Still v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 71-C-392 Civ.

Decision Date08 December 1971
Docket NumberNo. 71-C-392 Civ.,71-C-392 Civ.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Oklahoma
PartiesMarvin A. STILL, Plaintiff, v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD CO., a corporation, Defendant.

Frank R. Hickman, Tulsa, Okl., for plaintiff.

William K. Powers, Tulsa, Okl., for defendant.

ORDER

DAUGHERTY, District Judge.

After removing this case from the Tulsa County District Court, Defendant raised by Motion a claimed defect of venue in the State proceedings initiated by Plaintiff herein. The Defendant asserts that it is a transportation company within the meaning of 12 Okl.Stat.Ann. § 135 pertaining to venue and claims that none of the requirements of that Statute have been met in this case.1

Although Plaintiff opposes Defendant's Motion, he makes no showing that any of the prescribed statutory conditions of venue have been met under 12 Okl.Stat.Ann. § 135. However, he claims that venue is established under 12 Okl.Stat.Ann. § 137 in that Defendant is a foreign corporation and has personal property and furniture in Tulsa County, the County in which this action was brought, and is also doing business in said County presenting an affidavit in support of the factual portions of this claim.2

The Court is required to decide the question of venue presented because if Plaintiff did not have proper venue at the State level, the State Court never had jurisdiction to be conferred upon this Court upon removal. Pittman v. Compton, 277 F.Supp. 772 (Okl.1968).

Both 12 Okl.Stat.Ann. § 135 and § 137 have been characterized as special venue statutes whose provisions prevail to the exclusion of general venue statutes. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company v. Coryell, 483 P.2d 1148 (Okl.1971). In that case it was held that venue could not be established as to an action brought against a foreign transportation corporation under a general venue statute over its objection. Although the point involved here, whether one special venue statute has any particular precedence over another special venue statute, was not involved in that case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in a syllabus by the Court stated:

"3. In an action against multiple joint defendants in which a foreign transportation corporation is a party the following specific venue statutes are applicable, and where such party objects to being sued in a county other than one specified in such statutes, the trial court must dismiss said action insofar as it concerns said party: 12 O.S.1961, § 135 and § 137 and 18 O.S.1961, § 471." 483 P.2d at page 1149. (Italics added.)

It appears that the precise question here, whether 12 Okl.Stat.Ann. § 135 has any precedence over 12 Okl. Stat.Ann. § 137, has not been directly decided by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, but that Court's expression that both Statutes (and also 18 Okl.Stat.Ann. § 471) may be used for the purpose of establishing venue against a foreign transportation corporation should not be ignored by this Court. It is thus concluded that neither Statute has precedence over the other when a foreign transportation corporation is involved but that the same are cumulative. If any one of the venue requirements set out in either Statute (or 18 Okl.Stat. Ann. § 471) is present, then venue is deemed proper as to a foreign transportation corporation. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company v. Coryell, supra.

12 Okl.Stat.Ann. § 137 permits suit against a foreign corporation in any county in which it has property. Defendant is a foreign corporation and Plaintiff has presented the affidavit of his attorney stating that Defendant has personal property and furniture in Tulsa County. This Statute also permits suit against a foreign corporation in any county in which it may be found. The word "found" has been equated with "doing business" but has also been said to require more. See Vol. 17 Words & Phrases, Permanent Edition at 662 et seq. and 36 Am.Jur.2d, Foreign Corporations, Sections 507-510 at pages 520-525. Defendant is a foreign corporation and Plaintiff's said affidavit also states that Defendant is "doing business" in Tulsa County. It follows that venue may have been in Tulsa...

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3 cases
  • Transure, Inc. v. Marsh and McLennan, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 22 Luglio 1985
    ...also defective. See Rossi Sheet Metal Works v. American Employers Insurance Co., 439 F.Supp. 895 (D.R.I.1977); Still v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 335 F.Supp. 78 (N.D.Ok.1971); Cobb v. National Lead Co., 215 F.Supp. 48 (E.D.Ark.1963); Mayner v. Utah Construction Co., 108 F.Supp. 532 (W.......
  • Steve Standridge Ins., Inc. v. Langston
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 10 Luglio 1995
    ...thus it is necessary for the federal district court to determine if venue was proper in the state proceedings. Still v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 335 F.Supp. 78 (1971); Cobb v. National Lead Co., 215 F.Supp. 48 (1963). From these cases, the owners conclude that Standridge was obliged t......
  • Rossi Sheet Metal Works v. AM. EMP. INS. CO.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island
    • 11 Maggio 1977
    ...venue is improperly laid at the state level the federal court, upon removal, is without jurisdiction, see Still v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 335 F.Supp. 78, 80 (N.D.Okl.1971). However, the Court cannot agree that venue was improperly laid in Rhode Island Superior Court. Venue in the Rh......

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