Andres v. United States

• Decision Date: 26 April 1948
• Docket Number: No. 431,431
• Parties: ANDRES v. UNITED STATES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

333 U.S. 740

68 S.Ct. 880

92 L.Ed. 1055

ANDRES

v UNITED STATES.

No. 431.

Argued Feb. 5, 1948.

Decided April 26, 1948.

Mr. Oliver P. Soares, of Honolulu, Hawaii, for petitioner.

Mr. Vincent Kleinfeld, of Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Mr. Justice REED delivered the opinion of the Court.

On December 17, 1943, the petitioner, Timoteo Mariano Andres, was indicted in the United States District Court for the Territory of Hawaii for murder in the first degree. 18 U.S.C. §§ 451, 452, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 451, 452. The indictment recited that Andres 'on or about the 23rd day of November, 1943, at Civilian Housing Area No. 3, Pearl Harbor, Island of Oahu, said Civilian Housing Area No. 3 being on lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States of America * * * did * * * kill * * * Carmen Gami Saguid * * *.' Andres was tried before a jury which returned this verdict:

'We, the Jury, duly empaneled and sworn in the above entitled cause, do hereby find the defendant, Timoteo Mariano Andres, guilty of murder in the first degree.' He was sentenced to death by hanging. He appealed his conviction to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. That court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, unanimously. 163 F.2d 468. A petition for a writ of certiorari was filed in this Court and that petition was granted. 68 S.Ct. 266.

Four questions were presented in the petition for certiorari. Three of these we do not consider of sufficient doubt or importance to justify an extended discussion. We shall dispose of them before we reach what is, for us, the decisive issue of this case.

Andres contends that 18 U.S.C. § 567, 18 U.S.C.A. § 567,¹ as interpreted by Winston v. United States, 172 U.S. 303, 19 S.Ct. 212, 43 L.Ed. 456,² requires that the trial court explain to the jury the scope of their discretion in granting mercy to a defendant. In the Winston case, the judge had charged the jury that they could not qualify their verdict except '* * * in cases that commend themselves to the good judgment of the jury,—cases that have palliating circumstances which would seem to justify and require it.' 172 U.S. at page 306, 19 S.Ct. at page 213. This Court held that instruction erroneous. The Court read the statute to place the question whether the accused should or should not be capitally punished entirely within the discretion of the jury; an exercise of that discretion could be based upon any consideration which appealed to the jury.³ In h e case now before us, the trial judge gave the instructions set forth in the margin.⁴ It is clear that he left the question of the punishment to be imposed—death or life imprisonment—to the discretion of the jury. We hold that the trial judge's instructions on this issue satisfied the requirements of the statute.

It is next contended that the trial was unfair because the instructions quoted below⁵ indicated to the jury that the indictment against the petitioner reflected a finding by the Grand Jury that he was probably guilty of the crime of murder in the first degree. Perhaps the italicized language in the charge, read out of context, is mis- leading and it might have been better to omit it completely. However, when the language complained of is read in context, it seems to us that the petitioner had no read ground for complaint. No material error resulted from the words.

The petitioner also argues that the District Court for the Territory of Hawaii did not have the power to sentence him to death by hanging. 18 U.S.C. § 542, 18 U.S.C.A. § 542, provides: 'The manner of inflicting the punishment of death shall be the manner prescribed by the laws of the State within which the sentence is imposed. * * * If the laws of the State within which sentence is imposed make no provision for the infliction of the penalty of death, then the court shall designate some other State in which such sentence shall be executed in the manner prescribed by the laws thereof.' The petitioner contends that the phrase 'laws of the State' limits the statute to the forty-eight states and, consequently, provides for no method of inflicting the death penalty where that sentence is imposed by a district court sitting in a Territory.⁶ We reject that contention as being without merit. In many contexts 'state' may mean only the several states of the United States. Here, however, we hold that its meaning includes the Territory of Hawaii.

The last and most difficult issue raised by Andres is the question of the propriety of those instructions by which the trial judge attempted to explain to the jury the requirements of unanimity in their verdict. This issue is a composite of two problems: (1) The proper construction of 18 U.S.C. § 567, 18 U.S.C.A. § 567; and (2) the consideration of whether the instruction given clearly conveyed to the jury the correct statutory meaning.

