Cooper v. Office of Sheriff of Will County, 03 C 5064.
| Decision Date | 25 August 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 03 C 5064.,03 C 5064. |
| Citation | 333 F.Supp.2d 728 |
| Parties | James COOPER, Special Administrator of the Estate of Patrick L. Cooper, deceased, Plaintiff, v. OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF OF WILL COUNTY, Richard Kowalski, Daniel Tapper Deputy Vrakas, Deputy Hambrick # 1534, Deputy Burdnicki, Deputy Star # 1391, Deputy Star # 1253, and the County of Will, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Kurt D. Lloyd, Lloyd & Cavanagh, Chicago, IL, for James Cooper, Special Administrator of the Estate of Patrick L. Cooper, Deceased est Patrick L Cooper, plaintiff.
Steven M. Puiszis, James Constantine Vlahakis, Kristy Marie Kelly, Hinshaw & Culbertson, Chicago, IL, for Paul J Kaupas, Will County Sheriff's Department, County of Will, defendants.
Corinne Cantwell Heggie, James Constantine Vlohakis, Hinshaw & Culbertson, Chicago, IL, for Richard Kowalski, Daniel Tapper, Dep Vrakas, Dep Hambrick, # 1534, Dep Burdnicki, Dep Star # 1391, Dep Star 1253, defendants.
Plaintiff James Cooper, Special Administrator of the Estate of Patrick L. Cooper, deceased, initiated the instant suit against Paul J. Kaupas in his official capacity as Sheriff of Will County, the Office of the Sheriff of Will County, and the County of Will, seeking damages arising from decedent's death while in custody as a pretrial detainee at the Will County Jail. After this court granted defendants' motion to dismiss on December 18, 2003, plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding deputies Richard Kowalski, Daniel Tapper, Deputy Vrakas (sued as "Deputy Star # 1391"),1 Deputy Hambrick # 1534, Deputy Burdnicki and Ron Poturalski (sued as "Deputy Star # 1253"),2 as additional defendants and eliminating Paul J. Kaupas in his official capacity as Sheriff of Will County as a defendant.
Counts I and II allege state law claims for negligence against all defendants for failure to provide timely medical treatment to decedent. Counts III and IV allege state law claims for willful and wanton conduct against all defendants for failure to provide timely medical treatment to decedent. Count V alleges a civil rights claim under § 1983 against the defendant deputies for failure to provide timely medical treatment to decedent.
Defendants Office of the Sheriff of Will County and the County of Will, joined by defendants Richard Kowalski, Daniel Tapper, Deputy Vrakas, Deputy Hambrick, Deputy Burdnicki, and Ron Poturalski, have moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated herein, defendants' motion to dismiss is granted as to Counts I and II and denied with respect to Counts III, IV, and V.
Plaintiff James Cooper is the surviving father of Patrick L. Cooper ("decedent") and was appointed Special Administrator of the Estate of Patrick L. Cooper, and brings the instant lawsuit on behalf of the estate. The Office of the Sheriff of Will County ("Sheriff's Office") is a law enforcement agency that operates the Will County Jail in Joliet, Illinois. The County of Will ("Will County") and the Sheriff's Office employed, supervised, and trained deputies Richard Kowalski, Daniel Tapper, Deputy Vrakas, Deputy Hambrick, Deputy Burdnicki, and Ron Poturalski (together, the "Deputies"), who were on duty at the time of the alleged incident giving rise to the instant action.
Decedent was placed under arrest and transferred to the general inmate population of the Will County Jail in Joliet, Illinois, where he was awaiting trial. The Sheriff's Office and the Deputies were aware that decedent had an asthma condition that required medication, and prior to the alleged incident giving rise to the instant action, decedent suffered an asthma attack requiring inhaler medication. On July 7, 2003, decedent suffered a serious asthma attack that required immediate medical treatment. At the onset and during the attack, decedent and other inmates informed the Deputies on duty that decedent required immediate medical treatment for his attack. Defendants failed to provide decedent with timely medical care, and he sustained injuries that resulted in his death.
When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1428 (7th Cir.1996). Dismissal is proper only when it "appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts ... which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).
