Mace v. City of Palestine

• Citation: 333 F.3d 621
• Decision Date: 24 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-40335.,02-40335.
• Parties: Debera MACE, Individually and as representative of the Estate of Jacob Vincent Revill, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF PALESTINE; Pat Henderson, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Page 621

333 F.3d 621

Debera MACE, Individually and as representative of the Estate of Jacob Vincent Revill, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF PALESTINE; Pat Henderson, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-40335.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 24, 2003.

Rehearing Denied July 24, 2003.

Michael Edward Starr (argued), Hommel & Starr, Tyler, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Earl Glenn Thames, Jr. (argued), Potter Minton, Tyler, TX, for Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

Before JOLLY, DUHÉ and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:

After the shooting death of her son in a confrontation with police, Debera Mace brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Palestine, Texas and Palestine Police Chief Pat Henderson. Mace alleges that Henderson used excessive force against her son and, after shooting her son, he was deliberately indifferent to her son's need for medical attention — all in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants based on qualified immunity. We find no reason to disturb the ruling and, accordingly, we affirm.

I.

On April 16, 2001, police in the City of Palestine, Texas, responded to complaints of a disturbance involving two intoxicated individuals at a mobile home park. Officers arriving on the scene found Jacob Vincent Revill ("Revill") inside a mobile home with the door open, yelling, cursing, brandishing an eighteen to twenty inch sword and breaking windows. Blood was on his hands and on the broken windows. The officers, with weapons drawn, told Revill to drop the sword. Revill told the officers to stay away from him and threatened to kill himself.¹ He claimed to be an expert in martial arts and made several martial arts motions with the sword in an effort to keep the officers at bay. Revill demanded to talk to Chief of Police Pat Henderson.² Henderson arrived on the scene and attempted to calm Revill by talking to him.³ Revill remained agitated, cursing his father and his girlfriend, and continued yelling and brandishing the sword. Henderson told Revill to drop the sword and not to advance on the officers. He offered to take Revill to see a doctor or psychologist.⁴ While Henderson was talking to him, Revill exited the mobile home.⁵ Revill continued to brandish and make punching motions with the sword. During this time Revill was between eight and ten feet away from the officers. When Revill turned, and raised the sword toward the officers, Henderson shot Revill in his right arm, causing him to drop the sword.⁶

Henderson picked up the sword and shouted for a waiting ambulance while the other officers tried to subdue Revill. Revill attempted to flee, disobeyed orders to lie down, and fought off a police dog. The officers finally subdued Revill with pepper spray and pulled him to the ground. Medical personnel from the ambulance began treating Revill as soon as he was subdued. Henderson instructed one of the officers to drive the ambulance so the medical personnel could continue caring for Revill, which apparently caused a slight delay in the departure of the ambulance. Revill died at the hospital.

Mace, Revill's mother and representative of his estate, brought this suit against Henderson and the city under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Henderson used excessive force when he shot Revill and that he was deliberately indifferent to Revill's medical needs when he had an officer drive the ambulance. She also alleged that Henderson's actions represented a city policy for responding to emergency situations. Mace did not survive Henderson's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity and the City of Palestine's motion for summary judgment.

II.

This court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir.2002). Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, there is no genuine issue of material fact precluding judgment as a matter of law for the movant. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc).

Qualified immunity protects officers from suit unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Claims of qualified immunity require a two-step analysis. First we must determine "whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show that the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Price v. Roark, 256 F.3d 364, 369 (5th Cir.2001) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)). If there is no constitutional violation, our inquiry ends. However, if "the allegations could make out a constitutional violation, we must ask whether the right was clearly established — that is whether `it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.'" Id.

III.

Our qualified immunity analysis begins with a determination of whether Henderson violated Revill's constitutional right to be free from excessive force.⁷ Claims that law enforcement officers used excessive force are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). A plaintiff must prove injury suffered as a result of force that was objectively unreasonable. Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 433-34 (5th Cir.1996). In this case, the only question in our qualified immunity analysis is whether Henderson's use of deadly force was objectively unreasonable.

Applying the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard, we must determine the reasonableness of Henderson's use of deadly force in the light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time he acted, without regard to his underlying intent or motivation.⁸ Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. In making this determination, we must be mindful that police officers are "forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Id. at 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865.

Use of deadly force is not unreasonable when an officer would have reason to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious harm to the officer or others. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). It is undisputed that Revill was intoxicated, agitated, breaking windows, shouting, and brandishing an eighteen to twenty inch sword. Revill did not respond to commands to drop his sword or to stop moving toward the officers. He continued to make punching motions with his sword while no more than ten feet away from the officers. The record evidence is uncontradicted that when he was shot, Revill was raising his sword toward the officers. The record further shows that this event took place in the close quarters of a mobile home park, which limited the officers' ability to retreat or to keep Revill from harming others in the area. Mace urges us to find that two disputed issues of fact are material to whether Henderson's actions were unreasonable: first, the parties dispute whether Revill verbally threatened the officers and, second, the parties dispute the reason that Revill exited the mobile home. A resolution of these disputed issues in favor of either party would not change our analysis because we have viewed these facts in the light most favorable to Mace as is required for summary judgment.⁹

Henderson was faced with an intoxicated, violent and uncooperative individual who was wielding a sword within eight to ten feet of several officers in a relatively confined space. It is not objectively unreasonable for an officer in that situation to believe that there was a serious danger to himself and the other officers present. Although, in retrospect, there may have been alternative courses of action for Henderson to take, we will not use "the 20-20 vision of hindsight" to judge the reasonableness of Henderson's use of force. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. Henderson's use of force against Revill was not objectively unreasonable; therefore, it was not in violation of the Constitution. Because Henderson did not violate Revill's constitutional right to be free from excessive force, he is entitled to qualified immunity from suit on Mace's excessive force claim and the City of Palestine is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.¹⁰ City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986) (holding that a municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 where no constitutional deprivation has occurred).

IV.

We now turn to Mace's claim that Henderson showed deliberate indifference to Revill's medical needs. The constitutional right of a pretrial detainee to medical care arises from the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Wagner v. Bay City, 227 F.3d 316, 324 (5th Cir.2000). That right is violated if an officer acts with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious medical harm and resulting injuries. Id. Deliberate indifference requires that the official have subjective knowledge of the risk of harm. Id. Mere negligence or a failure to act reasonably is not enough. The officer must have the subjective intent to cause harm. Id.

Mace does not dispute the basic facts relating to the medical attention received by Revill. There was an ambulance at the scene, which Henderson summoned. The medical personnel present attended Revill immediately after he was subdued by police. Chief Henderson ordered one of the officers to drive the ambulance so that both medical personnel could attend to Revill during the drive. The medical personnel continued to attend to Revill as they transported him to the hospital. He...