Jackson v. State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 02-15545.

Citation331 F.3d 790
Decision Date20 May 2003
Docket NumberNo. 02-15545.,02-15545.
PartiesColeman JACKSON, Petitioner-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, v. STATE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES, Department of Offender Rehabilitation of the State of Georgia, Respondents-Appellees-Cross-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Devon Orland, Atlanta, GA, for Respondents-Appellees-Cross-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before ANDERSON and WILSON, Circuit Judges, and OWENS*, District Judge.

WILSON, Circuit Judge:

Coleman Jackson appeals the district court's order granting in part and denying in part his motion for attorney's fees and his supplemental application for attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d). Jackson contends that § 1997e(d) does not govern his motion for attorney's fees and his supplemental application for attorney's fees, because his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action challenged the length of his confinement and not "prison conditions" within the meaning of § 1997e(a). Alternatively, he contends that § 1997e(d) violates his right to equal protection under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.1 The State Board of Pardons and Paroles cross-appeals, contending that the court erroneously awarded Jackson fees-on-fees, or attorney's fees incurred in the course of litigating his petition for attorney's fees. These three arguments present issues of first impression in this Circuit. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

On August 4, 1999, Jackson was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to twenty years of imprisonment with five years to serve in prison and fifteen years of probation.2 As of August 25, 1996, the date Jackson committed the assault, a prisoner convicted of aggravated assault was required to serve a minimum of one-third of his prison term before becoming eligible for a parole hearing before the board. See O.C.G.A. § 42-9-45(f). On December 9, 1997, however, the board amended its policy to provide that a prisoner convicted on or after January 1, 1998 of certain crimes, including aggravated assault, must serve a minimum of ninety percent of his term before becoming eligible for a parole hearing. The board applied its ninety-percent policy retroactively — that is, the board applied the new policy to all convictions entered on or after January 1, 1998 even if the underlying criminal conduct occurred before January 1, 1998. Thus, under the new policy, the board postponed the date of Jackson's initial parole eligibility hearing.

After his requests to reconsider his parole eligibility were denied twice by the board and once by Georgia's Superior Courts Sentence Review Panel, Jackson filed a joint motion for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and a complaint for damages pursuant to § 1983. He alleged that by applying the new policy to his offense the board retroactively increased his punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. The magistrate judge recommended that the district court dismiss his habeas corpus petition without prejudice for lack of exhaustion of administrative remedies, dismiss his claim for damages under § 1983, and permit his claim for equitable relief under § 1983 to proceed. Jackson subsequently filed objections to the report and recommendation and incorporated a motion for equitable judgment therein.

The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation and, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, granted Jackson's motion for equitable judgment, permanently enjoined the board from enforcing the new policy against Jackson, and ordered the board to provide Jackson with an initial parole eligibility hearing within forty-five days of the order. As a result, the board held a hearing and subsequently notified the court that it granted Jackson parole.3

Thereafter, pursuant to § 1988(b), Jackson filed the instant motion for attorney's fees in the amount of $34,875 and costs in the amount of $335.21, for a total award of $35,210.21. The board objected to his motion and asserted that because Jackson filed a § 1983 claim "with respect to prison conditions," 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), the motion for attorney's fees and costs should be governed by § 1997e(d) of the PLRA.4 Thereafter, Jackson filed a reply brief and a supplemental application for attorney's fees incurred while litigating the underlying motion in the amount of $2375.

The district court concluded that (1) § 1997e governed Jackson's underlying § 1983 claim and thus his motion for attorney's fees, because the underlying claim challenged "prison conditions" within the meaning of § 1997e(a); (2) § 1997e(d)'s fees restrictions do not violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment; and (3) § 1997e(d) permits a prevailing plaintiff to recover fees-on-fees. Thus, pursuant to § 1988 and § 1997e(d), the court granted in part and denied in part Jackson's motion for attorney's fees and costs and his supplemental application for attorney's fees.5 Jackson appeals the court's application of § 1997e(d) to his motion for attorney's fees and his supplemental application for attorney's fees,6 and the board cross-appeals, challenging Jackson's supplemental attorney's fees award as impermissible fees-on-fees. See id. § 1997e(d)(1)(A) (prohibiting attorney's fees that are not "directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's rights").

DISCUSSION
I. Applicability of § 1997e(d)7

Under § 1988(b), a district court may, in its discretion, award reasonable attorney's fees to a successful § 1983 plaintiff. See id. § 1988(b).8 Accordingly, neither party disputes that, as a successful § 1983 plaintiff, Jackson may receive reasonable attorney's fees under § 1988. See id. The parties disagree, however, on the applicability of § 1997e(d) to Jackson's underlying § 1983 claim and thus his motion for attorney's fees. See id. § 1997e(d)(1) (restricting attorney's fees awards authorized under § 1988 "[i]n any action brought by a prisoner"). Jackson contends that § 1997e(d) is not applicable to his motion for attorney's fees, because his § 1983 action challenged the length of his confinement and not "prison conditions" within the meaning of § 1997e(a). The board alleges that because Jackson's § 1983 action was "brought by a prisoner," § 1997e(d) is applicable to his motion for attorney's fees.

"We begin our construction of section 1997e[ (d) ] where courts should always begin the process of legislative interpretation, and where they often should end it as well, which is with the words of the statutory provision."9 Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 972 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1065, 121 S.Ct. 2214, 150 L.Ed.2d 208 (2001). Section 1997e(d) provides (1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, in which attorney's fees are authorized under [42 U.S.C. §] 1988 ..., such fees shall not be awarded, except to the extent that —

(A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's rights protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may be awarded under section 1988 ... and

(B)(i) the amount of the fee is proportionately related to the court ordered relief for the violation; or

(ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(A)-(B) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Here, we must determine the meaning of the phrase "any action brought by a prisoner" to decide whether § 1997e(d) applies to Jackson's underlying § 1983 action and thus his motion for attorney's fees and his supplemental application for attorney's fees.

"In the absence of a statutory definition of a term, we look to the common usage of words for their meaning." CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Often, courts look to dictionary definitions to ascertain the common usage of words. Id. at 1223. The dictionary definition of the word "action" is "a legal proceeding by which one seeks to have a wrong put right; lawsuit." Webster's New World College Dictionary 14 (Michael Agnes et al. eds., 4th ed.1999); see also Black's Law Dictionary 28 (Bryan A. Garner et al. eds., 7th ed.1999) (defining "action" as "[a] civil or criminal judicial proceeding").

Furthermore, Congress chose "an expansive modifier — the word `any' — instead of a restrictive one." CBS Inc., 245 F.3d at 1223; see also United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 137 L.Ed.2d 132 (1997) ("Read naturally, the word `any' has an expansive meaning...."). We previously stated that "the adjective any is not ambiguous; it has a well-established meaning." Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, 166 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir.1999) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, without any language to limit the significance of this modifier, "any means all." CBS Inc., 245 F.3d at 1223 (internal quotation marks omitted). Hence, the phrase "any action" covers a lawsuit challenging the length of an inmate's confinement.

Additionally, we have held that the term "brought," as used in subsections (a) and (e) of § 1997e, means filed. See Harris, 216 F.3d at 974 (interpreting the term "brought" as used in § 1997e(e)'s "[n]o federal civil action shall be brought" language to mean filed); Miller v. Tanner, 196 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir.1999) (interpreting the term "brought" as used in § 1997e(a)'s "[n]o action shall be brought" language to mean filed). Normally, identical words that appear in various parts of the same act are meant to have the same meaning. See Atl. Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433, 52 S.Ct. 607, 76...

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