Counts I and II allege wrongful death and survival action claims for negligent conduct against defendants for failing to provide decedent with timely medical treatment. Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts I and II argues that defendants are immune from liability under the Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/4-105, which provides:
Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for injury proximately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner in his custody; but this Section shall not apply where the employee, acting within the scope of his employment, knows from his observation of conditions that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and, through willful and wanton conduct, fails to take reasonable action to summon medical care. Nothing in this Section requires the periodic inspection of prisoners.
In response, plaintiff points to Section 3-6016 of the Counties Code, which states that a "sheriff shall be liable for any neglect or omission of the duties of his or her office, when occasioned by a deputy or auxiliary deputy, in the same manner as for his or her own personal neglect or omission." 55 ILCS 5/3-6016. Plaintiff argues that Section 3-6016 of the Counties Code "trumps" the Tort Immunity Act because it is a more specific provision, relying on the canon of statutory interpretation that specific provisions prevail over general provisions. Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Construction Co., 149 Ill.2d 190, 172 Ill.Dec. 200, 595 N.E.2d 561, 563 (1992).4
Upon review of the two statutory provisions, it appears, contrary to plaintiff's argument, that § 10/4-105 of the Tort Immunity Act is the more specific provision, because it addresses the limits of responsibility for medical care for a particular class of persons: prisoners. The Counties Code addresses the sheriff's liability for the actions of his/her deputies generally, as to all classes of persons who claim to be injured by negligence of deputies. As a matter of statutory interpretation, § 10/4-105 of the Tort Immunity Act "trumps" the Counties Code as the more specific provision, and thus provides immunity against plaintiff's negligence claims. Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss Counts I and II is granted.
Counts III and IV allege wrongful death and survival action claims for willful and wanton conduct against defendants for failing to provide the decedent with timely medical treatment. Defendants have urged the court to dismiss these counts on several grounds, as discussed below.
Defendants argue that Section 10/6-105 of the Tort Immunity Act provides immunity for failure to conduct a physical examination of decedent's medical condition and that Section 10/6-106 provides immunity for failing to diagnose that a person is afflicted with a physical illness. Defendants recognize that plaintiff does not allege a failure to diagnose decedent's condition or a failure to conduct a physical examination. Rather, plaintiff alleges that decedent's condition was correctly diagnosed during a physical examination before the alleged incident because the Deputies were "aware" of decedent's condition and the decedent received medical treatment for a prior attack. As plaintiff argues, "once the correct diagnosis is made and treatment for it is prescribed, all immunity bets are off." Antonacci v. City of Chicago, 335 Ill.App.3d 22, 268 Ill.Dec. 814, 779 N.E.2d 428, 433 (2002). The court thus concludes that, based on the allegations of the amended complaint, §§ 10/6-105 and 106 do not require dismissal of Counts III and IV.
Defendants also argue that § 10/4-103 of the Tort Immunity Act provides them absolute immunity for claims based on the failure to provide sufficient equipment, failure to provide sufficiently trained personnel, the failure to adequately supervise employees, and the failure to provide adequate facilities. While plaintiff's amended complaint does allege a failure to provide sufficiently trained personnel, the gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is defendants' failure to provide timely medical care and treatment to decedent. With those allegations in mind, the court concludes that § 10/4-103 of the Tort Immunity Act does not require dismissal of Counts III and IV.
Defendants have also moved to dismiss Counts III and IV against the Sheriff's Office, arguing that 55 ILCS 5/3-6016 of the Counties Code bars all liability against a sheriff for the acts or omissions of his deputies where the deputies are charged with acting in a willful or wanton manner. Section 5/3-6016 provides:
The sheriff shall be liable for any neglect or omission of the duties of his or her office, when occasioned by a deputy or auxiliary deputy, in the same manner as for his or her own personal neglect or omission.
The statute is silent as to willful and wanton conduct. Recently, in Brown v. King, 328 Ill.App.3d 717, 262 Ill.Dec. 897, 767 N.E.2d 357 (2001), the Illinois Appellate Court stated:
It appears that the Counties Code actually expands the liability of the Sheriff by making him liable for the negligent...
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