Sealfon v. United States

Decision Date05 January 1948
Docket NumberNo. 174,174
Citation332 U.S. 575,68 S.Ct. 237,92 L.Ed. 180
PartiesSEALFON v. UNITED STATES
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Mr. John J. Wilson, of Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Mr. W. Marvin Smith, of Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether an acquittal of conspiracy to defraud the United States precludes a subsequent prosecution for commission of the substantive offense, on the particular facts here involved.

Two indictments were returned against petitioner and others. One charged a conspiracy to defraud the United States of its governmental function of conserving and rationing sugar by presenting false invoices and making false representations to a ration board to the effect that certain sales of sugar products were made to exempt agencies.1 The other indictment charged petitioner and Greenberg with the commission of the substantive offense,2 viz., uttering and publishing as true the false invoices. The conspiracy indictment was tried first and the following facts were shown:

Defendant Greenberg manufactured syrup and approached Sanford Doctors, a salesman for a brokerage concern, to sell vanilla syrup. Doctors negotiated some sales to petitioner who did a wholesale business under the name of Sero Syrup Co. Thereafter Greenberg asked Doctors to get a list from petitioner showing the places where petitioner made sales and told him that if any sales were made to exempt agencies, Greenberg could sell to petitioner in larger quantities. Doctors so informed petitioner and some time thereafter petitioner wrote to Greenberg saying, 'at the present time some of our syrups are being sold at the Brooklyn Navy Yard' and various defense plants. Petitioner did sell some of his syrup to a vending company which had machines at the Navy Yard but it was not vanilla syrup and no sales were made to the Navy Yard as such. Greenberg thereafter presented a series of false invoices to the ration board purporting to show sales to petitioner for delivery to the Navy Yard. Petitioner's letter was never shown to the board. On the basis of these invoices Greenberg received replacement certificates for 21 million pounds of sugar, 10 million of which he sold to petitioner in the form of vanilla syrup, and which was by petitioner sold to non-exempt consumers, mostly the Natio al Biscuit Company. Petitioner at first made payments to Greenberg by check but thereafter gave checks to his trucker which the latter cashed, deducted his trucking fee, and paid Greenberg.

The jury returned a verdict of not guilty as to petitioner.3 Thereafter a trial was had on the other indictment which charged petitioner and Greenberg with uttering and publishing as true the false invoices introduced in the conspiracy trial. Greenberg pleaded guilty and the trial proceeded against petitioner on the theory that he aided and abetted Greenberg in the commission of the substantive offense. The false invoices, the letter from petitioner to Greenberg, and essentially the same testimony were again introduced against petitioner. In addition, it was brought out on cross-examination that petitioner had unsuccessfully sought replacement certificates from his ration board for sugar contained in syrups sold at the Navy Yard and defense plants. Geenberg gave testimony from which the jury could conclude that petitioner was a moving factor in the scheme to defraud which was constructed around petitioner's letter and that he was familiar with Greenberg's intention to submit false invoices. Greenberg further testified that petitioner received $500,000 in cash under the agreement as a rebate of two cents a pound on all replacement sugar which Greenberg received on Navy Yard invoices whether or not it was used in syrup sold to petitioner. This time the jury returned a verdict of guilty and petitioner was sentenced to five years' imprisonment and fined $12,000.

Petitioner moved to quash the second indictment on grounds of double jeopardy (abandoned in this Court) and res judicata, and also objected to the introduction of the evidence adduced at the first trial. The district judge ruled against petitioner, and the court below affirmed. 3 Cir., 161 F.2d 481. We granted the petition for a writ of certiorari because of the importance of the question to the administration of the criminal law.

It has long been recognized that the commission of the substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit it are separate and distinct offenses. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 1182, 90 L.Ed. 1489. Thus, with some exceptions, one may be prosecuted for both crimes. Ibid. But res judicata may be a defense in a second prosecution. That doctrine applies to criminal as well as civil proceedings (United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 87, 37 S.Ct. 68, 69, 61 L.Ed. 161, 3 L.R.A. 516; United States v. De Angelo, 3 Cir., 138 F.2d 466, 468; Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 17 S.E.2d 573, 147 A.L.R. 991; see Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 334, 35 S.Ct. 582, 590, 59 L.Ed. 969) and operates to conclude those matters in issue which the verdict determined though the offenses be different. See United States v. Adams, 281 U.S. 202, 205, 50 S.Ct. 269, 74 L.Ed. 807.

Thus the only question in this case is whether the jury's verdict in the conspiracy trial was a determination favorable to petitioner of the facts essential to conviction of the substantive...

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    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 27 Agosto 1973
    ...Beltran, 94 Cal.App.2d 197, 203, 210 P.2d 238; People v. Majado, 22 Cal.App.2d 323, 326, 70 P.2d 1015; see Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 578, 68 S.Ct. 237, 92 L.Ed. 180, and see People v. Medina, 6 Cal.3d 484, 492, 99 Cal.Rptr. 630, 492 P.2d On this appeal the parties have, howeve......
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    ...substantive wire fraud counts is not necessary.3 The principal authorities on which the defendants rely — Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 68 S.Ct. 237, 92 L.Ed. 180 (1948), and United States v. Ohayon, 483 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir.2007) — are distinguishable precisely because the conspir......
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    ...jeopardy has been terminated. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 37 S.Ct. 68, 61 L.Ed. 161 (1916); Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 68 S.Ct. 237, 92 L.Ed. 180 (1948). In Cousins v. State, 277 Md. 383, 388, 354 A.2d 825 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027, 97 S.Ct. 652, 50 L.E......
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    • 17 Junio 1957
    ...from attempting a second time to prove a fact that he sought unsuccessfully to prove in a prior action. Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 68 S.Ct. 237, 92 L.Ed. 180. Nor need we quarrel with petitioner's premise that the standard of proof applicable in denaturalization cases is at lea......
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1 books & journal articles
  • The Supreme Court as Protector of Civil Rights: Criminal Justice
    • United States
    • ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, The No. 275-1, May 1951
    • 1 Mayo 1951
    ...of the original Con- 532 (1947)—Rutledge, J., dissenting; Sealfon stitution against ex post facto laws 6 and v. United States, 332 U. S. 575 (1947); bills of attainder,7 and the guarantees v. Hunter, 336 U. S. 684 (1949)—Murphy, of the Bill of Rights. While the guar- Douglas, Ru......

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