Section 567 of 18 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C.A. § 567, reads as follows: 'In all cases where the accused is found guilty of the crie of murder in the first degree * * * the jury may qualify their verdict by adding thereto 'without capital punishment'; and whenever the jury shall return a verdict qualified as aforesaid, the person convicted shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life.' If a qualified verdict is not returned, the death penalty is mandatory.⁷ The Government argues that § 567 properly construed requires that the jury first unanimously decide the guilt of the accused and, then, with the same unanimity decide whether a qualified verdict shall be returned. As the statute requires the death penalty on a verdict of guilty, the contention is that the jury acts unanimously in finding guilt and the law exacts the penalty. It follows, that if all twelve of the jurors cannot agree to add the words 'without capital punishment,' the original verdict of guilt stands and the punishment of death must be imposed. The petitioner contends that § 567 must be construed to require unanimity in respect to both guilt and punishment before a verdict can be returned. It follows that one juror can prevent a verdict which requires the death penalty, although there is unanimity in finding the accused guilty of murder in the first degree. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that unanimity of the jury was required both as to guilt and the refusal to qualify the verdict by the words 'without capital punishment.' It interpreted the instructions, however, as requiring this unanimity.

The First Congress of the United States provided in an Act of April 30, 1790: 'That if any person or persons shall, within any fort, arsenal, dock-yard, magazine, or in any other place or district of country, under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, commit the crime of wilful murder, such person or persons on being thereof convicted shall suffer death.'⁸ This was the federal law, in the respects here relevant, until 1897. In that year Congress passed and the President signed the Act of January 15, 1897.⁹ That statute provided:

'That in all cases where the accused is found guilty of the crime of murder or of rape under sections fifty-three hundred and thirty-nine or fifty-three hundred and forty-five, Revised Statutes, the jury may qualify their verdict by adding thereto 'without capital punishment;' and whenever the jury shall return a verdict qualified as aforesaid the person convicted shall be sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for life.'

It is this language, substantially unchanged, which we must construe in this case.¹⁰

The reports of the Congressional Committees and the debates on the floor of Congress do not discuss the particular problem with which we are now concerned. ¹¹ There are, however, many expressions which indicate that the general purpose of the statute was to limit the severity of the old law.¹²

Unanimity in jury verdicts is required where the Sixth and Seventh Amendments apply.¹³ In criminal cases this requirement of unanimity extends to all issues—character or degree of the crime, guilt and punishment—which are left to the jury. A verdict embodies in a single finding the conclusions by the jury upon all the questions submitted to it. We do not think that the grant of authority to the jury by § 567 to qualify their verdict permits a procedure whereby a unanimous jury must first find guilt and then a unanimous jury alleviate its rigor. Therefore, although the interpretation of § 567 urged by the Government cannot be proven erroneous with certainty, since the statute contains no language specifically requiring una- nimity on both guilt and punishment before a verdict can be brought in, we conclude that the construction placed upon the statute by the lower court is correct—that the jury's decision upon both guilt and whether the punishment of death should be imposed must be unanimous. This construction is more consonant with the general humanitarian purpose of the statute and the history of the Anglo-American jury system than that presented by the Government.¹⁴

The only question remaining for decision is whether the instructions given by the trial judge clearly conveyed to the jury a correct understanding of the statute. There was a general charge that 'the unanimous agreement of the jury is necessary to a verdict.' Later, and the instructions on the specific issue under consideration can best be understood by the colloquy, the following took place:

'(At 3:45 o'clock, p.m., the jury returned to the courtroom, and the following occurred:)

'The Court: Note the presence of the jury and the defendant together with his attorney. I am advised by the bailiff that the jury wishes to ask the Court a question. Which gentlemen (sic) is the foreman—you, Mr. Ham? You are Mr. Ham?

'The Foreman: * * * The members of the jury would like to know if a verdict of guilty in the first degree was brought in, whether it would be mandatory on the part of the Judge to sentence the man to death, or hanging, or use his own discretion.

'The Court: Just a minute. I...