Park View Heights Corporation v. City of Black Jack

• Decision Date: 21 December 1971
• Docket Number: No. 71 C 15 (A).,71 C 15 (A).
• Citation: 335 F. Supp. 899
• Parties: The PARK VIEW HEIGHTS CORPORATION et al., Plaintiffs, v. The CITY OF BLACK JACK et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

335 F. Supp. 899

The PARK VIEW HEIGHTS CORPORATION et al., Plaintiffs, v. The CITY OF BLACK JACK et al., Defendants.

No. 71 C 15 (A).

United States District Court, E. D. Missouri, E. D.

December 21, 1971.

Samuel Liberman and Richard Baron, St. Louis, Mo., Jerry Pratter, Clayton, Mo., Melvin L. Wulf and Lawrence G. Sager, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York City, for plaintiffs.

Roy W. Bergman, Sheldon K. Stock, Clayton, Mo., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HARPER, District Judge.

This is an action pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 1343(3) and (4), in conjunction with the Fifth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1983, 2000d and 3617, against the City of Black Jack, Missouri, the members of the Black Jack City Council, the members of its Zoning Commission, its mayor and chairman of the Zoning Commission, in their official capacity, and as individuals. The plaintiffs are two not-for-profit corporations, the Park View Heights Corporation and the Inter-Religious Center for Urban Affairs, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as ICUA), and several individual plaintiffs purporting to represent the class of "lower and moderate income families, confined by economic and/or racial circumstances to the City of St. Louis and eligible for residence in Park View Heights."

From oral argument and an examination of the briefs and plaintiffs' inartfully drawn complaint, the court has concluded that the plaintiffs' claims fall into two categories: First, that the zoning ordinance of the City of Black Jack arbitrarily and irrationally excludes provisions for the erection of multi-family dwellings within the city, resulting in a drastic devaluation of the proposed site of the Park View Heights development in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; and second, that the purpose and effect of the zoning ordinance is to prohibit moderate and lower income persons, including members of the Negro race who do not even reside in St. Louis County, from moving into Black Jack in violation of their right to travel, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the supremacy clause, the Thirteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982), the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d), the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.), and the National Housing Act (42 U.S. C. 1401 et seq.).

The matter is now before the court on multiple motions by the several defendants. For purposes of these motions, the facts may be described as follows: In December, 1969, the ICUA acquired an option to purchase a parcel of land in an unincorporated portion of St. Louis County in furtherance of a plan to develop a federally assisted housing project. The Park View Heights Corporation, comprised of several religious entities and incorporated on August 13, 1970, was formed by the ICUA to effectuate this development. ICUA thereafter assigned its option to purchase the property in question to Park View Heights Corporation, who on September 8, 1970, acquired title as shown by photostatic copies of deeds furnished to the court. In June, 1970, Park View Heights Corporation received a contingent commitment of federal funds from the Department of Housing and Urban Development. When ICUA obtained its option to purchase this property, the zoning ordinance of St. Louis County applicable to this land permitted the construction of multiple-family housing. On June 25, 1960, members of the area of St. Louis County, now constituting the City of Black Jack, filed a petition for incorporation with the St. Louis County Council. The city was thereafter incorporated, and on August 7, 1970, began functioning as a municipality. On October 20, 1970, the City of Black Jack enacted the zoning ordinance which plaintiffs claim is unconstitutional. The ordinance zoned an area including the parcel of land owned by the Park View Heights Corporation to permit only single family dwellings.

When the City of Black Jack enacted its zoning ordinance, it did not, as the plaintiffs state, "rezone" the Park View Heights property. The incorporation of territory formerly part of a county is similar to the situation in which an area is annexed to a municipality. In State ex rel. Audrain County v. City of Mexico, 355 Mo. 612, 197 S.W.2d 301, 303 (1946), the Missouri Supreme Court said:

"The jurisdiction of the city attaches and that of the county ceases when rural or county territory is annexed to a municipality. St. Louis Gaslight Co. v. City of St. Louis, 46 Mo. 121, 133; Kurtz v. Knapp, 127 Mo.App. 608, 106 S.W. 537; 43 C.J. 142, Municipalities, Secs. 117, 120."

Courts have repeatedly held that any territory upon being annexed by a city goes into the city with the status of unzoned property regardless of what zoning status it occupied before annexation. See i. e., Louisville & Jefferson County P. & Z. Comm. v. Fortner, 243 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Ky.Ct.App.1951); Incorporated Village of Muttontown v. Friscia, 60 Misc.2d 1014, 304 N.Y.S.2d 664, 670 (N. Y.1969); Taylor v. Bowen, 272 N.C. 726, 158 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1968). It follows that the effect of the Black Jack ordinance was to "zone", not "rezone", the property in question.

In order to properly consider the motions to dismiss the court must determine which plaintiffs have standing to raise the questions which are ultimately to be decided in this case. The standard enunciated by the Supreme Court to test a party's eligibility for relief, and recently applied by the Eighth Circuit in Nebraska State AFL-CIO v. Nebraska, 445 F.2d 1333, is whether he has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663. This test was again reiterated by the Supreme Court in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947, wherein more helpful guidelines for determining standing were enunciated:

"The fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wished to have adjudicated." (l.c. 99, 88 S.Ct. at 1952)

"Such inquiries into the nexus between the status asserted by the litigant and the claim he presents are esential to assure that he is a proper and appropriate party to invoke federal judicial power." (l.c. 102, 88 S.Ct. at 1953)

Applying the above standards to this litigation, the court finds that only the Park View Heights Corporation has standing to raise plaintiffs' first claim, that the zoning ordinance is arbitrary and irrational and results in a taking of property without just compensation. Of the plaintiffs before this court, Park View Heights alone has a personal stake in the determination of this controversy, since it holds title to the land allegedly devaluated by the zoning restrictions. Although ICUA initially obtained an option to purchase the property whose value is at stake, it has since relinquished this option and fails to allege any retained interest. The individual plaintiffs representing the class are not personally harmed by the devaluation of the property. Albeit the class is a potential beneficiary should the building be erected, this is another question unrelated to a taking of property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. There is no nexus between ICUA and the individual plaintiffs' nonproprietary status and the claim of loss of property by an arbitrary and irrational use of police power.

If any of the plaintiffs have standing to raise the second federal question before this court, that the purpose and effect of the zoning ordinance is to exclude persons of...