Koki Hirota v. General of the Army Arthur Kenji Dohihara v. General of the Army Arthur Koichi Kido v. General of the Army Arthur v. 29, s. 239

• Decision Date: 02 December 1948
• Docket Number: 240 and 248,M,Nos. 239,s. 239
• Citation: 69 S.Ct. 157,335 U.S. 876,93 L.Ed. 418
• Parties: KOKI HIROTA v. GENERAL OF THE ARMY MacARTHUR et al. KENJI DOHIHARA v. GENERAL OF THE ARMY MacARTHUR et al. KOICHI KIDO et al. v. GENERAL OF THE ARMY MacARTHUR et al. isc. Distributed on Motions for Leave to File Nov. 29 and
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

335 U.S. 876

69 S.Ct. 157

93 L.Ed. 418

KOKI HIROTA

v GENERAL OF THE ARMY MacARTHUR et al.

KENJI DOHIHARA

v. GENERAL OF THE ARMY MacARTHUR et al.

KOICHI KIDO et al.

v. GENERAL OF THE ARMY MacARTHUR et al.

Nos. 239, 240 and 248, Misc.

Distributed on Motions for Leave to File Nov. 29 and Dec. 2, 1948.

Dec. 6, 1948.

Messrs. David F. Smith (Mr. George Yamaoka, of counsel) for petitioner, Koki Hirota.

Mr. David F. Smith, for petitioner, Kenji Dohihara. At Messrs. John W. Crandall and Ben Bruce Blakeney, for petitioners Koichi Kido.

The Court desires to hear argument upon the questions presented by the motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus. Action upon the motions for leave to file will be withheld meanwhile, and the motions are set down for oral argument on Thursday, December 16, 1948.

The CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice REED, Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, and Mr. Justice BURTON are of the opinion that there is want of jurisdiction. U.S. Constitution, Article III, Sec. 2, Clause 2.

Mr. Justice JACKSON has filed a memorandum stating his views.

Mr. Justice JACKSON.

Four members of this Court feel that the Japanese convicted of war crimes should have some form of relief, at least tentative, from this Court. The votes of these are not enough to grant it but, if I refrain from voting, they constitute one-half of the sitting Court. As I understand it, these Justices do not commit themselves as to whether there is any constitutional power in this Court to entertain these proceedings but only feel that they would like to hear argument to enlighten them in reaching a determination of that issue. They feel it so strongly that they not only favored grant of relief in conference, but, having failed, announce their dissent to the public—an interested section of which consists of our late enemies and allies in the Orient. This perhaps is all that these Justices could do consistently with the course that they have already taken in several German cases.¹ This is their right, and I point it out not to question the right but as one of the facts which confronts me in deciding my own course.

On the other hand, four other Justices are convinced, from their study of the question, that there is no constitutional jurisdiction whatever in this Court over the subject matter. To interfere and assume to review it would in that view constitute an unwarranted interference with delicate affairs that are in no way committed to the jurisdiction of this Court. These four Justices having satisfied themselves that this Court is without lawful power, have consistently refused to take action which would usurp it, even tentatively, in the German cases. Of course, they could not consistently, with equal justice under law, apply a different jurisdictional rule to these cases than they have to those of the Germans.

By reason of nonparticipation in the German cases, for reasons which are obvious, I remain uncommitted on the jurisdictional issues. My nonparticipation has prevented their resolution heretofore and I must decide whether another nonparticipation will prevent it now. The issue transcends the particular litigation.

This public division of the Court, equal if I do not participate, puts the United States before the worl , and particularly before Oriental peoples, in this awkward position: Having major responsibility for the capture of these Japanese prisoners, it also has considerable responsibility for their fate. If their plea ends in stalemate in this Court, the authorities have no course but to execute sentences which half of this Court tells the world are on so doubtful a legal foundation that they favor some kind of provisional relief and fuller review. The fact that such a number of men so placed in the United States are of that opinion would for all time be capitalized in the Orient, if not elsewhere, to impeach the good faith and to discredit the justice of this country, and to comfort its critics and enemies.

The other possible course is to assert tentatively a jurisdiction in this Court to stay and order hearings in these proceedings. This is likewise bound to embarrass the United States. On American initiative, under direction of the President as Commander-in-Chief, this country invited our Pacific allies, on foreign soil, to cooperate in conducting a grand inquest into the alleged crimes, including the war guilt, of these defendants. Whatever its real legal nature, it bears the outward appearance of an international enterprise, undertaken on our part under the war powers and control of foreign affairs vested in the Executive. For this Court now to call up these cases for judicial review under exclusively American law can only be regarded as a warning to our associates in the trials that no commitment of the President or of the military authorities, even in such matters as these, has finality or validity under our form of government until it has the approval of this Court. And since the Court's approval or disapproval cannot be known until after the event—usually long after—it would substantially handicap our country in asking other nations to rely upon the word or act of the President in affairs which only he is competent to conduct.

In this equal division each side's position is taken after long and frequent consideration and repeated public announcement in the German cases. The one group of Justices can hardly fail to proffer to the Japanese an opportunity to argue reviewability which they have consistently announced should be allowed to the Germans. Neither can the other side extend to the Japanese opportunities which they have consistently denied to the Germans. The fact that neither side in good grace can retreat puts to me disagreeable alternatives as to whether I should break the deadlock or permit it to continue.

I do not regard myself as under a legal disqualification in these Japanese cases under the usages as to disqualification which prevail in this Court. While I negotiated the international Charter under which the Nazi was criminals were tried and also represented the United States in that Four-Power trial, the Japanese were not tried under that Charter but under a later and, in respects relevant to the present...