Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Village, Cal
Decision Date | 15 March 1948 |
Docket Number | No. 101,101 |
Parties | ECCLES et al. v. PEOPLES BANK OF LAKEWOOD VILLAGE, CAL |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
See 333 U.S. 877, 68 S.Ct. 900.
Mr. J. Leonard Townsend, of Washington, D.C., for petitioners.
Mr. Samuel B. Stewart, Jr., of New York City, for respondent.
This is a proceeding under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 48 Stat. 955, 28 U.S.C. § 400, 28 U.S.C.A. § 400. Its aim is to have declared invalid a condition under which the respondent became a member of the Federal Reserve System. The California State Banking Commission authorized the establishment of the respondent provided it obtained federal deposit insurance. This requirement could be met either by direct application to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or through membership in the Federal Reserve System. § 12B(e) and (f) of the Federal Reserve Act, 49 Stat. 162, 170, 49 Stat. 684, 687, 12 U.S.C. § 264(e) and (f), 12 U.S.C.A. § 264(e, f). Respondent sought such membership but its application was rejected. The promoters of the Bank, having requested the Board of Governors of the federal Reserve System to reconsider the application for membership, were advised that favorable action depended on a showing that the Transamerica Corporation, a powerful bank holding company, did not have, nor was intended to have, any interest in this Bank. Having been satisfied on this point, the Board of Governors granted membership to respondent sube ct to conditions of which the fourth is the bone of contention in this litigation.
This condition reads as follows:
The Board of Governors gave the respondent this explanation for the condition:
Some time later, in 1944, Transamerica, without prior knowledge of the respondent, acquired 540 of the 5,000 shares of its outstanding stock. The Bank duly advised the Board of Governors of this fact, but requested that it be relieved of Condition No. 4. This, the Board of Governors declined to do. Then followed this action, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, against the Board of Governors for a declaration that Condition No. 4 was invalid and for an injunction against its enforcement. A motion by the defendants to dismiss the complaint, in that it failed to set forth a justiciable controversy, was denied. 64 F.Supp. 811. The defendants answered, claiming that the Bank's acceptance of membership barred it from questioning the validity of Condition No. 4, and that in any case the condition was valid, and moved for judgment on the pleadings. The Bank, having filed a number of affidavits, moved for summary judgment. The District Court, in an unreported opinion, held that the Bank was bound by the condition on which it had accepted mem- bership in the Federal Reserve System, and gave judgment for the defendants. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, one judge dissenting, reversed. It rejected the defense of estoppel and sustained the validity of the condition 'only as a statement that, if the Board of Governors should determine, after hearing, that Transamerica's ownership of the bank's shares has resulted in a change for the worse in the character of the bank's personnel, in its banking policies, in the safety of its deposits or in any other substantial way, it may require the bank to withdraw from the Federal Reserve System.' 161 F.2d 636, 643, 644. Accordingly, it remanded the case to the District Court for entry of a judgment construing Condition No. 4 to such effect. Since this ruling involves a matter of importance to the administration of the Federal Reserve Act, we brought the case here. 332 U.S. 755, 68 S.Ct. 55.
Condition No. 4 provides for withdrawal from membership in the Federal Reserve System, for violation of its provisions, 'within 60 days after written notice from the Board of Governors * * *.' Section 9 of the Federal Reserve Act authorizes the Board of Governors to revoke the membership status of a bank 'after hearing.'1 If the case contained no more than the foregoing elements, three questions would emerge:
(1) Was this action premature, brought as it was before the Board of Governors commenced revocation proceedings?
(2) If not, could the respondent attack the validity of a condition on the basis of which it had been accepted, and had enjoyed, membership? Compare Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 255, 67 S.Ct. 1552, 1556.
(3) If so, did the Board of Governors have power to impose the condition as a means of guarding against acquisition by Transamerica of an interest in respondent?
However, with due regard for the considerations that should guide us in rendering a declaratory judgment, the record as a whole requires us to dispose of the case without reaching any of these questions.
Extended correspondence between Marriner S. Eccles, the then Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and A. P. Giannini, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Transamerica, together with the testimony of Eccles before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, set forth the reason for the Board's insistence on the fourth condition. The Board sought to block 'acquisition by Transamerica of stock in independent unit banks, especially when it constitutes a means of evading the requirements of the Federal agencies who will not permit its banks to establish additional branches.' Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, on H.R. 2634, 78th Cong. 1st Sess., p. 15. The Board was concerned not that Transamerica might purchase some shares of independent banks for the ordinary purposes of investment, but that it would buy into banks in order to acquire control, and thereby turn banks, though outwardly independent, into parts of its own banking network. The Board of Governors was therefore carrying out the policy underlying Con- dition No. 4 when it formally disavowed any intention to invoke that condition against respondent merely because of acquisition by Transamerica of an interest in the Bank, with no indication of subversion of its independence.2 This action by the Board was taken after it had satisfied itself that Transamerica's holding did not affect the Bank's control. The Bank had vigorously insisted on its continued independence, in urging upon the Board the harmlessness of Transamerica's ownership of some of the Bank's stock, and the Board, upon independent investigation found such to be the fact. Accordingly, the Board concluded that 'the public interest' called for no action.
A declaratory judgment, like other forms of equitable relief, should be granted only as a matter of judicial discretion, exercised in the public interet . Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 62 S.Ct. 1173, 86 L.Ed. 1620; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 297, 298, 63 S.Ct. 1070, 1072, 1073, 87 L.Ed. 1407; H.R.Rep. No. 1264, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2; Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (2d ed. 1941) pp. 312—14. It is always the duty of a court of equity to strike a proper balance between the needs of the plaintiff and the consequences of giving the desired relief. Especially where governmental action is involved, courts should not intervene unless the need for equitable relief is clear, not remote or speculative.
The actuality of the plaintiff's need for a declaration of his rights is therefore of decisive importance. And so we turn to the facts of the case at bar. The Bank has always insisted that it is independent of Transamerica; the Board of Governors has sustained the claim. The Bank stands on its right to remain in the Federal Reserve System; the Board acknowledges that right. The Bank disclaims any intention to give up its independence; the Board of Governors, having imposed the condition to safeguard this independence, disavows any action to terminate the Bank's membership, so long as the Bank maintains the independence on which it insists. What the Bank really fears, and for which it now seeks relief, is that under changed conditions, at some future time, it may be required to withdraw from membership, and if this happens, so the argument runs, the Comptroller of the Currency, one of the Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, has agreed with the Federal Reserve Board to refuse any application by the Bank for deposit insurance as a non-member.
Thus the Bank seeks a declaration of its rights if it should lose its independence, or if the Board of Governors should reverse its policy and seek to invoke the condition even though the Bank remains independent and if then the Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation should not change their policy...
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