332 U.S. 258 (1947), 133, Ex parte Fahey
|Docket Nº:||No. 133, Misc.|
|Citation:||332 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 1558, 91 L.Ed. 2041|
|Party Name:||Ex parte Fahey|
|Case Date:||June 23, 1947|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued April 30, 1947
Mandamus, prohibition, and injunction against judges are extraordinary remedies which should be reserved for really extraordinary cases, and this Court will not countenance their use as substitutes for an appeal. Pp. 259-260.
Petition invoking the original jurisdiction of this Court and asking leave to file petition for writ of mandamus, prohibition, or injunction against a District Judge to vacate his order allowing fees to counsel in Fahey v. Mallonee, ante, p. 245, to prohibit any further allowance therein, and to enjoin any payments heretofore allowed, denied, p. 260.
JACKSON, J., lead opinion
[67 S.Ct. 1559] MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
This petition by John H. Fahey, individually and as Federal Home Loan Bank Commissioner, and A. V. Amman, individually and as Conservator for the Long Beach Federal Savings and Loan Association, invokes the original jurisdiction of this Court. They ask leave to file petition for a writ of "mandamus and/or prohibition and/or injunction" against Judge Peirson M. Hall of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California to vacate his order allowing fees to counsel in Fahey v. Mallonee, decided today, ante, p. 245, to prohibit any further allowance therein, and to enjoin any payments heretofore allowed.
While an appeal in the principal case was pending in this Court, application was made by various counsel for the plaintiffs and associated interests therein for allowance of fees aggregating some $125,000. The District Court allowed counsel for plaintiffs $50,000 as a partial payment on account of services, but withheld action on other applications. Certain costs and expenses of the plaintiffs in the amount of $17,295.13 were also ordered reimbursed.
The petition involves serious questions of law and of fact. Whether, because of the pendency of the appeal and the stay order granted therein, the District Court had power to entertain the application, whether before the final outcome of the case could be known an allowance was premature, whether the source of the fund on deposit with the court was so related to the services as to be subject to disbursement for their compensation, and whether one judge can make allowances in a case before a three-judge court,...
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