Minch v. City of Fargo, 10267
Citation | 332 N.W.2d 71 |
Decision Date | 30 March 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 10267,10267 |
Parties | A.R. MINCH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF FARGO, Defendant and Appellee. Civ. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota |
Tenneson, Serkland, Lundberg, Erickson & Marcil, Fargo, for plaintiff and appellant; argued by Ronald H. McLean, Fargo.
Solberg, Stewart, Boulger & Miller, Fargo, for defendant and appellee; argued by Wayne O. Solberg, Fargo.
The City of Fargo rezoned an area in the city which included a small lot owned by Minch. Minch claimed that he had plans for, and had made, investments in some improvements on his lot that are prohibited by the new zoning ordinance. His suit against Fargo is described more fully in Minch v. City of Fargo, 297 N.W.2d 785 (N.D.1980). That was an appeal from a clearly interlocutory determination and, because no Rule 54(b), NDRCivP 1 order had been entered, we remanded for further proceedings which have now occurred.
Minch sought, in the alternative: (1) a declaration that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutional; (2) compensation for the "taking or damaging" of his property (inverse condemnation); or (3) a declaration that he had established a nonconforming use. He demanded a jury trial on the second and third alternatives.
A jury trial was had; however, when all testimony was in, the trial court determined that there was a preliminary question for the court. The court made findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment of dismissal with prejudice and on the merits. We affirm the judgment.
Before we reach the issues discussed by the parties, it might be helpful to analyze some of the procedural confusion encountered in zoning and inverse condemnation law. The Institute on Planning, Zoning and Eminent Domain, Southwestern Legal Foundation, Dallas, has periodically addressed these and other related subjects. Particularly interesting articles in some of their annual publications are: Arnebergh, Recent Developments in the Law of Inverse Condemnation (1974); Huxtable, Inverse Condemnation--Its Structures, Advantages, and Pitfalls (1977); Sackman, Factors in Inverse Condemnation (1978); Kanner, Inverse Condemnation Remedies In An Era Of Uncertainty (1980); and Sackman, When Is A "Taking" Not A "Taking"? (1982).
In the 1980 publication, Professor Kanner of Loyola Law School in Los Angeles wrote about "a veritable torrent of legal commentaries vying with one another in pointing out the glaring deficiencies in the doctrinal bases of the existing law ...." Kanner quotes from one of those commentaries as follows:
In Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2659, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978), Justice Brennan, for the majority, with Justice Rehnquist and others dissenting, reviewed "the factors that have shaped the jurisprudence of the Fifth Amendment injunction 'nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.' " Subsequently, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175, 100 S.Ct. 383, 390, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979), Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, with Justice Brennan and others dissenting, quoted approvingly from Penn Central that the United States Supreme Court has generally "been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated ...."
Clear guidelines are similarly absent from the variety of precedents pronounced by this court. Cases and authorities that may be applicable to this determination are cited in the comprehensive analysis made by Justice VandeWalle in Eck v. City of Bismarck, 283 N.W.2d 193 (N.D.1979) (Eck I). 2 See also Rippley v. City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 505 (N.D.1983), and Eck v. City of Bismarck, 302 N.W.2d 739 (N.D.1981) (Eck II). Eck I, Eck II, and Rippley were zoning cases. Compare Yegen v. City of Bismarck, 291 N.W.2d 422, 424 (N.D.1980) with syllabus 5 of Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Morton County, 131 N.W.2d 557, 559 (N.D.1964).
It is clear that whether or not there is a taking is a question of law which ordinarily is not to be presented to a jury. See the discussion in United Power Ass'n v. Heley, 277 N.W.2d 262 (N.D.1979). Nevertheless, where there is a dispute of the facts showing that there has been a taking or damaging of property, as there is in the instant case, there must be a hearing before the trial court on that fact question before the court can determine the question of law. It logically follows that findings of fact should be (and were) made as required by Rule 52(a), NDRCivP. 3 To the extent that our disposition of this case may involve fact issues, we determine only if the findings of fact made by the trial court are clearly erroneous.
First, we will consider Minch's allegations that the rezoning ordinance is unconstitutional because it is "an unreasonable, arbitrary, and discriminatory spot zoning." Minch fails to advise us which provisions of the constitution are claimed to be violated. 4 Conclusion of law VIII provides:
"That the action of the City in rezoning plaintiff's property was based upon a comprehensive master plan and was in conformity with that plan and with a systematic program of 'down-zoning' or 'corrective zoning' and was not arbitrary and capricious."
Minch refers us to finding of fact VI as the support for conclusion of law VIII. Finding of fact VI provides:
"That the 'down-zoning' or 'corrective zoning' was in accordance with the comprehensive master plan of the City, which is known as the 'Barton-Aschman Plan.' "
It is argued by Minch that that finding of fact is not supported by sufficient evidence--that the testimony more aptly indicates that the City was only reacting to the whims of a group of disgruntled neighbors. We believe that city officials may, by reacting to even unreasonable complaints, enact constitutional ordinances.
The validity of ordinances which exercise control over land use through police powers (zoning) has been long recognized. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303, 54 A.L.R. 1016 (1926). See also Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 285 N.E.2d 291 (1972), and Eck II, supra.
"In enacting a zoning ordinance the governing body of the city is exercising a legislative function, and where the question whether the determination of the City Council that a certain district shall be included in a classification of a comprehensive zoning plan is an unreasonable, arbitrary or unequal exercise of power is fairly debatable, courts will not substitute their judgment for that of the legislative body, and the conclusion of the latter will not be disturbed." Midgarden v. City of Grand Forks, 79 N.D. 18, 54 N.W.2d 659 (1952) at syllabus 1.
See Munch v. City of Mott, 311 N.W.2d 17 (N.D.1981).
Specific testimony by witnesses that a zoning change in a specific case is reasonable and is not arbitrary or discriminatory does not provide the type of convincing evidentiary support required to sustain either a finding of fact or a conclusion of law. Minch has failed to show that the zoning change violated any provision of the United States or North Dakota Constitution. Findings or conclusions that a statute or ordinance is constitutionally valid is entitled to a presumption of correctness.
Next we address the issue--did the rezoning exceed the bounds of police power and accomplish a "taking or damaging" without just compensation as prohibited by Article I, Sec. 16 of the North Dakota Constitution.
We said before in remanding this case:
Minch v. City of Fargo, supra, 297 N.W.2d at 790. [Emphasis in original.]
Because Minch had alleged substantial reliance, we pointed out the need for an inquiry into Minch's reliance in this case in the light of our holding in City of Fargo, Cass Cty. v. Harwood Tp., 256 N.W.2d 694, 700 (N.D.1977), where we stated:
"... a landowner who has made substantial expenditures in reliance upon existing zoning or otherwise committed himself to his substantial disadvantage before the zoning change may be protected."
Without referring us to any specific finding...
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