United States v. Williams, Crim. No. 71-025-HM.

• Decision Date: 01 October 1971
• Docket Number: Crim. No. 71-025-HM.
• Citation: 332 F. Supp. 1
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Woodrow WILLIAMS, Jr. a/k/a Robert Walker.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

332 F. Supp. 1

UNITED STATES of America v. Woodrow WILLIAMS, Jr. a/k/a Robert Walker.

Crim. No. 71-025-HM.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

October 1, 1971.

John G. Sakellaris, Asst. U. S. Atty., Baltimore, Md., for plaintiff.

Joesph E. Emerson, Baltimore, Md., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HERBERT F. MURRAY, District Judge.

In this case the defendant was charged in a two-count indictment under Title 18, U.S.C.A. Sections 2113(a) and (b) with robbery of a branch of the Maryland National Bank in Cambridge, Maryland on December 4, 1970. The case was tried non-jury on September 13 and 14, 1971.

The basic facts are not in dispute. In a stipulation signed by government counsel, the defendant and his counsel, it was agreed that on the date set out in the indictment, the defendant went into the bank in Cambridge, Maryland and requested a loan from a branch officer of the bank. The officer declined to grant the defendant a loan. Thereafter the defendant walked up to Mrs. Martina Bennett, a teller, and handed to her a note stating "This is a stickup". Mrs. Bennett gave him all her cash, and defendant then left the bank with the money. It was also stipulated that Mrs. Bennett was intimidated by defendant giving her the note and for that reason turned over to defendant the funds in her drawer. An audit made immediately after the robbery showed the defendant had taken $4,727 of the bank's money.

While defendant thus does not contest the fact that a robbery occurred and he committed it, his counsel urges upon the Court that an essential element of the crime is lacking. It is contended that the two sections of the bank robbery statute on which the counts in the indictment are based both require a specific intent to steal, and that at the time of the robbery defendant was so intoxicated from alcohol and drugs that he was incapable of forming such specific intent.

The threshold legal questions thus are whether voluntary intoxication can negative specific intent as an element of crime and, if so, whether the offenses charged in either or both counts of the indictment require proof of specific intent. If specific intent is an element of the offense in either count of the indictment, the factual question then arises as to whether on all the evidence the degree of defendant's intoxication was such as to create a reasonable doubt that defendant had a specific intent to steal when the robbery took place.

It is clear from the cases that while voluntary intoxication is ordinarily no defense to crime,¹ it may have that effect if specific intent is an element of the crime. Edwards v. United States, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 310, 172 F.2d 884 (1949) (housebreaking and larceny—specific intent required); Proctor v. United States, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 341, 177 F.2d 656 (1949) (unauthorized use of vehicle— specific intent not required); Allen v. United States, 239 F.2d 172 (6th Cir. 1956) (breaking into post office—specific intent required); Heideman v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 128, 259 F.2d 943 (1958) (robbery—specific intent required); Womack v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 40, 336 F.2d 959 (1964) (robbery under the D. C. Code—specific intent required); Rivers v. United States, 368 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1966) (theft from interstate shipment —intent to take goods required); Goings v. United States, 377 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1967) (burglary—intent to commit required); Kane v. United States, 399 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1968) (voluntary manslaughter—does not require specific intent), cert. den. 393 U.S. 1057, 89 S.Ct. 698, 21 L.Ed.2d 699 (1969); United States v. Leeper, 413 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969) (kidnapping—specific intent required).

The teaching of these cases is embodied in the recommended instruction on voluntary intoxication in Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Sec. 13.18 of Vol. 1, 2nd Edition which reads:

"Voluntary Intoxication

Although intoxication or drunkenness alone will never provide a legal excuse for the commission of a crime, the fact that a person may have been intoxicated at the time of the commission of a crime may negate the existence of a specific intent.

"So, evidence that a defendant acted or failed to act while in a state of intoxication is to be considered in determining whether or not the defendant acted, or failed to act, with specific intent, as charged."

The rule has also been adopted by the American Law Institute. Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 9, Section 2-08.²

Thus in the area of criminal responsibility as affected by voluntary intoxication, a distinction must be drawn between so-called "general intent" to commit a crime and a "specific intent" to do a particular criminal act.

