United States v. Sullivan

Decision Date10 April 1964
Docket NumberNo. 14091.,14091.
Citation333 F.2d 100
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellant. v. Cornelius W. SULLIVAN et al.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John B. Jones, Jr., and Joseph Kovner, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C. (Louis F. Oberdorfer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson, Michael A. Mulroney, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Joseph S. Ammerman and Gustave Diamond, U. S. Attys., Thomas J. Shannon, Asst. U. S. Atty., on the brief), for appellant.

Alexander Black, Buchanan, Ingersoll, Rodewald, Kyle & Buerger, Pittsburgh, Pa. (John M. Reed, Reed & Egler, Pittsburgh, Pa., John H. Filer, Hartford, Conn., on the brief), for appellee Aetna Life Ins. Co.

Gilbert J. Helwig, Pittsburgh, Pa. (J. Tomlinson Fort, Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, Pittsburgh, Pa., E. H. McVitty, Toronto, Canada, on the brief), for appellee Manufacturers Life Ins. Co.

Thomas Lewis Jones, White, Jones & Gregg, formerly White & Jones, Pittsburgh, Pa., for General American Life Ins. Co.

K. Martin Worthy, Glenn L. Archer, Jr., Hamel, Morgan, Park & Saunders, Washington, D. C., for Life Insurance Ass'n of America, amicus curiae.

Before BIGGS, Chief Judge, and McLAUGHLIN, KALODNER, STALEY, HASTIE, GANEY and SMITH, Circuit Judges

BIGGS, Chief Judge.

The United States brought this action under Section 7403 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,1 to foreclose a tax lien on unmatured insurance policies. Defendants in the proceeding below in addition to the delinquent taxpayers, Cornelius W. Sullivan and his wife, Mary E. Sullivan, were the Aetna Life Insurance Company "Aetna", and the Manufacturers Life Insurance Company "Manufacturers".2 From adverse determinations in the court below, reported at 203 F.Supp. 1 (1962), the Government has appealed.

There is no question that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue can reach the "cash surrender values" of a delinquent taxpayer's unmatured insurance policies and can apply the amounts realized to the satisfaction of the deficiency. The issues raised on this appeal concern the fundamental problem of the means by which the foregoing can be accomplished and the interrelated question of the proper measure of the Commissioner's recovery.

The facts are not in dispute. On November 4, 1952 the Commissioner made an assessment of income taxes with penalties and interest jointly against the Sullivans for deficiencies for the year 1950. On November 5, 1952 the District Collector received the assessment list from the Commissioner and vainly demanded payment from the Sullivans. A lien against the Sullivans' "property and rights to property" automatically arose at this time under Section 3670 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.3

Thereafter, between November 8, 1952 and April 6, 1953, and pursuant to Section 3672 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,4 notice of lien was filed of public record in various counties.5

The outstanding tax liability of the Sullivans was partially reduced subsequently pursuant to a determination of the United States Tax Court. In addition, some of the amount due was recovered. A balance of $163,486.54 was still outstanding at the time of commencement of the present action.

On May 21, 1953 the Sullivans purchased an insurance policy from Aetna, No. P 975 434, in the face amount of $10,000. On June 17, 1953 the Sullivans purchased an insurance policy from Manufacturers, No. 1 250 226, in the face amount of $15,000.6 Under each of the policies Mrs. Sullivan was the named insured and Mr. Sullivan was the designated beneficiary. Mrs. Sullivan had the right under the policies to change the beneficiary, to exercise all options, and to take part in for present purposes substantially identical dividend sharing plans.7 Mrs. Sullivan elected under both policies to have dividends accumulated at interest.8

The Aetna policy was of the endowment type. It was to mature at the end of twenty-six years at which time Mrs. Sullivan, then having atttained the age of sixty-five, was to receive an income of $100.00 a month for life.9 In the event of Mrs. Sullivan's death before the policy's maturity, the proceeds of the policy were to be paid in one lump sum to the beneficiary, Mr. Sullivan.10 The Manufacturers policy was a "whole life policy" with its face amount, $15,000.00, payable to the beneficiary, Mr. Sullivan, on the death of Mrs. Sullivan.

It is unquestioned that the policies were substantially identical in all respects material to this appeal. Generally speaking, at any given time and as to each of the policies, the part of the total premiums paid in on the policy which exceeded the insurer's accrued policy costs plus, for essential purposes, accumulated dividend amounts represented the cash value of that policy.11 The cash value varied throughout the life of the policy. The cash value less any outstanding policy indebtedness previously incurred by the insured to the insurer constituted the cash surrender value of the policy. The cash surrender value was the amount the insured was entitled to receive on election to cancel the policy in accordance with its terms as detailed hereafter.12

