Johnson v. Pike Corporation of America

• Decision Date: 29 September 1971
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 68-1688-F.
• Citation: 332 F. Supp. 490
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: Edward L. JOHNSON, on behalf of himself and all other employees similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. PIKE CORPORATION OF AMERICA, Defendant.

332 F. Supp. 490

Edward L. JOHNSON, on behalf of himself and all other employees similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. PIKE CORPORATION OF AMERICA, Defendant.

Civ. No. 68-1688-F.

United States District Court, C. D. California.

September 29, 1971.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jack M. Newman, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff.

Richard F. Oetting, of Voegelin & Barton, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FERGUSON, District Judge.

The question presented is whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) prohibits an employer covered by the Act from discharging a black person solely because his wages have been garnisheed to satisfy judgments.

Plaintiff, Edward L. Johnson, a black person, was employed by defendant, an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), on May 7, 1965, as a warehouseman. During the period of his employment with defendant, plaintiff's wages were garnisheed several times in satisfaction of judgments against him. On February 15, 1968, after issuing several warnings to plaintiff, defendant discharged plaintiff on the ground that he was in violation of defendant's Company Rule 6, which reads: "Conduct your personal finances in such a way that garnishments will not be made on your wages." It was a company policy to issue a warning after the first garnishment and to terminate after several garnishments.

After filing charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and further complying with the requirements of Section 706 of Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5), plaintiff filed the present action alleging his discharge was the result of discrimination against him because of his race. The prayer was for money damages and an order enjoining defendant from any further application of Rule 6. The defendant answered the complaint, denying any and all liability to plaintiff and denying that plaintiff was discharged from his employment or in any respect discriminated against by defendant on account of his race.

The plaintiff does not contend, except for the effect of Rule 6, that the defendant has ever engaged in any racial discrimination in its employment practices. Furthermore, plaintiff concedes that Rule 6 was never intended by the defendant to be racially discriminatory.

After extensive discovery and pre-trial conferences, the parties submitted to the court for its approval a stipulation for judgment against the defendant. The stipulation provides for the following:

(1) Plaintiff is to have judgment and money damages for the difference between what he has earned since defendant terminated his employment and what he would have earned had he been continuously employed by defendant from the date of his termination through December 31, 1970. The parties have stipulated this sum to be $3,173.32. Plaintiff shall also recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

(2) Defendant is restrained and enjoined from discharging any employee by reason of the fact that said employee's wages are attached and garnisheed pursuant to said Rule 6.

The court approves the stipulation and orders that judgment be entered for the reasons set forth herein. The issue presented has not been rendered moot by Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969), which invalidates summary attachments of wages prior to judgment. In this case the plaintiff's wages were garnisheed after judgments were obtained against him.

Plaintiff bases his claim on several statutory provisions, namely, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985 (the Civil Rights Acts of 1870 and 1871). Although the court is of the opinion that the complaint raises substantial questions under §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985, it is not necessary to reach those issues, and accordingly no opinion is expressed on them. It is clear that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is sufficient to support plaintiff's claim.

Section 703(a) (1) of that Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2) makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer:

"to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."

The Supreme Court was recently called upon to interpret Section 703(a). In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971), although the Court cited only Section 703 (a) (2), it is clear from the decisions of the lower courts in that case that both subsections of Section 703(a) were involved in the action. Since these two subsections share the identical purpose and format and overlap considerably in coverage, this court can see no reason to approach the issues covered by subsection 1 any differently than the Supreme Court approached the issues under subsection 2. There, black employees brought suit challenging the requirement by their employer of obtaining a high school diploma or passing specified intelligence tests as a condition of employment in or transfer between certain jobs. The court of appeals adopted the position that an employer's subjective intent should govern the legality of his acts under § 703(a). Since there was no showing that the respondent's high school diploma or intelligence tests requirements had been adopted with any intent or purpose to discriminate, that court found no violation of Title VII. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970).

The Supreme Court reversed, stressing that "what is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification". 401 U.S. at 431, 91 S.Ct. at 853. The Court adopted a two-step approach to determine whether an employment practice is prohibited by Title VII.

The first inquiry is whether the practice discriminates against any person or group on the basis of race (or other impermissible criterion). In this regard, the Court emphasized that "the Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation". 401 U.S. at 431, 91 S.Ct. at 853. The Court found that the requirements of a diploma and intelligence testing, although racially neutral on their face and even though adopted in good faith with no intent to discriminate, did in fact discriminate against blacks in that the requirements rendered ineligible for employment or transfer a markedly disproportionate number of blacks.

The second inquiry is whether the practice bears a "demonstrable relationship" to successful performance of the job. "If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited." 401 U.S. at 431, 91 S.Ct. at 853. Finding that neither the high school diploma nor the general intelligence test requirements bore the required "demonstrable relationship", the Court held that they violated Title VII.

The holding of the Supreme Court was presaged by several lower courts. In Local 189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), the court found that a company's seniority system, although racially neutral on its face and applied in a non-discriminatory manner, violated § 703 because the system was based upon and therefore reflected the discriminatory effects of the previously discriminatory hiring and placement system and there was no "overriding legitimate, non-racial business purpose". 416 F.2d at 989. See also Local 53 of the International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers International Association, Local Union No. 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969). These cases demonstrate that an employment practice violates Title VII whenever it has the foreseeable effect of denying blacks an equal opportunity for employment. The policy or practice may be adopted in good faith with no intent to discriminate, may be racially neutral on its face and may be objectively and fairly applied; it is nonetheless interdicted by Title VII if the consequence of the policy or practice is to discriminate and there is no overriding business purpose.

It might be argued that the Griggs decision, as well as the court of appeals' decisions cited, supra, are distinguishable from the present action, in that they deal with situations in which the effects of racial discrimination practiced before the effective date of the 1964 Act are carried forward and retained by the facially neutral practice in question. The Griggs decision, however, renders this distinction immaterial. The discrimination in Griggs—the inferior education received by blacks—is attributable to present as well as past discrimination in educational facilities. The decision cannot be narrowly construed to rest only upon past educational differences. Indeed, the entire thrust of the opinion is toward a liberal construction of Title VII so as to fully effectuate the congressional mandate to insure members of minority groups equal employment opportunities and eliminate employment practices which act as "built-in headwinds" for minority groups. The fact that many of the early cases interpreting Title VII were concerned with whether Congress intended the Act to invalidate present and continuing consequences of past discrimination cannot blind us to the fact that the Act also proscribes the present effects of present discrimination.

Applying these principles to the present case, the court is compelled to find that plaintiff's claims are fully supported by Title VII. The first inquiry is whether defendant's Rule 6 discriminates against black employees in an impermissible manner. It should be emphasized...