Nicodemus v. Lampert

Decision Date30 October 2014
Docket NumberNo. S–14–0071.,S–14–0071.
PartiesKenneth Dale NICODEMUS, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Robert LAMPERT, Director, Wyoming Department of Corrections ; Eddie Wilson, Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary ; and Dotti Wixson, Appellees (Defendants).
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

Representing Appellant: Pro se.

Representing Appellees: Peter K. Michael, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Susan G. O'Brien, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, KITE, DAVIS, and FOX, JJ.

Opinion

DAVIS, Justice.

[¶ 1] Inmate Kenneth Nicodemus appeals from the denial of a Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion for relief from a district court order that dismissed a civil suit against three employees of the Wyoming Department of Corrections (DOC). We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] Nicodemus raises two issues, which we restate as follows:

1. Did the district court abuse its discretion by ignoring Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18, 294 P.3d 36 (Wyo.2013) (Bear Cloud II ), when it denied his Rule 60(b) motion?
2. Did his failure to receive the defendants' response to his motion deprive him of due process?
FACTS

[¶ 3] In 1992, Nicodemus pled guilty to two counts of first-degree murder and one count of felony larceny, for which he was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences and a sentence of eight to ten years to be served consecutively to the life sentences. Approximately five years later, while serving the first life sentence, he attempted to escape from the Wyoming State Penitentiary. A conviction for that offense netted Nicodemus an additional sentence of two to four years, to be served concurrently with his first life sentence.1

[¶ 4] In 2010, the legislature amended Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7–16–205(a) by creating a new paragraph (i) dealing with withholding from a prisoner's earnings:

Unless the prisoner is serving a sentence of death or life without the possibility of parole or is subject to mandatory savings under W.S. 25–13–107(b)(i), ten percent (10%) shall be credited to the prisoner's personal savings account within the correctional facility's trust and agency account, until the prisoner's account has a balance of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00). Once the prisoner's personal savings account balance reaches one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), the income otherwise distributed to the prisoner's savings account under this paragraph shall be distributed to the prisoner as provided by paragraphs (ii) through (vi) of this subsection. Funds in the prisoner's personal savings account shall be paid to the prisoner upon parole or final discharge[.]

2010 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 43, § 1. The statute prevents a prisoner from using the first $1,000 he earns for prison labor until he is paroled or released, when it is paid to him. Appellant asserts that the purpose of this statute is to assure that an inmate who has been paroled or finally discharged from his sentence has funds to pay expenses until he can find employment or another source of legitimate revenue so that he is not tempted or forced to steal or commit other crimes to keep body and soul together. He does not expect to ever be paroled or released, and he anticipates that he will die in prison. However, when the amendment went into effect in July of 2010, the DOC began withholding ten percent of Nicodemus' monthly earnings from penitentiary labor and crediting that amount to his mandatory savings account.

[¶ 5] On October 20, 2011, Nicodemus filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action in the district court for Carbon County. He asserted that Appellees violated his federal constitutional right to due process by placing his earnings in the mandatory savings account, from which he could not withdraw them without a hearing. He contended that Appellees lacked statutory authority to withhold his property from him because he was serving a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and that he therefore belonged to a class of inmates which the newly amended § 7–16–205 expressly excluded from its income-withholding provisions.

[¶ 6] The defendants moved to dismiss the original and an amended complaint. The district court granted the motion on March 14, 2012.2 The court concluded that the legislature's use of the phrase “life without the possibility of parole” in § 7–16–205(a)(i) had to be viewed in light of other statutory provisions relating to that subject, particularly § 6–10–301(c). In 2010, that subsection read as it had when it was enacted in 1996:3

A sentence specifically designated as a sentence of life imprisonment without parole is not subject to commutation by the governor. A sentence of life or life imprisonment which is not specifically designated as a sentence of life imprisonment without parole is subject to commutation by the governor. A person sentenced to life or life imprisonment is not eligible for parole unless the governor has commuted the person's sentence to a term of years.
1996 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 73, § 1.

