91 1158 Levinson v. Spector Motor Service

• Decision Date: 31 March 1947
• Docket Number: No. 22,22
• Citation: 330 U.S. 649,67 S.Ct. 931
• Parties: 91 L Ed. 1158 LEVINSON v. SPECTOR MOTOR SERVICE. Re
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

330 U.S. 649

67 S.Ct. 931

91 L Ed. 1158

LEVINSON

v SPECTOR MOTOR SERVICE.

No. 22.

Reargued Oct. 21, 22, 1946.

Decided March 31, 1947.

Mr. Harry L. Yale, of Chicago, Ill., for petitioner.

[Argument of Counsel from page 650 intentionally omitted] Mr. Jeter S. Ray, of Washington, D.C., for Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, U.S. Dept. of Labor, amicus curiae, by special leave of Court.

Mr. Daniel W. Knowlton, of Washington, D.C., for the United States and Interstate Commerce Commission, amicus curiae, by special leave of Court.

Mr. Roland Rice, of Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Mr. Justice BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether the Interstate Commerce Commission has the power, under § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935,¹ to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service with respect to any 'checker' or 'terminal foreman,' a substantial part of whose activities in that capacity consists of doing, or immediately directing, the work of one or more 'loaders' of freight for an interstate motor carrier as such class of work is defined by the Interstate Commerce Commission in Ex parte No. MC—2, 28 M.C.C. 125, 133, 134,² although the rest of his activities do not affect the safety of operation of any such motor carrier.³ We hold that the Commission has that power and that § 13(b)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act⁴ therefore expressly excludes any such employee from a right to the increased pay for overtime service prescribed by § 7 of that Act. ⁵

In this action, brought in the Municipal Court of Chicago, pursuant to § 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act,⁶ the petitioner recovered judgment against his em- ployer, the respondent, for $487.44 for unpaid overtime compensation for petitioner's services, as a 'checker' or 'terminal foreman,' computed in accordance with § 7 of that Act. In addition, the judgment included $487.44, as liquidated damages, and $175 as an attorney's fee, making a total of $1,149.88 and costs. The defense was that, under § 13(b)(1), the provisions of § 7 did not apply to the petitioner's service. On that ground, the judgment was reversed by the Appellate Court of Illinois and the cause remanded with directions to enter judgment, with costs, for the respondent. 323 Ill.App. 505, 56 N.E.2d 142. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed. 389 Ill. 466, 59 N.E.2d 817. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the question in interpreting the Motor Carrier Act and Fair Labor Standards Act. 326 U.S. 703, 66 S.Ct. 30. It was argued at the October Term, 1945, of this Court and, on January 2, 1946, was restored to the docket for reargument before a full bench at this Term. It was so argued on October 21 and 22, 1946. In addition to the briefs and arguments on behalf of the parties, we have had the benefit of those presented, at our request, on behalf of amici curiae. These were from the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, United States Department of Labor, who supported the position of the petitioner, and, on the other hand, from the Interstate Commerce Commission which claimed that it possessed, under the Motor Carrier Act, the power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service with respect to the petitioner. he Solicitor General, also at our request, filed a memorandum. In it he supported the petition for certiorari and took what he has described as 'a position somewhat between that of the Commission and that of the Wage and Hour Administrator.'

The respondent is a Missouri corporation, licensed in Illinois and engaged in interstate commerce as a motor carrier of freight. It does not appear whether the re- spondent is a common carrier, contract carrier or private carrier of property. The result, however, does not turn upon differences between those classifications. The petitioner was employed by the respondent from October 1, 1940, through October 6, 1941, in one or more capacities which he designates generally as those of a 'checker' or 'terminal foreman.' While the evidence is conflicting as to some of his duties, there is ample to sustain the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois on the basis that a substantial part of his activities consisted of doing, or immediately directing, the work of one or more 'loaders' of freight for an interstate motor carrier as that class of work is defined by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Supreme Court of Illinois accepted the Appellate Court's description of petitioner's activities. ⁷ The power of the Commission to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service with respect to such 'loaders' has been defined and delimited by it in a series of well-considered decisions, dating from the extension of its jurisdiction, in 1935, so as to include motor carriers.