These terms are often used in the cases but seldom defined.³ An illustration of a general intent sufficing for conviction is the case of A intending to strike B but instead striking C. A is yet guilty of assault and battery, or, if the striking results in death, of homicide, even though A had no specific intent to harm C. Ginsberg, Criminal Law and Procedure in Maryland (1940), p. 25. On the other hand, there are certain crimes such as burglary and larceny where the act must be accompanied with a specific intent. Thus at common law in larceny there must be a taking and carrying away of the property of another with the intent to permanently deprive that person of his ownership of the goods. In burglary there must be a breaking and entry of a dwelling house in the night-time with the intent to commit a felony therein. Holmes in his work The Common Law suggests (p. 74) that the object of punishing such breaking and entering is not to prevent trespasses, even when committed by night, but only such trespasses as are the first step to wrongs of a greater magnitude, like robbery or murder. He further suggests that if the apprehended act did follow, then it is no longer necessary to allege that the breaking and entering was with that intent. "An indictment for burglary which charges that the defendant broke into a dwelling-house and stole certain property, is just as good as one which alleges that he broke in with intent to steal".

Did Congress in the several subsections of the bank robbery statute create "general intent" crimes or "specific intent" crimes? Some cases uncritically lump all subsections of the statute under the "specific intent" label. Other cases ascribe more careful draftsmanship to the Congress, and find a specific intent an element of the crime only in those subsections of the statute where the language "with intent" is used.

Thus, in United States v. DeLeo, 422 F.2d 487 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. den. 397 U.S. 1037, 90 S.Ct. 1355, 25 L.Ed.2d 648 (1970), the indictment was under 18 U.S.C.A. Sections 2113(a) and (d). On appeal the defendant contended that the crime was of the common law larceny genus requiring allegation and proof of specific intent. The Court rejected this argument, stating at pages 490-491:

"Six specific crimes are set out in Section 2113. Felonious intent is specifically incorporated in the definition of two of them: entering a federally insured institution with intent to commit a felony (a—second paragraph), and taking property with intent to steal or purloin (b). However, it is not made part of the crimes of taking by force and violence or by intimidation (a—first paragraph); knowingly receiving stolen property (c); assaulting or putting in jeopardy the life of a person by a dangerous weapon (d); or killing a person, or forcing a person to accompany him, while in the course of committing one of the other offenses or avoiding apprehension or confinement for any of them (e).

"This differentiation shows careful draftsmanship. Entering and taking can be innocent acts, and therefore require felonious intent to constitute crime*; receiving stolen property can be innocent, unless done knowingly. However, the other offenses describe acts which, when performed, are so unambiguously dangerous to others that the requisite mental element is necessarily implicit in the description.* Contra: United States v. Margeson, Cr. No. 64-26 (D.Me. 1964). It therefore is immaterial for sections 2113(a) and (d) whether the subjective intent of a bank robber is to steal that to which he has no claim or to recover his own deposit; the crime is his resort to force and violence, or intimidation, in the presence of another person to accomplish his purposes. United States v. Lester, 287 F.Supp. 870 (E.D.Pa.1967), aff'd 399 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1968); Pitman v. United States, 380 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1967)." (* Footnotes omitted)

See also the opinion of the 5th Circuit in Prince v. United States, 230 F.2d 568 (1956) reversed for resentencing because of merger of lesser offense of entry with completed offense of robbery, Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 77 S.Ct. 403, 1 L.Ed.2d 370 (1957).⁴ Compare United States v. Porter, supra note 3.

The Court in the present case concludes as a matter of law that the distinction made by the 1st Circuit in DeLeo and by the 5th Circuit in Prince is a valid one, and that the act of the defendant, which he admits of taking by intimidation from the presence of another money belonging to the bank, constitutes a violation of subsection (a) of the statute as charged in Count I of the indictment. The Court rejects as a defense to the crime charged in Count I of the indictment any voluntary intoxication of the defendant.

As to Count II of the indictment, the Court feels that historically and legally the contention of the defendant is correct, and that a specific intent to steal is an element of the crime. The Court on a review of all the evidence in the case is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant when he took and carried away money belonging to the bank exceeding $100 in value did so with the intent to steal or purloin.

The Court in finding as a fact that defendant had the intent to steal is not unmindful of the fact that there was...