[¶ 7] The district court noted that Nicodemus' life sentences were not designated as sentences of “life without parole,” and that the governor could therefore commute them to terms of years. Citing to Bear Cloud v. State, 2012 WY 16, 275 P.3d 377 (Wyo.2012) (Bear Cloud I ), the court concluded that, although commutation and subsequent parole from such sentences are rare, parole was nevertheless possible. It held that Nicodemus was not therefore serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, and that § 7–16–205 therefore empowered—and in fact required—the DOC to place a portion of his inmate income in his savings account until the balance reached $1,000.00, and to deny him the right to withdraw those funds from the account.

[¶ 8] Nicodemus did not appeal the order dismissing his case. Instead, nearly a year later, he filed a motion for relief from the order of dismissal under W.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) and (6). He claimed that the ruling was incorrect because it was based on this Court's decision in Bear Cloud I, which had since been vacated by the United States Supreme Court and then supplanted by our decision in Bear Cloud II.4 He relied upon language indicating that, for purposes of sentencing juveniles, a sentence to life as a matter of law allows no realistic possibility of parole because it depends upon executive clemency. Bear Cloud II, ¶ 36, 294 P.3d at 45–46.

[¶ 9] In late April of 2013, the district court denied Nicodemus' Rule 60(b) motion. The court observed that its earlier order of dismissal rested on the distinction in § 6–10–301(c) between life sentences which were and were not specifically designated as confining a prisoner to life without parole, and on its conclusion that the plain language of § 7–16–205(a)(i) must be said to have incorporated that distinction. The court also noted that it referred to Bear Cloud I in its order only to further explain the statutory nature of any life sentence that was not expressly designated by a sentencing court as being “life without parole,” and that consequently its explanation—and Bear Cloud I generally—were not the basis for its decision to dismiss Nicodemus' suit.

[¶ 10] Nicodemus timely appealed the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion.

DISCUSSION
The Ruling on the W.R.C.P. 60(b) Motion

[¶ 11] This Court reviews decisions disposing of Rule 60(b) motions for an abuse of discretion. We must determine whether the trial court's decision was reasonable when the record is viewed in the light most favorable to that decision and to the prevailing party. We will reverse an order denying a Rule 60(b) motion only if the movant establishes that the trial court was clearly wrong. Campbell v. Hein, 2013 WY 131, ¶¶ 8–9, 311 P.3d 165, 167 (Wyo.2013) ; Barron v. Barron, 834 P.2d 685, 687 (Wyo.1992).

[¶ 12] Nicodemus argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to recognize the significance of our Bear Cloud II decision to the question posed by his civil rights complaint—i.e., the meaning of the legislature's choice of the phrase “life without the possibility of parole” in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7–16–205(a)(i). Because the district court clarified that its ruling did not rely upon the two Bear Cloud decisions, we will first examine its interpretation of that language.

[¶ 13] Statutory construction presents a question of law that we examine de novo. In interpreting statutes, our primary goal is to determine the legislature's intent. We therefore construe each statutory provision in pari materia, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence according to their arrangement and connection. To ascertain the meaning of a given law, we also consider all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose and strive to interpret them harmoniously. We presume that the legislature has acted in a thoughtful and rational manner with full knowledge of existing law, and that it intended new statutory provisions to be read in harmony with existing law and as part of an overall and uniform system of jurisprudence. When the words used convey a specific and obvious meaning, we need not go farther and engage in statutory construction. Estate of Dahlke ex rel. Jubie v. Dahlke, 2014 WY 29, ¶¶ 36–37, 319 P.3d 116, 125–26 (Wyo.2014) (citing Rock v. Lankford, 2013 WY 61, ¶ 19, 301 P.3d 1075, 1080–81 (Wyo.2013) ; Redco Const. v. Profile Props., LLC, 2012 WY 24, ¶¶ 26, 37, 271 P.3d 408, 415–16, 418 (Wyo.2012) ).

[¶ 14] Until 1996, the only sort of determinate5 life sentence available in Wyoming was that characterized in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–2–101(b) as “life imprisonment according to law.” See Sincock v. State, 2003 WY 115, ¶ 12, 76 P.3d 323, 330 (Wyo.2003) ; Schultz v. State, 751 P.2d 367, 368 n. 1 (Wyo.1988). An inmate serving such a sentence could not be paroled under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7–13–402(a) (Michie 1995), which provided that the state board of parole was empowered to “grant a parole to any...

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