The history of the development of the congressional safety program in interstate commerce, up to and including the enactment of the Motor Carrier Act in 1935 and the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938, tells the story.

In comparable fields, Congress previously had prescribed safety equipment, limited maximum hours of service and imposed penalties for violations of its requirements.⁸ In those Acts, Congress did not rely upon increases in rates of pay for overtime service to enforce the limitations it set upon hours of service. While a requirement of pay that is higher for overtime service than for regular service tends to deter employers from permitting such service, it tends also to encourage employees to seek it. The requirement of such increased pay is a remedial measure adapted to the needs of an economic and social program rather than a police regulation adapted to the rigid enforcement required in a safety program. Overnight Motor Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 577, 578, 62 S.Ct. 1216, 1219, 1220, 86 L.Ed. 1682.

By 1935, 40 states had attempted to regulate safety of operation of carriers by motor vehicle. Some had established qualifications and maximum hours of service for drivers and helpers. Increased interstate movements of motor carriers then made necessary the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, approved August 9, 1935, as Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 Stat. 543. This Act vested in the Interstate Commerce Commission power to establish reasonable requirements with respect to qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees and safety of operation and equipment of common and contract carriers by motor vehicle. § 204(a)(1)(2). Similar, but not identical, language was used as to private carriers of property by motor vehicle. § 204(a)(3). The Act expressly superseded 'any code of fair competition for any industry embracing motor carriers.' § 204(b). Section 203(b) listed many types of motor carriers which were exempted in general from the Act but that Section signficantly applied to all of them the provisions of § 204 as to qualifications, maximum hours of service, safety of operation and equipment.⁹ It is even more significant that in 1942, several years after enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Congress slightly, but expressly, expanded the jurisdiction of the Commission over these subjects of qualifications, maximum hours of service, safety of operation and equipment and thereby restricted, to a corresponding degree, the application of the compulsory overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.¹⁰ In 1940, this Court, in United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 1068, 84 L.Ed. 1345, recognized the emphasis given by Congress to the clause 'qualifications and maximum hours of service' in §§ 204(a) and 203(b). That decision reviewed the legislative history of the Act and held 'that the meaning of employees in section 204(a)(1) and (2) is limited to those employees whose activities affect the safety of operation. The Commission has no jurisdiction to regulate the qualifications or hours of service any others.' Id., 310 U.S. at page 553, 60 S.Ct. at page 1069. The opinion dealt with employees who devoted themselves exclusively to their respective assignments, such as those of drivers on the one hand or of clerks on the other. It demonstrated that § 204(a)(1) and (2) related to the former but not to the latter.¹¹ It did not discuss its relation to employees who, as in the present case, are required to divide their activities between those affecting safety of operation and those not affecting it.

In Southland Co. v. Bayley, 319 U.S. 44, 63 S.Ct. 917, 87 L.Ed. 1244, this Court applied similar reasoning to an employee of a private carrier of property under § 204(a)(3). It recognized the Commission's power to find a need for its action and, having found it, to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service for employees of private motor carriers of property affecting the safety of operation of such carriers. It held that, under § 3(b)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Commission's mere possession of that power, whether exercised or not, necessarily excluded all employees, with respect to whom the power existed, from the benefits of the compulsory overtime provisions of § 7 of that Act. The present case involves a comparable situation in that the Commission has found here that it has the power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service for those doing the work of loaders for common or contract motor carriers or private motor carriers of property, but it has not found it advisable, as yet, to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service for that work.

The logic of the situation is that Congress, as a primary consideration, has preserved intact the safety program which it and the Interstate Commerce Commission have been developing for motor carriers since 1936. To do this, Congress has prohibited the overlapping of the jurisdiction of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, United States Department of Labor, with that of the Interstate Commerce Commission as to maximum hours of service. C...