Texas State AFL-CIO v. Kennedy, 17976.

Citation330 F.2d 217,117 US App. DC 343
Decision Date06 February 1964
Docket NumberNo. 17976.,17976.
PartiesTEXAS STATE AFL-CIO, et al., Appellants, v. Robert F. KENNEDY, Attorney General of the United States, and Raymond F. Farrell, Commissioner of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, et al., Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)

Mr. Charles J. Morris, of the bar of the Supreme Court of Texas, Dallas, Tex., pro hac vice, by special leave of court, with whom Messrs. J. Albert Woll, Washington, D. C., and L. N. D. Wells, Jr., Dallas, Tex., were on the brief, for appellants. Mr. Robert C. Mayer, Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for appellants.

Mr. Gil Zimmerman, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David C. Acheson, U. S. Atty., Frank Q. Nebeker and David Epstein, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellees Kennedy and Farrell.

Mr. Michael J. Shea, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Martin L. Friedman, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee Thomas Alvarado (Lugo), and certain other appellees.

Before WASHINGTON, DANAHER and McGOWAN, Circuit Judges.

WASHINGTON, Circuit Judge.

This litigation was brought in the District Court by a labor organization active in the Texas counties bordering on Mexico, and by individual workers employed in those counties, to obtain injunctive and declaratory relief against the United States immigration authorities, seeking to cause the expulsion or exclusion of a certain group of Mexican aliens permitted by those authorities to enter Texas, and to obtain and keep jobs there, in alleged violation of law. This relief would free the plaintiffs-appellants from the competition offered in the local labor market by these aliens. The Mexicans in question are individuals who have been given by the Federal authorities (defendants-appellees) the status of lawfully admitted "immigrants," entitled to permanent residence in this country. They have also been permitted by the defendants-appellees to become so-called "alien commuters," i. e., persons who continue to maintain their homes in Mexico, but who are allowed to cross the border at frequent intervals to pursue their established employment in the United States. This permitted practice has prevailed for some decades, and many thousands of these aliens are said to be holding jobs in the United States, without either residing here or spending any major part of their earnings here.1

The plaintiff labor organization sued in a representative capacity on behalf of its members and its affiliated labor groups. In addition, some 188 individuals alleging economic detriment from the activities of the alien commuters sued as plaintiffs on their own behalf and as representatives of others similarly situated. The sole defendants named in the complaint were the two principal Government officials charged with the administration and enforcement of the immigration laws. Some 19 alien commuters intervened as defendants, individually and as representatives of a class. Motions for summary judgment were filed by all parties, and all the defendants moved to dismiss. The motions to dismiss were granted, and the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was denied. This appeal followed.

Much of the argument addressed to us relates to the merits of the controversy, namely, whether "alien commuters" are entitled under the law to enjoy the privileges which have long been extended to them.2 But we do not think it is either necessary or proper for us to express a view on this question.

Assuming the truth of the crucial allegations of the complaint brought by plaintiffs-appellants — namely, that expulsion or exclusion of the alien commuters would result in many jobs becoming available to the individual plaintiffs, or would at least reduce the competition faced by them in seeking employment, that the union is handicapped in its activities by the presence of the alien commuters, and that the latter are employed in this country only because the Government officials charged with the enforcement of the immigration laws have illegally permitted them to enter and to work here — this is not enough to give the plaintiffs-appellants standing to sue the defendant officials for declaratory and injunctive relief. Congress has not given them any such standing by express or implied provision of statute — either in the immigration laws or in any other act. Absent such a congressional grant, mere economic competition made possible by governmental action (even if allegedly illegal) does not give standing to sue in the courts to restrain such action. Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 U.S. 118, 59 S.Ct. 366, 83 L. Ed. 543 (1939); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 58 S.Ct. 300, 82 L.Ed. 374 (1938); Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 273, 225 F.2d 924, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884, 76 S.Ct. 137, 100 L.Ed. 780 (1955).3 Even more emphatically must this be so where the competition complained of is sought to be eliminated by the wholesale expulsion or exclusion from this country of persons who have entered in reliance on our laws as interpreted and administered by the officials in charge.

It is quite true that an alien whose status here is threatened by action of our...

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