's right to relief.” In re Adoption of H.S., 483 N.E.2d 777, 780 (Ind.Ct.App.1985) (citations omitted). Rather, “[t]he only relevant inquiry in determining whether any court has [ ] subject matter jurisdiction is to ask whether the kind of claim which the plaintiff advances falls within the general scope of the authority conferred upon such court by the constitution or by statute.” Pivarnik, 636 N.E.2d at 137 (emphasis added).

The Tax Court has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over all “original tax appeals.” Ind.Code §§ 33–26–3–1

, –3 (2015). A case is an original tax appeal if it: 1) arises under the tax laws of Indiana and 2) is an initial appeal of a final determination made by the Indiana Board. See I.C. § 33–26–3–1.

Here, the Auditor's appeal arises under the tax laws of Indiana because it implicates the collection of property tax under Indiana Code § 6–1.1–15–12

. See, e.g.,

State v. Sproles, 672 N.E.2d 1353, 1357 (Ind.1996) (explaining that a case “arises under” Indiana's tax laws if it principally involves either the collection of a tax or defenses to that collection). Moreover, the Auditor received a final determination from the Indiana Board when, on April 24, 2014, the Indiana Board dismissed her appeal. The State's claim that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Auditor's appeal is therefore without merit, and its Trial Rule 12(B)(1) motion is DENIED.

II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION

Next, the State argues that the Auditor's appeal must be dismissed pursuant to Trial Rule 12(B)(2)

because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction. (Resp't Mot. Dismiss ¶ 18.) More specifically, it argues that “[p]ursuant to Indiana Tax Court Rule 4(B), neither the State nor the Auditor is a proper party to [this appeal].”¹ (See Resp't Mot. Dismiss ¶ 17.)

“Personal jurisdiction is the court's power to bring a person into its adjudicative process and render a valid judgment over a person.” Brockman v. Kravic, 779 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (Ind.Ct.App.2002)

. Whether the Auditor has standing to bring her appeal, or whether she improperly named the State as the respondent, does not, however, implicate the Court's personal jurisdiction. See, e.g.,

McPeek v. McCardle, 888 N.E.2d 171, 173 (Ind.2008) (explaining that an allegation that a party lacks standing to file an appeal is properly filed under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, not for lack of personal jurisdiction under Trial Rule 12(B)(2) ); Musgrave v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 658 N.E.2d 135, 138–39 n. 5 (Ind. Tax Ct.1995) (stating that the issue of standing does not implicate the Court's personal jurisdiction); Indiana Model Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 639 N.E.2d 695, 698 (Ind. Tax Ct.1994) (explaining generally that the Tax Court acquires personal jurisdiction over a party through the service of summons); Harp v. Indiana Dep't of Highways, 585 N.E.2d 652, 659 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) (stating that failure to name the proper party as the defendant in a complaint does not implicate a court's personal jurisdiction). Consequently, the State's Trial Rule 12(B)(2) motion is also DENIED.

III. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED

Finally, the State argues that the Auditor does not have standing to bring her appeal. (See Resp't Mot. Dismiss ¶ 29.) As a result, the State asks that the Auditor's petition be dismissed under Trial Rule 12(B)(6)

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.²

The judicial doctrine of standing focuses on whether the complaining party in a lawsuit is the proper person to invoke the court's power. Bielski v. Zorn, 627 N.E.2d 880, 888 (Ind. Tax Ct.1994)

. More specifically, it “insure[s] that the party before the court has a substantive right to enforce the claim that is being made in the litigation.” Pence v. State, 652 N.E.2d 486, 487 (Ind.1995). A party's standing to sue is conferred through either statutory or common law authority. See

In re Guardianship of A.J.A., 991 N.E.2d 110, 112–13 (Ind.2013) ; Schloss v. City of Indianapolis, 553 N.E.2d 1204, 1206 (Ind.1990) (explaining that under the latter, a plaintiff must demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit and that she has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a result of the conduct at issue). See also

Ohio Valley Associated Builders & Contractors v. Kuempel, 192 Ohio App.3d 504, 949 N.E.2d 582, 587 (2011) (stating that standing “does not flow from the common-law ‘personal stake’ doctrine alone[; i]t also may be conferred by a specific statutory grant of authority” (internal quotations and citations omitted).)

Indiana Code § 6–1.1–15–12

permits only taxpayers to appeal to the Indiana Board from a PTABOA determination on a Form 133. I.C. § 6–1.1–15–12(e). See also

Musgrave, 658 N.E.2d at 141. Consequently, the Auditor lacks statutory standing to appeal the PTABOA's determination on Grandville's Forms 133 to the Indiana Board and, ultimately, to this Court. The Auditor acknowledges as much. (See Pet'r Pet. at 3 ¶ 18.)

Despite the lack of statutory standing, the Auditor urges the Court not to dismiss her case because she has “traditional standing” in that she has been “aggrieved” (i.e., she has suffered an injury). (See Hr'g Tr. at 21

.) Specifically, she states:

Under [Indiana Code § 6–1.1–15–12

] ... [a] taxpayer can appeal [a] PTABOA [Form 133...