United States v. Enmons, Crim. No. 1918.

Decision Date16 December 1971
Docket NumberCrim. No. 1918.
Citation335 F. Supp. 641
PartiesUNITED STATES of America v. Travis Paul ENMONS et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

Gerald J. Gallinghouse, U. S. Atty., E. D. Louisiana, Julian R. Murray, Jr., Joseph R. McMahon, Jr., Asst. U. S. Attys., New Orleans, La., for the United States.

Sam J. D'Amico, D'Amico, Curet & Bush, Alex W. Wall, Dodd, Hirsch, Barker, Avant & Wall, Baton Rouge, La., for defendants.

E. GORDON WEST, Chief Judge:

Defendants have been indicted for alleged violations of the Hobbs Act, 18 U. S.C.A. § 1951. They have moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the acts alleged therein do not constitute a federal offense under that act.

Briefly stated, three of the defendants were members of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Union, Local 390, and one was a member of Local 2286 of the same union. The indictment charges them with conspiring to obstruct, delay, and affect commerce by extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act. The indictment particularly charges that:

"9. It was a part of said conspiracy that the defendants and the co-conspirators would obtain the property of the Gulf States Utilities Company in the form of wages and other things of value with the consent of the Gulf States Utilities Company, its officers and agents, such consent to be induced by the wrongful use of actual force, violence and fear of economic injury by said defendants and co-conspirators in that defendants and the co-conspirators did commit acts of physical violence and destruction against property owned by the Gulf States Utilities Company in order to force said Company to agree to a contract with Local 2286 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers calling for higher wages and other monetary benefits."

The indictment then charges the defendants with certain overt acts designed to cause the malfunctioning of transformers and to damage other property belonging to Gulf States Utilities Company. The defendants, in support of their motion to dismiss the indictment, take the position that the Hobbs Act, which makes it a federal crime to obstruct, delay, or affect interstate commerce by robbery or extortion, simply does not include acts of violence which might occur while employees are in the process of picketing an employer in furtherance of some lawful labor objective such as securing higher wages for persons employed by the employer pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. The defendants would distinguish this type of violence from that which is designed to extract from an employer by violence or threats of violence, money or property for which nothing is given in return, and to which the extorter is not entitled, such as wages for unnecessary and unwanted employees. The defendants argue that the Hobbs Act has never been held to include, and was never intended to include, activities, even though unlawful under State law, which have for their purpose the securing of higher wages for legitimate employees who are parties to a lawful collective bargaining agreement.

The Government, on the other hand, would interpret the Hobbs Act much more broadly. Their interpretation would include in the definition of "property" (1) higher wages sought by collective bargaining, and (2) the company's "right to negotiate" the wage questions without unlawful interference.

While there is, as far as this Court can determine, no definitive jurisprudential answer to this dispute, and while there is, in the legislative background of the Hobbs Act, inferences at least to support both sides, this Court, nevertheless, concludes that the Hobbs Act was not intended by the Congress to have the broad application for which the Government contends. This is not to say that there could not be cases in which violence or threats of violence which occur during labor disputes could be prosecuted under the Hobbs Act. It is to say, though, that under the circumstances of this case, the indictment does not charge an offense punishable under the Hobbs Act. The caveat contained in Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952), is apropos the present situation:

"The spirit of the doctrine which denies to the federal judiciary power to create crimes forthrightly admonishes that we should not enlarge the reach of enacted crimes by constituting them from anything less than the incriminating components contemplated by the words used in the statute."

The pertinent parts of the Hobbs Act under which defendants were indicted, read as follows:

"(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce, or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts to conspire so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined * * *.
(b) As used in this section * * *
"(1) * * *
"(2) The term `extortion' means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right." 18 U. S.C.A. § 1951.

Section (b) (3), then, in effect, defines "commerce" to mean interstate commerce.

In the case before us, the defendants were union members who were on strike against their employer, Gulf States Utilities Company. The main purpose of the strike was to secure higher wages for Gulf States employees. In the course of the strike, violence apparently erupted. It is alleged that the defendants either individually or in conspiracy, one with the other, caused damage to certain transformers and other property of Gulf States Utilities Company by firing into said property with high powered rifles or by draining oil out of certain transformers for the purpose of causing them to malfunction. There is no suggestion that the strike itself was illegal, nor is there any suggestion that the object of the strike, i. e., to secure higher wages from Gulf States Utilities Company was an illegal objective. The only question presented is whether or not the acts with which defendants are charged constituted "extortion" as contemplated by the Hobbs Act. We think they do not. The Hobbs Act grew out of the case of United States v. Local 807, etc., 315 U.S. 521, 62 S.Ct. 642, 86 L.Ed. 1004 (1942), which involved a prosecution brought pursuant to the Anti-Racketeering Act of June 18, 1934, 18 U.S.C.A. § 420(a). That statute made it a crime when:

"Any person who, in connection with or in relation to any act in any way or in any degree affecting trade or commerce, or any article or commodity moving or about to move in trade or commerce—(a) obtains or attempts to obtain, by the use of or attempt to use or threat to use force, violence, or coercion, the payment of money or other valuable consideration, or the purchase or rental of property or protective services, not including, however, the payment of wages by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee; * * *" (Emphasis added.)

The question involved was whether or not the exemption contained in the statute applied only to one who had attained the status of a bona fide employee prior to the time of the alleged violent acts aimed at seeking payment of wages, or whether the exemption also applied to one seeking to become a bona fide employee at the time the acts complained of were committed. The United States Supreme Court held that the latter category was also included within the exemption on the ground that these activities formed a part of regular activities of labor unions, and that the Congress did not intend to impair the ordinary, lawful activities of unions, one of which was to seek work for its members as well as to seek more favorable wages for people already employed. Shortly after this decision, the Hobbs Act was introduced as H.R. 6872 of the 77th Congress, 2d...

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5 cases
  • United States v. Burhoe
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • September 8, 2017
    ...an employer to accept certain provisions providing for higher wages in a CBA that was under negotiation. United States v. Enmons, 335 F.Supp. 641, 643 (E.D. La. 1971). While the violence was undoubtedly unlawful, the question before the Court was whether that violence qualified as Hobbs Act......
  • United States v. Enmons 8212 1193
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • February 22, 1973
    ...law) to achieve legitimate union objectives, such as higher wages in return for genuine services that the employer seeks. Pp. 399—411. 335 F.Supp. 641, William Bradford Reynolds, Washington, D.C., for appellant. Bernard Dunau, Washington, D.C., for appellees. Mr Justice STEWART delivered th......
  • United States v. Stofsky
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • December 21, 1973
    ..."the union had a right to disrupt the business of the employer by lawfully striking for higher wages . . ." United States v. Enmons, 335 F.Supp. 641, 646 (E.D.La.1971). The Supreme Court repeated those words and reasoned that there had been no wrongful use of force. "Wrongful," the Court sa......
  • United States v. Burhoe, 15-1542
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • September 8, 2017
    ...an employer to accept certain provisions providing for higher wages in a CBA that was under negotiation. United States v. Enmons, 335 F. Supp. 641, 643 (E.D. La. 1971). While the violence was undoubtedly unlawful, the question before the Court was whether that violence qualified as Hobbs Ac......
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