The two policies contained a number of substantially identical provisions authorizing various uses of their respective reserves by the insured, Mrs. Sullivan.13 The first of these gave the insured the right to elect to cancel the policy and to receive in settlement its cash surrender value. A condition precedent to the right to recover the cash surrender value was surrender of the policy to the company for discharge. Mrs. Sullivan never took any action to obtain the cash surrender value of either policy other than that implicit in the policy loan transactions with Manufacturers discussed infra

The second of these provisions gave the insured the right to borrow on the security of the policy at five per cent per annum. The Manufacturers policy specifically stated and the Aetna policy provided in effect that all amounts so loaned and interest thereon were to be a first lien on the policy. Under each of the policies there was no specific obligation to repay the amount borrowed; a failure in this regard simply served to bring about a permanent reduction in the cash surrender value. But if the permanent arrearage came to exceed the cash value of the policy, the obligations of the company under the policy were terminated and the policy was thereby cancelled.

The third provision was an optional automatic premium loan clause, revocable at will, which provided in substance that in the event of a default in the payment of premiums, as long as a cash surrender value existed on the policy the company would automatically loan to the insured and apply to premium payment the amount due. The insurance policies prescribed the same terms for these loans as were applicable to general policy loans, i. e., a first lien on the policy to the extent of the loan and an interest charge of five per cent. Mrs. Sullivan elected to have the automatic premium loan provisions of the policies be operative and she did not at any time revoke her elections.14

Finally, a fourth substantially identical clause of significance was contained in the policies. This was a non-forfeiture provision which in substance provided that in the event of default in payment of premiums and at the election of the insured, each policy could be continued to the extent of its cash surrender value as either participating paid-up insurance or non-participating extended term insurance. In the absence of an election on the part of the insured, there was to be an automatic conversion into non-participating extended term insurance.

The non-forfeiture provision mentioned in the preceding paragraph was never operative in the instant case inasmuch as Mrs. Sullivan elected that the automatic premium loan provision of the policies should become operative in the event of premium default. The clause is nevertheless of some relevance in that Mrs. Sullivan could have revoked the applicability of the automatic premium loan provision at any time.15

Aetna and Manufacturers were never served with notice of lien, nor did they receive actual notice of the Government's claim from any source until later served with notice of levy, discussed infra. On July 12, 1955 and on June 24, 1957 Manufacturers granted to Mrs. Sullivan policy loans of the combined principal amount of $714.52. The policy loan amounts were applied to outstanding premiums at the request of Mrs. Sullivan. The automatic premium loan clause of course was in effect at these times, but it had not yet become operative because it made provision for a grace period which had not expired in either instance.

On January 9, 1958 Aetna and Manufacturers were served with an identical "notice of levy" under the purported authority of Sections 6331 and 6332 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.16 The notice in pertinent part stated: "You are further notified that demand has been made upon the taxpayer for the amount set forth herein, and that such amount is still due, owing, and unpaid from this taxpayer, and that the lien provided for by Section 6321, Internal Revenue Code of 1954 the current lien provision, corresponding in substance to Section 3670, Internal Revenue Code of 1939, see note 19 infra, now exists upon all property or rights to property belonging to the aforesaid taxpayer. Accordingly, you are further notified that all property, rights to property, moneys, credits and bank deposits now in your possession and belonging to this taxpayer (or with respect to which you are obligated) and all sums of money or other obligations owing from you to this taxpayer are hereby levied upon and seized for satisfaction of the aforesaid tax, together with all additions provided by law, and demand is hereby made upon you for the amount necessary to satisfy the liability set forth herein, or for such lesser sum as...

To continue reading

Request your trial
72 cases
  • State of New Jersey v. Moriarity
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
    • 31 d5 Março d5 1967
    ...process of self help to protect the tax lien and to place the burden of resistance on those opposing his claim. United States v. Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100, (3rd Cir., 1964). The mainsprings of this procedure, Sections 6321, 6331 and 6332, provide for the lien, the levy and a duty to surrender ......
  • In re Jones, Bankruptcy No. 94-01296
    • United States
    • United States Bankruptcy Courts – District of Columbia Circuit
    • 26 d3 Março d3 1997
    ...States. In re Voelker, 42 F.3d 1050, 1052 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Barbier, 896 F.2d 377, 379 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100 (3d Cir.1964); United States v. Phillips, 267 F.2d 374 (5th Cir.1959). "The inalienability of the pension interests does not destroy ......
  • United States v. National Bank of Commerce
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 26 d3 Junho d3 1985
    ...statute which provides the Commissioner with a prompt and convenient method for satisfying delinquent tax claims." United States v. Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100, 116 (CA3 1964). It provides no notice to third parties that property in which they may have an interest has been seized. If an individu......
  • In re Quality Health Care
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Indiana
    • 28 d1 Julho d1 1997
    ...26 U.S.C. ?? 6331 and 6332, are special procedural devices available to the IRS to protect and satisfy its liens, United States v. Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100, 116 (C.A.3 1964), and are analogous to the remedies available to private secured creditors. See Uniform Commercial Code ? 9-503, 3A U.L.......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT