Com. v. Bryant
| Decision Date | 18 March 1975 |
| Citation | 334 A.2d 603,461 Pa. 3 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Donald BRYANT, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Louis M. Natali, Jr., Philadelphia, for appellant.
Arlen Specter, Dist. Atty., Richard A. Sprague, First Asst. Dist. Atty., David Richman, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., Melvin Dildine, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.
The Court being equally divided the judgments are affirmed.
EAGEN, J., filed an opinion in support of affirmance in which O'BRIEN, J., joins.
POMEROY, J., filed an opinion in support of affirmance.
ROBERTS, J., filed an opinion in support of reversal in which NIX, J., joins.
JONES, C.J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Appellant's statements were obtained during a period of unnecessary delay between arrest and arraignment in violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 130. 1 Under our decision in Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972), and its progeny, it was error to admit those statements at trial. I would therefore reverse the conviction.
Appellant was arrested at 5:00 p.m. on May 7, 1970, on a burglary charge unrelated to this murder prosecution. The police realized that appellant might be a suspect in the homicide and therefore transferred him to the homicide division where he arrived at 5:45. He was then questioned for one-half hour, and subjected to a polygraph test which lasted over an hour and a half. Finally, at 8:40 p.m., almost four hours after his arrest and three hours after his arrival at the homicide division, he admitted complicity in the murder. Interrogation continued until 9:25 p.m. during which appellant gave further details about the crime. Questioning resumed at 11:45 p.m. and continued until 12:15 a.m. During this phase of the interrogation appellant revealed still more details. At 1:20 a.m. appellant dictated a formal statement. Appellant was finally arraigned at 11:00 a.m. May 8, 1970.
The Commonwealth contends that the oral statements and the formal confession were admissible. It reaches this result by concluding that the first statement was not the product of unnecessary delay and then concluding that under our decision in Commonwealth v. Rowe, --- Pa. ---, 327 A.2d 358 (1974), the subsequent statements were 'merely' reiterations of the initial statement and therefore, not 'reasonably related' to delay. The Commonwealth's analysis is fallacious.
In Futch, we held that all evidence prejudicial to the defendant obtained during an unnecessary delay in arraigning the defendant is inadmissible at trial unless it has no reasonable relation to the delay whatsoever. Our cases clearly hold that delay solely for the purpose of obtaining incriminating statements is always unnecessary. Commonwealth v. Johnson, --- Pa. ---, ---, 327 A.2d 618, 619 (1974); Commonwealth v. Cherry, 457 Pa. 201, 204, 321 A.2d 611, 612--13 (1974); Commonwealth v. Williams, 455 Pa. 569, 573--74, 319 A.2d 419, 421 (1973); Commonwealth v. Dixon, 454 Pa. 444, 446--47, 311 A.2d 613, 614--15 (1973); Commonwealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa. 241, 244--46, 301 A.2d 701, 703--04 (1973). In this case, only the 45 minutes required to transport appellant to the homicide division can be attributed to any purpose other than the extraction of an incriminating statement. The bulk of the remaining three hours was spent interrogating appellant and administering the polygraph tests.
Clearly, under our precedents this delay was 'unnecessary.' Because appellant's initial statement was in response to the interrogation and the polygraph test, it must be concluded that it bore the required nexus to the unnecessary delay. Even if it were assumed that the subsequent statements were products of the initial statement, they too would be inadmissible as derivative products of 'unnecessary delay.'
However, the subsequent statements were not, in fact, products of the initial admission. In Rowe, supra, we held that where a defendant reveals 'all the relevant' details of his crime in an initial confession, subsequent statements which merely reiterate the same facts are products of the initial statement, not of the delay between the statements. --- Pa. at ---, 327 A.2d at 361--62.
In the present case, appellant's initial statement merely admitted complicity. After this admission, the police interrogated appellant for an additional 45 minutes during which further information was elicited. Later that evening, the police questioned appellant for thirty minutes more and it was only at the completion of this session, more than seven hours after appellant's arrest, 2 that the police were satisfied that they had enough facts to warrant the taking of a formal statement. Clearly, the admissions made during the interrogations subsequent to the original admission contained additional 'relevant details' and, therefore, cannot under Rowe be viewed as products of that admission. It follows that if the formal statement, the culmination of the evening's interrogation, was the product of any of the previous statements, it was the product of the final one, taken almost seven hours after arrest.
I would reverse the judgment of sentence and remand for a new trial.
NIX, J., joins in this opinion.
OPINION IN SUPPORT OF AFFIRMANCE
On June 9, 1972, the appellant, Donald Bryant, was convicted by a jury of burglary, aggravated robbery and murder in the first degree. On the murder conviction, the jury fixed the punishment at death. Post trial motions were subsequently denied by a court en banc. The sentence of death fixed by the jury was then 'set aside', and a sentence of life imprisonment was imposed on the murder conviction. Additional prison sentences were imposed on the burglary and robbery convictions, and it was directed that these particular sentences be served concurrently with each other, but consecutively with the life imprisonment sentence imposed. This one appeal was filed in this Court. 1
The sufficiency of the evidence to warrant the jury's verdict is not in issue, nevertheless, we have examined the record and find ample evidence therein to sustain the convictions. Suffice to say, the trial evidence established that on May 6, 1970, Bryant and three other young men brutally and repeatedly assaulted one Isadore Selez with blunt instruments in the course of perpetrating a robbery at the victim's junkshop in Philadelphia. As a result of the blows, Selez's skull was crushed like an egg and he died instantly.
The primary assignment of error involves the use at trial of evidence of an oral incriminating statement and a subsequent recorded incriminating statement made by Bryant to the police. Initially, it is maintained this evidence should have been suppressed 2 because it was the product of an unnecessary delay between arrest and arraignment. See Rule 118 (now 130) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. See also Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972). The pertinent facts disclosed by the record are these.
Bryant and others were taken into police custody about 5:00 p.m. on May 7, 1970, on an unrelated burglary charge. Because Bryant and his companions fit the descriptions given the police of those suspected of having committed the Selez robbery and killing, they were transferred to Homicide Headquarters about 5:45 p.m. for questioning about these crimes. Upon arrival Bryant was immediately advised of his constitutional rights as mandated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and was told he was suspected of having participated in the Selez robbery and killing. During a period of questioning lasting about one-half hour or until 6:20 p.m., Bryant denied any knowledge of, or involvement in, these crimes. He was then left alone until about 7:05 p.m., when he was requested to take a polygraph examination. He consented and such a test proceeded. When it was completed about 8:40 p.m., Bryant was told the test demonstrated he was lying. Bryant then changed his story and admitted he was involved in the Selez crimes. He was then questioned further until 9:25 p.m., during which period he detailed the robbery, the killing and his participation. From 9:25 p.m. until 11:45 p.m., Bryant rested and received medical treatment for an ankle complaint. From 11:45 p.m. until 12:15 a.m. on May 8th, he was questioned again and supplied additional facts. After a further period of rest lasting until 1:20 a.m., the police repeated the 'Miranda' warnings and began the recording of a formal statement. 3
Accepting there was an 'unnecessary delay' between his arrest and arraignment, Rule 118 (now 130), Pa.R.Crim.P., did not require the suppression of the evidence of Bryant's self-incriminations, because this evidence had no reasonable relationship to the delay. Cf. Commonwealth v. Rowe, --- Pa. ---, 327 A.2d 358 (1974). In order for this evidence to be excluded because of the delay, the accused must show prejudice resulting from the delay, i.e., 'a nexus between the delay and the challenged evidence . . ..' Commonwealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa. 241, 245, 301 A.2d 701, 703 (1973). Herein this nexus is missing.
Bryant's first self-incrimination occurred just less than three hours after his arrival at Homicide Headquarters. Aside from the questions submitted as part of the polygraph examination, the questioning during these three hours was limited to one-half hour. The subsequent formal statement was merely a reiteration of what Bryant had already admitted. Under these circumstances, the incriminating statements were not 'reasonably related' to the delay in arraignment. See and compare, Commonwealth v. Rowe, supra.
Bryant also argues his self-incriminations were the product of coercion, and, therefore, involuntary. He asserts two...
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